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Preface
At the end of 2015, the CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory produced a
White Paper [1] to present the main cybersecurity challenges that Italy had to
face in the next five years. The volume focused mainly on the risks arising from
cyber attacks and outlined a number of recommendations, including organisa-
tional ones.
The present volume is a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of
outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian research community
considers essential to complement and support those foreseen in the executive
decree on cybersecurity issued on February 2017, known as DPCM Gentiloni,
by the Italian government. Reading the volume does not require any particu-
lar technical skills; the text is accessible to anybody who knows how to use a
computer or surf the net.
The volume considers different aspects of cybersecurity, including: (i) the
definition of infrastructures and centres necessary to organise defence; (ii) the
actions and technologies to be developed to improve protection; (iii) the iden-
tification of the main technologies to defend; (iv) the proposal of a set of hori-
zontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management.
The focus areas and the action, which we hope will be developed in the next
few years in Italy, are complemented by a set of recommendations for the policy
makers, in charge of dealing with the challenge of digital transformation at the
country level. The recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive; they
focus on issues that we consider essential for the correct implementation of
a national cybersecurity policy. A policy that, by nature, must necessarily be
dynamic and constantly evolving according to technological, regulatory, social,
and geopolitical changes.
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Inside the volume, the reader will find boxes with a violet or grey back-
ground; the former ones are used in the introductory chapter and in the con-
clusions to highlight some concepts considered important; the latter ones are
used in other chapters to explain the meaning of some technical terms com-
monly used by professionals.
In conclusion, we would like to thank all the colleagues who have con-
tributed to this volume: a group of over 120 researchers from about 40 research
institutions and universities, unique in terms of number and excellence, repre-
senting the best of Italian research in the field of cybersecurity. Special thanks
go to Gabriella Caramagno and Angela Miola who have contributed to all the
phases of production of the book and to Sara Olson for her help in the transla-
tion from the Italian version. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the support
from the FILIERASICURA project.
Finally, we would like to point out that our editorial work required a signif-
icant rephrasing of the texts provided by colleagues; this reworking may have
partially misinterpreted their message or ignored some important aspects: we
apologise in advance.
Roberto Baldoni
Rocco De Nicola
Paolo Prinetto
Rome, January 15th, 2018
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CHAPTER
1
Role and Impact of
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is the second emergency in Europe, after climate change and be-
fore immigration. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude
Junker, pointed it out in his State of the Union address of 13 September 2017.
In fact, for several years now, Chancelleries all over the world have put cyber-
security at the top of their agendas. The blocking of business operations, the
surreptitious control of critical infrastructure services, the theft of intellectual
property or information crucial to the survival of a company are examples of
the major threats a country faces. The recent malware campaigns wannacry
and notpetya were the visible events of an impressive series of attacks in every
corner of the planet.
The cyberspace is the most complex thing that man has ever built: on one side, the
union of thousands of networks that make it difficult to even have a snapshot of who
is connected to it; on the other, the stratification of software programs and protocols
developed in the last forty years. This complexity generates vulnerabilities (software
errors, incorrect configurations and weaknesses in protocols) that are exploited by
cyber criminals to steal data or cause damage.
In an increasingly digitalised world, cyber attacks are alarming populations,
causing huge damage to the economy, and endangering the lives of citizens
when they affect distribution networks for essential services such as healthcare,
energy, transport, i.e., critical infrastructures of modern society. Just imagine
what might happen if all the traffic lights of a metropolis were suddenly turned
off, if the elevators were stopped, and if the ambulances could no longer re-
ceive the right address to reach the injured. In addition, a successful cyber at-
tack could also represent the point of no return for a company’s credibility, the
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development of its business and its ability to competitively sell products. A suc-
cessful cyber attack could also destabilise the stock market by plunging entire
countries into chaos, or block gas supplies in winter or the municipal waste col-
lection system; the resulting political scenario would be tragic.
The damage caused by cyber attacks often depends on an identifiable weak
link. The weak link of cybersecurity is the human factor. Man is now an integral
part of cyberspace and therefore the human factor is the most important and
unpredictable vulnerability of this macrosystem. One wrong click can in fact
destroy any technological line of defence of a single apparatus, an organisation,
or a country. It is people who are “fished” in a phishing campaign, who use the
name of their cat or wife as their password, who access the company network
with the same smartphone their children have played with. These people are
the first to open the doors for criminals to their organisation’s sites, networks
and databases, with dangerous and unpredictable effects.
Before the advent of cyberspace, the world was based on information
printed on paper or stored on isolated computers and placed in well-defined
physical perimeters. This world had developed very precise threat models, al-
lowing national, corporate and individual security, and protection policies to
be defined with sufficient clarity and detail. In cyberspace, however, threats
are constantly changing and many remain unknown for months or years before
they emerge. We therefore have to define security policies in a world where in-
formation on the threat is highly incomplete.
When you are immersed in the cyberspace, looking at it from only one point
of view signifies not truly being able to deal with the threat; vulnerabilities are
potentially hidden in hardware, firmware, application software, in addition to
organisational processes, contracts, and laws.
A country that does not put cybersecurity at the heart of its digital transformation
policies is a country that puts its economic prosperity and independence at serious
risk.
In Italy, entire sectors of excellence, such as the mechanic and the ship-
building industries, the made-in-Italy brand, tourism, agri-food commerce, and
transport could suffer heavy downsizing of turnover due to attacks in the cy-
berspace by sovereign states or competitors.
Beyond industry, attacks can also be waged against democracy. Fake news is
the evolution of attacks based on social engineering: created and disseminated
through the cyberspace, false information tends to confuse and destabilise the
citizens of a country by plunging them into an uncontrolled information space,
with an almost endless set of sources of news.
We must therefore be ready to monitor, as citizens, businesses and public
administrations (PA), our digital world. This monitoring must become our way
of life, just as the advent of cars has made it natural to look left and right before
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crossing a busy road. Keeping our devices under control, updating their soft-
ware, and knowing our possible vulnerabilities are all actions that must be part
of an endless monitoring process and continuous IT risk management.
The processes of monitoring and control cannot be uncoordinated, nor can
they be isolated from each other. They must be linked and coordinated through
multidimensional actions involving all the actors in play: public, private, re-
search. Awareness raising, training, communication, a common cyber language,
certification, and the use of best practices are just some of the cross-cutting as-
pects of this complex coordination.
In this context, the executive decree published in February 2017 and known
as DPCM Gentiloni1 comes into play in the area of cybersecurity. The text pro-
vides a strategic and operational national reference point where the public and
the private sectors, both military and civil, from large organisations to citizens,
can work in a coordinated way.
Coordination also allows for the development of projects aimed at guaran-
teeing the capabilities necessary for improving the country’s response and re-
silience to cyber attacks. The executive decree offers an articulated and mul-
tidimensional range of actions, initiatives, and cutting-edge centres, such as
the Cyber Security Centre (NSC), the National Centre for Research and Develop-
ment in Cybersecurity, the National Laboratory for Encryption, the National Cy-
ber Range, and the Centre for Evaluation and Certification. They are all pieces of
a complex mosaic that must be composed to support a national cyber policy. It
is thus important that the executive decree be translated as soon as possible into
concrete actions and that the necessary resources be made available in multi-
annual programmes, which, as will be seen in chapter 8, other countries have
already started a long time ago.
The new white book This volume was created with the aim of outlining a
set of project areas and transversal actions that the national research community
considers essential to complement and support those foreseen in the February
2017 executive decree.
Areas and actions typically contain various operational projects aimed at
both the public and private sectors. Each presentation includes motivations,
a brief state of the art, and a set of challenges and objectives to be addressed. In
this regard, it is assumed that a set of projects will be set up in order to provide
adequate and sustainable responses to each of the challenges and to achieve the
objectives.
The different project areas have been grouped into five operational areas:
1https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/DPCM-17-02-2017.pdf
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• Infrastructures and Centres — In this area, the tools and actions neces-
sary to secure the national internet network and data centres of the PA
are considered; in addition, some types of competence centres are pre-
sented to be activated on the national territory in order to strengthen the
defences of the country.
• Enabling actions — In this area, actions necessary to make the threat
management cycle safer are considered: from the protection of critical
national applications to the creation of a national threat repository, from
defence against different attacks (cybernetic, social, physical) to forensic
analysis, from system-wide risk management to active protection.
• Enabling Technologies — In this area, the design areas aim to strengthen
some of the basic technologies to be used to protect data, to limit attacks
and their effects and, in general, to increase the resilience of systems,
mostly resorting to the security by design paradigm. In particular, the area
deals with hardware architectures to guarantee higher levels of security,
encryption, blockchain, biometric, and quantum technologies.
• Technologies to Protect — This area presents the tools and actions needed
to protect some key technologies, such as wireless communications,
cloud services, functional system logic and, in the perspective of Industry
4.0, IoT, industrial control systems, and robots.
• Horizontal Actions — This area includes the tools and actions necessary
to ensure the protection of personal data, to raise the level of knowledge
and competence through training, awareness and certification projects
and to improve risk management at the company level.
After the presentation of the project ideas, the volume analyses their im-
pact on some of the cornerstones of digital transformation, highlighting how
democracy, finance, industry, tourism, and culture can benefit from a national
cybersecurity policy.
A chapter of the volume is then devoted to the presentation of the poli-
cies and actions undertaken by some key nations in European and international
contexts.
The final chapter presents a number of recommendations which, if fol-
lowed, will allow the country to properly respond to the challenge of digital
transformation. While not exhaustive, these recommendations focus on aspects
considered essential for a correct implementation of a cybersecurity policy at
the national level.
Necessary Synergies The implementation of projects, given the diversity of
the objectives and involved skills, will require a particular synergy between the
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world of research, government and industry, leveraging the appropriate mech-
anisms of public-private partnerships as well. In particular:
• The role of research in this context is basically linked to the study of new
solutions for each identified challenge. To complement theoretical re-
sults, it is necessary to create prototype systems aimed at a more rapid
industrialisation of solutions.
• Companies will play a fundamental role in the subsequent prototyping
and industrialisation within an integrated system of all the proposed so-
lutions. The relationship between research and industry must be circular,
in the sense that the definition of problems tackled must be shared; in-
novative approaches defined on the basis of scenarios and requirements
should be identified collaboratively; solutions developed, modified, and
refined on the basis of industrial experiences in the field. All of this will
enable us to achieve a timely and effective technology transfer.
• On the government side, we expect a definition of the necessary regula-
tory frameworks and the implementation of appropriate financing pro-
grams.
1.1 Impact of cyber attacks in Italy
Finance Ministers and central bank governors of the G7 countries, at the end of
the Bari meeting in May 2017, stressed the need to have statistically sound and
public databases on cyber attacks: how many, who carried out the attack, whom
and what they hit, the cost of the damage 2:
We acknowledge that cyber accidents are a growing threat to our
economies, and policy responses are needed that involve the en-
tire production system, . . . based on reliable, impartial, compre-
hensive and widely accessible data. . . . Definitions, methodologies
for data collection and sharing should, where appropriate, be co-
ordinated and consistent across countries and sectors, so that re-
sults be comparable.
Despite the fact that mass media periodically provide estimates of such
data, these estimates are almost never based on scientific collection methods.
There are some exceptions. In the United Kingdom the government led a sam-
ple survey covering the whole private sector: it shows that a little less than half
2https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/609186/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2017_main_report_
PUBLIC.pdf
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of all British companies were victims of at least one attack attempt in last year3.
In Italy, the Bank of Italy estimated that between September 2015 and Septem-
ber 2016, 45% of national companies were hit by some type of attack. The most
risky subjects are large companies, exporters, and operators working in a sector
with high-end technological intensity. In this regard, Table 1.1, taken from [16],
reports the percentages of Italian companies in the private non-financial indus-
try and services sector, with at least 20 employees, affected by one or more cyber
attacks between September 2015 and September 2016.
Table 1.1: Attacks suffered by Italian companies, September 2015 – 2016
Geographic area
North-West 44.2
North-East 47.3
Centre 52.3
South and Islands 35.9
Number of employees
20 – 49 42.7
50 – 199 48.4
200 – 499 56.0
500 or more 62.8
Technology intensity
High and medium-high 48.8
Low and medium-low 43.8
Effect of exports on turnover
Less than 1/3 43.0
Between 1/3 and 2/3 51.8
More than 2/3 48.5
Percentage on total number of companies 45.2
In the same target universe, in 2016 the expenditure on IT security was mod-
est: the median enterprise devoted only EUR 4 530 to attack prevention, i.e., 15%
of the gross annual retribution of a typical employee [16]. There were important
differences between sectors: the figure went as high as EUR 19 080 among ICT
companies, to decreased to EUR 3 420 among low technology companies. Al-
most all companies claim to use at least one anti-virus software, and two thirds
of employees are trained in the safe use of information technology; less diffused
is instead the practice of data encryption, performed by less than a third of non-
ICT companies.
3https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/609186Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2017_main_report_
PUBLIC.pdf
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Regarding damages caused by attacks, both British and Italian data show
that in most cases the direct economic impact is limited; in Italy, the costs of
repairing the affected systems and lost earnings resulting from the interruption
of activities exceed EUR 50 000 in only one instance out of one hundred cases.
The distribution of costs is highly asymmetric: on the one hand, the average
dimension of the phenomenon is more limited than what has been reported
from commercial sources, on the other hand few major accidents appear to be
responsible for a very large proportion of the overall economic damage. Mea-
suring the so-called tail phenomena poses methodology challenges; detection
methods and models should be developed to accurately quantify the cost of the
most serious attacks.
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the economic impact of
an attack is often not limited to the cost it imposes on the direct victim. In some
cases, for example when an infrastructure is affected, the extent is also clear to
non-specialists. In other cases, however, awareness is limited to specialists. In
particular, not all seem to have understood the extent to which the techniques of
indirect attacks are spread and leverage the vulnerabilities of a subject in order
to affect another. In this regard, see the two cases described below.
1. Indirect attacks involving Italian companies [80] — A company in the city
of Cuneo that produces pet food, with international customers, suffered
the theft of a list of customers and information about their supply rela-
tionship. Cyber criminals then contacted customers to notify a change in
the IBAN of the Piedmontese society; the plausibility of the communica-
tion was linked to the fact that to the e-mail an invoice with exact supply
amounts was attached. Of the four companies contacted, all Asian, three
credited the amounts requested to the IBANs indicated for a total of USD
200 000. Just one company, suspicious of the fact that the IBAN was not
linked to an Italian bank, called the company in Cuneo to double-check,
making it so aware of the fraud that took place.
2. Identity theft4 — A company from Turin in 2013 received an e-mail from
one of its (long-standing) Chinese suppliers, which communicated that
the company had changed banks. Without any further verifications,
the company paid to the would-be supplier about USD 60 000. Subse-
quent investigations identified a Nigerian citizen as the guilty party, who
had managed to steal data from the Chinese company’s email account.
Fraudsters escaped any control by depositing the stolen money into a
Thai account, from which the money was subsequently withdrawn in
cash from an ATM.
4“So I steal your identity on the web‘”, la Repubblica, 24/11/2014, (A. Longo).
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In many countries, including Italy, it is not clear who is responsible in cases
like this, except in events linked to personal data protection, payment services
and a few other economic activities. The possible reimbursements due from
vulnerable subjects to third party victims can be established only at the end of
long, complex and expensive legal proceedings. Therefore, many companies,
which are not particularly attractive to attackers and do not operate within a
regulated framework, are less motivated to protect themselves. The presence
of thousands of weak rings in the value chain affects the security of the cy-
berspace as a whole and sets the conditions for the proliferation of accidents
on a large scale, almost always conducted with indirect attack techniques (tar-
geted attack).
Vulnerability – Weaknesses present in a software or hardware element of a system
that can be exploited by an attacker to conduct an attack against the system itself.
Threat – Threats to the assets of a target entity which, based on malicious soft-
ware agents (threat agent) and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target, are able
to penetrate its computer system and/or network.
Targeted Attack – Targeted and deliberate attacks against a defined target, be it an
individual, an enterprise or a system.
There is a particular risk of weakening the competitiveness of small and
medium size enterprises. They clearly see the economic advantages of digiti-
sation, while they do not seem to fully understand the risks that the new instru-
ments entail. As highlighted in sections 6.2 and 6.3, it is particularly important
that appropriate cyber-hygiene practices are developed in these companies, i.e.,
behavioural habits which, at a very low cost, may nullify the most common at-
tack attempts. It is also essential that they acquire at least a minimum awareness
of their own vulnerabilities and of the operational modes typical of attackers.
Analysing the accidents reported in 2016, it is possible to provide a taxon-
omy of the main trends, see fig. 1.1 (resulting from the analysis of reports by
ENISA5,6,7 - apologies for some Italian text in the Table). This taxonomy is use-
ful to both policy makers and potential victims.
5https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/etl2015
6https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-
report-2016
7https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ce2016-after-action-
report
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	 minaccia	non	associata	alla	categoria	di	attaccante	
	 	
	 	
	 In	discesa	nel	2016	rispetto	al	2015	
	 In	ascesa	nel	2016	rispetto	al	2015	
	 Posizione	stabile	tra	il	2016	e	il	2015	
	 	
 Top	threat	utilizzati	e	Top	threat	agent	generalmente	coinvolti	nei	cosiddetti	Targeted	attack	
	 Top	threat	utilizzati	e	Top	threat	agent	generalmente	coinvolti	in	attacchi	cd	Common	ransomware	
	 Top	threat	utilizzati	e	Top	threat	agent	generalmente	coinvolti	in	cd	Common	attack	to	breach	data	
	 Top	threat	utilizzati	e	Top	threat	agent	generalmente	coinvolti	in	attacchi	DDoS	
	
Figure 1.1: Threat Agent, Attack Vector and Threat: trends based on accidents
reported in 2016
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1.2 European legislation
A recommendation, two communications, a proposal for a regulation and a pro-
posal for a directive: these are the legal instruments with which the European
Commission, together with the High Representative, has updated and strength-
ened its cybersecurity strategy. Some of these instruments are immediately op-
erational, others will become operational as soon as they are adopted following
the initiated legislative procedure8.
The initiative, announced by President Juncker in his speech on the “State
of the Union”, has a clear objective: to increase the resilience of the European
Union (EU) against cyber attacks and to create an effective deterrent to protect
the emerging cybersecurity single market with concrete actions, thus contribut-
ing to the construction of a solid and coordinated institutional structure at a
European and a national level. This is based on:
• a European Agency already in operation, the European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security (ENISA)9, whose mandate will be
made permanent and which is given new tasks and resources to take on
a more operational role directly in support of the European Commission
and Member States;
• a framework of rules for an EU security certification of ICT products, sys-
tems, and services, based on international standards on a voluntary ba-
sis;
• the Blueprint, i.e., principles and mechanisms, in terms of objectives and
methods of cooperation, to respond in a coordinated way to large-scale
cyber incidents and crises;
• the proposal to create a European network and a centre of research and
expertise on cybersecurity.
To be added to this list is the proposal for a directive to combat fraud and
counterfeiting by non-cash means of payment (credit and debit cards) in or-
der to provide a more effective enforcement and criminal law response. This
initiative is focused on the detection, tracking and repression of cyber criminals
involved in activities that mostly have a transnational dimension, such as terror-
ism and drug and human trafficking. The proposal also aims at defining actions
for a joint EU diplomatic response to harmful cyber activities and measures to
strengthen international cooperation on cybersecurity.
8https://ec.europa.eu/commission/state-union-2017_it
9https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/
library/deliverables/algorithms-key-size-and-parameters-report-2014/
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The broad scope of the initiative is shown in particular by the contents of the
communication devoted to the NIS Directive (see section 1.2.1) and its trans-
position, which includes a document full of operational indications. The Com-
mission’s concern, already expressed in its communication of 2016, is clear: as
the NIS Directive is the cornerstone of the European strategy on cybersecurity,
its implementation by the Member States must be based on a harmonised ap-
proach, aimed at avoiding misalignments and fragmentation that could com-
promise the efforts deployed thus far.
Hence, a series of concrete indications which constitute a kind of opera-
tional manual for the Member States in view of the deadlines of 9 May and 9
November 2018, for the transposition of the Directive and the designation of
operators of essential services, respectively.
First, Member States need to have a national cybersecurity strategy at their
disposal, aimed at defining both appropriate policy and regulatory objectives
and actions on the basis of a holistic and coordinated approach.
Another important aspect, to which the Commission’s document devotes
particular attention, is the identification of the persons to whom the rules of
the Directive apply. While Member States do not have to indicate digital service
providers, the designation of operators of essential services is a complex and
sensitive exercise. The Directive, in this respect, merely sets out the criteria to
be applied at the national level, in the hope that this will happen everywhere
in a consistent manner and that, where an operator provides services in differ-
ent Member States, there will be an agreement between them to regulate their
identification under the Directive. Regulatory approaches should not vary from
country to country. Moreover, Member States have the possibility to extend the
scope of the Directive and thus apply its rules (in terms of security requirements
and notification requirements) to sectors not directly covered by the Directive
as well, such as the PA (where these are essential services), the postal sector,
the food sector, the chemical and nuclear industry, the environment and civil
protection.
1.2.1 NIS Directive
The NIS Directive – Network and Information Security10 on network and infor-
mation system security is the first set of European security rules approved by the
EU. The Directive, which was adopted on 6 July 2016 and entered into force in
August 2016, deals mainly with three essential aspects: (i) strengthening cyber-
security management capacities in each EU Member State; (ii) increasing the
level of cooperation between EU Member States; (iii) strengthening cybersecu-
rity risk management and incident reporting strategies.
10http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32016L1148&rid=1
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The main objective of the Directive is to achieve a high common high level
of network and information security in all EU Member States and to achieve
greater cooperation between them to facilitate the information sharing on risks,
with particular reference to the management of cybersecurity incidents and re-
lated risks. In particular, it applies to providers of “essential services” operating
in critical sectors and to digital service providers and requires operators to take
measures for the management of cyber risks and the timely, albeit not tempo-
rally quantified, reporting of security incidents.
The Directive must be transposed into national law by May 2018, and each
Member State must identify the operators of essential services by November
2018.
More specifically, the NIS Directive sets out a number of network and in-
formation security requirements that apply to essential service operators and
providers of digital services – DSP11. With the aim of establishing a security
culture in sectors vital to the EU economy, these entities shall take appropri-
ate security measures and report serious accidents to the competent national
authority. Providers of essential services operate in the following sectors: en-
ergy, transport, banking and financial services, health, water, and digital infras-
tructures. Digital service providers include online markets, cloud services, and
search engines12.
One of the essential features of the NIS Directive is to build a solid founda-
tion for forming a European framework for network and information security: it
arises from the need for each Member State to secure its infrastructures and
ensure their operation in accordance with common rules and requirements.
To achieve this, each country must therefore align its security methods, ap-
proaches, and practices. This will prevent European companies from operating
within a fragmented environment and will facilitate and improve their efforts to
comply with these rules.
Finally, the Directive requires the designation at a national level of an IT
security authority and of a national Computer Security Incident Response Team
(CSIRT) for the management of cyber risks and notifications in case of major
incidents involving the critical infrastructures of each Member State13.
Essential and digital service providers are obliged to notify such events to
the competent authorities without undue delay and such notification must in-
clude information to allow the determination of the severity of incidents and
their possible impact14.
11https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nis-directive-and-
national-csirts
12http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6270_it.htm
13https://clusit.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/direttiva_nis.pdf
14http://community.forumpa.it/system/files/file_upload/Direttiva%
20NIS%20-%20allegato%201.pdf
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1.2.2 The GDPR legislation
On 27 April 2016, the EU adopted the EU Regulation 2016/679 on data protec-
tion, known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), applicable from
25 May 2018 and intended to replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Its
main purpose is to reform, update and modernise European data protection
legislation so as to make it more robust and coherent. Directly applicable with-
out the need for any transposing legislation, it will have a significant impact on
each Member State and on the rules in force at the national level. The GDPR is
presented in detail in section 6.1.1.
1.2.3 The cPPP in cybersecurity
As part of the Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission set up
a contractual Public-Private Partnership (cPPP) on cybersecurity, with the main
objective of strengthening the EU cybersecurity industry and stimulating the
European cybersecurity sector. This aim is pursued through several actions:
• bringing together industrial and public resources to improve European
industrial policy on cybersecurity, focusing on innovation and following
a jointly agreed strategic research and innovative path;
• promoting trust between Member States and industrial actors by foster-
ing bottom-up cooperation in research and innovation;
• helping stimulate the cybersecurity industry by aligning offer and de-
mand of products and services, enabling the industry to efficiently ad-
dress the future needs of end users;
• using the Horizon 2020 funding to maximise the impact of available sec-
tor funds through better coordination and focus on some technical pri-
orities;
• improving the visibility of European excellence in R&D in cybersecurity
and the protection of digital personal data.
The public part of the cPPP is represented by the European Commission,
while the private part by the Belgian law association European Cyber Security
Organization (ECSO)15, which currently has about 220 members.
The establishment of the cPPP has enabled the increase in the budget avail-
able in the remaining part of Horizon 2020 from EUR 200 million to EUR 450
million. A similar increase seems to be possible for the next framework pro-
gramme.
15www.ecs-ppp.eu
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The vastness and complexity of the problems related to cybersecurity re-
quire cooperation between subjects that, even if with distinct roles, operate in
this sector, which is so strategic for the security and economy of the EU and Italy.
There is no doubt that for a more effective management of the whole matter it
is necessary to develop every possible synergy that facilitates such integrations.
In this context, hence, the ECSO represents a strategic element of the utmost
importance.
1.3 Italian legal framework
The entry into force of the NIS directive and GDPR - as well as the by now bound-
less potential extent of the damage that a cyber attack can cause - have imposed,
at the Italian level, a revision of the so-called Monti’s decree of 24 January 2013
(hereinafter DPCM Monti)16 This Prime Minister’s decree, together with the Na-
tional Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security17 and the National Plan for
Cyberspace Protection and ICT Security of 201318, essentially constituted the
Italian national strategy for cybersecurity.
This section examines both the new Prime Minister’s decree of 17 February
2017 (also called in Italian DPCM Gentiloni)19, which replaces Monti’s decree
providing guidelines for cyberspace protection and ICT security, and the update
of the National Plan, also published in 201720.
1.3.1 Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s Decree (February 2017)
The first Prime Minister’s decree outlining a national cybersecurity architecture
was the one adopted by Mario Monti in 2013. Monti’s decree was extremely im-
portant because it came at a time when reaction activities against cyber threats
were marginal and unstructured. However, the decree introduced a cumber-
some crisis management, due to the high number of interactions among vari-
ous public actors – among them, different departments of the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers, several Ministries and the AgID (Agency for Digital Italy) –
16http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/03/19/13A02504/sg
17https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/quadro-strategico-nazionale-cyber.pdf
18https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/piano-nazionale-cyber.pdf
19https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/DPCM-17-02-2017.pdf
20https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/piano-nazionale-cyber-2017.pdf
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which were hardly prone to be coordinated in short timeframes, as required by
wide-ranging crises, thus slowing reactivity.
The revision of the Prime Minister’s decree was therefore driven, on the one
hand, by the need to reduce complexity and, on the other, by the necessity to
prepare for the transposition of the NIS Directive. This Directive aims at sys-
tematising the various competences involved in crisis management.
Therefore, Gentiloni’s decree is aimed to optimize crisis management and
centralise responsibilities. This is achieved by strengthening the role of the Se-
curity Intelligence Department (DIS); the Italian Secret Services - as national cy-
bersecurity governance holder. DIS hosts the National Cybersecurity Board -
Nucleo di sicurezza cibernetica - (NSC), an interagency and intergovernmental
cybersecurity operational body, chaired by one of the DIS Deputy General Di-
rectors.
The NSC is composed of representatives from the Interministerial Commit-
tee for the Security of the Republic (CISR)21 Administrations, the Intelligence
Community (DIS, AISE, and AISI), the Department of Civil Protection (to man-
age the kinetic effects of a cyber event) and AgID, as well as the Prime Minister’s
Military Advisor. In case of a national cyber crisis, the Board is also integrated
with representatives from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Infrastructures
and Transports, and the Fire Department. NSC competences on cyber crisis pre-
vention, preparation and management, strengthened DIS role, posing it at the
core of the national cybersecurity architecture, as shown in fig. 1.2.
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team – Official bodies responsible for
providing assistance on risk prevention and incident response, whose priority tasks
are::
• taking charge of requests for assistance in case of security incidents (at-
tacks) on networks and information systems;
• processing of alerts and responding to cyber attacks: developing technical
analysis, exchanging information with other CERTs, contributing to techni-
cal studies;
• creating and maintaining vulnerability databases;
• disseminating best practices on risks reduction measures;
• coordinating with other entities: operators and Internet service providers,
and international CERTs.
This is reflected in the Italian transposition law of the NIS Directive, which
foresees that a “single point of contact” will be established within the DIS in or-
21Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of In-
ternational Affairs, Intelligence System.
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der to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication at EU level. The
law also foresees the establishment of an Italian CSIRT that will take up the du-
ties of the National CERT and of the Public Administration CERT.
The Prime Minister’s decree also introduces a National Evaluation and Cer-
tification Centre - Centro Nazionale di Valutazione e Certificazione - (CVCN) to
be set up at the Ministry of Economic Development (MISE), to evaluate the se-
curity of products and devices to be deployed within national critical infrastruc-
tures.
National	Cybersecurity	Architecture	
NSC	
CERT-PA	
DIS	
Ministry	of	
Defence	
National	Center	of	Evaluation	
and	Certification	(CVCN)	
CERT-N	
National	
Digital	
Agenda	 Ministry	of	
Interior	
Industries	PA	
Art.	7	bis	D.Lgs.	174/2015	
Prime	Minister	
CISR-T	
CIOC	
AISE	 AISI	
AgID	 MiSE	
CISR	
CNAIPIC	
via	SMD-RIS	
Figure 1.2: National architecture for cybersecurity as provided by Paolo Gen-
tiloni’s executive decree (2017)
1.3.2 National Plan for Cyberspace Protection and ICT
Security
The new National Plan for cyber protection and information security22 ((here-
inafter referred to as the National Plan) implements the Gentiloni’s decree and
aims to update and simplify national cyber crisis management and reaction
procedures. In this regard, the National Plan states the following:
22https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/piano-nazionale-cyber-2017.pdf
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The need to allow a rapid and effective qualitative leap of the na-
tional cyber architecture has made it necessary to identify an es-
sential nucleus of priority initiatives, selected on the basis of the
needs that have informed the activity of revision of the National
Strategic Framework and National Plan and taking into considera-
tion the evolving national and international legal requirements.
The awareness that cyber threats and risks cannot be addressed through
a bureaucratic and slow decision-making process is at the basis of the above-
mentioned initiatives. An action plan was therefore created with the aim of
making the national cybersecurity architecture more effective and efficient; the
box below summarises the main actions.
Action Plan – from executive decree by Gentiloni
• Revision of the National Cyber Security Management Board (NSC)
• Shortening of the chain of command for cyber crisis management
• Optimisation of the national cybersecurity architecture, through the sup-
pression/merger of bodies
• Progressive unification of CERT-N and CERT-PA
• Establishment of a National Evaluation and Certification Centre at the Min-
istry of Economic Development
• Creation of a Foundation or a Venture Capital Fund
• Establishment of a National Centre for Research and Development on Cy-
bersecurity
• Institution of a National Cryptography Centre.
This action plan aims to increase both cyberspace protection through the
implementation of appropriate security policies and to streamline decision-
making in the event of a cyber crisis. Both operational lines call for developing
organizational, procedural and technical tools. These include: the certification
of ICT devises, the development of a public-private partnership through forms
of venture capital funding, the launching of National Centre for Research and
Development in Cybersecurity and of a National Cryptography Centre.
In addition, the National Plan aims at stimulating a further qualitative leap
in terms of cooperation capabilities between public actors and private sector
operators. The detailed list of the eleven operational guidelines of the National
Plan is reported in the next box.
19
Operational guidelines of the Italian National Plan
1. Strengthening intelligence, police, civil protection, and military defence ca-
pabilities
2. Enhancing organisational preparedness of, coordination and dialogue be-
tween private and public stakeholders
3. Promoting cybersecurity culture, education and training
4. Enhancing international cooperation and organising cyber exercises at Na-
tional level
5. Strengthening the readiness of national bodies competent for incident pre-
vention, response and remediation
6. Updating the legislation according to technological developments and en-
suring compliance with international obligations
7. Granting compliance with standard security requirements and protocols
8. Supporting industrial and technological development
9. Fostering effective strategic and operational communication
10. Ensuring rationalisation of financial resources
11. Implementing a national system of Cyber Risk Management.
1.3.3 National Cybersecurity Management Board - Nucleo per
la Sicurezza Cibernetica - (NSC)
According to Gentiloni’s decree, the Cybersecurity Management Board (NSC) is
responsible for preventing, preparing for a national cyber crisis, for declaring
such a crisis, as well as for coordinating the response and recovery activities
carried out by competent administrations in compliance with Prime Minister’s
decisions.
The NSC, through the DIS Director General, keeps the Prime Minister con-
stantly informed on crisis developments. The Prime Minister is supported by
the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic (CISR), which
is responsible for providing guidance in case of national security crisis.
The Unit ensures all the necessary contacts, for crisis management, with
cybersecurity entities of other States, the NATO, the EU, and other international
organisations.
The Board can declare a situation of cyber crisis whenever a cyber event, for
its dimension, intensity or nature cannot be dealt with by the single Administra-
tion concerned but it requires a coordinated approach, which is ensured by the
NSC.
The Board is supported by an “Early warning and Cyber Incident Response
Unit”, to operate 24/7, that receives information related to relevant cyber events
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for prevention and reaction initiatives, as well as any information useful for a
cyber situational awareness. This information currently come from:
• National CERT together with the Public Administration CERT: they get
alert respectively from private operators, the European Union and na-
tional CERTs, and from Central and Local Public Administrations;
• National Cybercrime Centre for Critical Infrastructures Protection
(CNAIPIC): other than Interpol and Europol, it gets alerts from national
critical infrastructures;
• Defence CERT: it receives information about cyber events from the NATO
Computer Incident Response Capability (N-CIRC);
• Intelligence Community.
1.4 Protection of Italy’s assets
The cyber threat has in fact created a time-space collapse that has essentially
destroyed the threat management models as conceived so far. The enemy can
be anywhere, at no more than a hundred milliseconds away from you; a single
enemy, with even only an average cyber capability, can simultaneously attack
thousands of a country’s strategic assets. This is why we need a new way of in-
terpreting national security, which should also consider the cyber protection of
the country by an operational coordination plan that must be flexible, adaptable
and have a very short chain of command, i.e., fast in the response. Although it
can be improved in some respects, the above mentioned points are all qualities
found in the executive decree by Gentiloni.
Figure 1.3 represents the overall picture of the public and private assets of
Italy: from the Ministries constituting the CISR, from critical infrastructures to
the industrial system, and finally to the citizens. Raising the country’s level of se-
curity and resilience necessarily requires an increase in the level of security and
resilience of each of the components of the overall framework. The closer you
are to the middle of the picture, the more you need to increase response coor-
dination and speed. The sector with inadequate defences becomes, in fact, the
weak link of the entire country system. The levels of security are peculiar to the
specific asset. While, for example, citizens are required to maintain an adequate
form of cyber-hygiene, the CISR is required to have an extremely sophisticated
and articulated security infrastructure with rapid response times.
It is advisable to immediately highlight how, in order to minimise the conse-
quences of an attack, a sequence of operations must be activated in the shortest
possible time by the NSC and by its operational players (see fig. ??) as stated
in the National Plan. These actions include, for example, the detection by the
target asset of the ongoing attack, the notification of the attack to the NSC, the
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Figure 1.3: Overview of public and private Italian assets
assessment done of the threat entity, the identification of potentially attacked
assets and actions to be taken, their communication by the NSC to the assets
involved, and the application of appropriate countermeasures by these assets.
To deal with the threat caused by the collapse of the cyberspace, it is neces-
sary to reduce the transit times of relevant information from any point in fig. 1.3
to the point where it can be handled appropriately, bringing to the heart of the
system only those events that threaten national security in terms of the eco-
nomic, political and scientific interests of the country. A sort of nervous system
of the Italian platform overlying the assets shown in fig. 1.3. This nervous system
is formed by the constituencies of NSC operational players and by the Centres of
Competence dealt with in section 2.3.
In general, the operational projects within the various focus areas presented
in this volume are aimed, in their entirety, at raising the level of security and/or
the resilience of one or more national assets.
1.5 Deterrence in cyberspace
Deterrence plays an important role in the preparation of cybersecurity tools. It
aims to curb an attacker by making him think about the cost of his attack and
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is characterised by two components: the defence and the counter-attack23. The
first tends to raise the level of defence of a system with the aim of increasing the
cost of the attack disproportionately, in order to make it unprofitable. The sec-
ond serves to “scare” the attacker, who must be sure that his attack will trigger
an answer (retaliation) capable of inflicting a punishment on him that is greater
than what he himself considers acceptable.
Deterrence – Prevention of an action through a credible threat of retaliation with
consequences of unacceptable size to the attacker and/or through operations that
lead to the belief that the cost of the action exceeds the perceived benefits.
The component of the counter-attack in the deterrence concept worked well
in the nuclear context as the punishment the attacker would suffer could be
catastrophic for him. Furthermore, the investment in nuclear weapons is such
that only a few countries are able to possess them and the attribution of an at-
tack becomes a relatively simple matter. This has led to the establishment of
international treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear power is very different from cyberspace, where cyberspace
weapons can potentially be in anybody’s hands, copied and spread through-
out every part of the planet in just a few hundred milliseconds. In addition, in
the cyberspace, an individual can launch a huge number of attacks and the at-
tribution of responsibilities is a very complex and error-prone process thanks
to the possibilities of anonymity that the network offers. These characteristics
make it difficult to set up cyber weapon non-proliferation treaties. Finally, even
if an attack can be attributed, the damage that could be inflicted with a cyber
counter-attack would not be as catastrophic as a nuclear counter-attack and the
attacker could accept to take the risk.
As a result, to date defence represents the only possible deterrent in the cy-
ber world. The project areas and actions presented in the following chapters are
a way to raise the level of cybersecurity (the defences) of the country and there-
fore act as an implicit deterrent to a cyberspace, where attacks are already an
endemic factor.
23https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=798700
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CHAPTER
2
Centres and
Infrastructures
To make Italy more resilient to cyber attack campaigns, a robust national cy-
berspace must be developed. This can by done by strengthening the national
internet service and consolidating PA data centres to reduce the attack surface
area and secure both data and applications of national interest. In addition, the
country’s defence capacities must be developed by creating a network of cyber-
security centres, distributed throughout the country and, in some cases, spe-
cialised in specific market sectors. The centres must range from R&D to com-
petence and support centres for industrial sectors, from information analysis
centres to CERTs. These centres must be equipped with an adequate critical
mass in terms of resources and staff, with appropriate professional profiles. Fi-
nally, centres pursuing similar goals should be networked and their operations
orchestrated in order to amplify their resilience effect on the country as a whole.
2.1 Italian Internet
We are now so used to having easy access to the internet that the lack of con-
nectivity represents a major inconvenience in living our daily life. This makes
the internet an indispensable asset for social life and for most of the country’s
strategic activities, characterising it as an indispensable service of public utility
and as a critical infrastructure, on a par with distribution networks for electric-
ity, water, and so forth.
The internet is a great network, indeed, an immense network and being able
to have a complete map of it is very difficult if not impossible, due to the com-
pletely decentralised and highly dynamic nature that characterises its growth,
as well as to the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the technological solutions
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and parties involved. This makes it extremely hard to define a security perime-
ter and, consequently, to identify protection strategies and the points for their
implementation.
To understand the reason behind the above statement and to assess its con-
sequences, it is necessary to understand how the internet is structured and how
it has evolved over time. The components that constitute the network are the so-
called Internet Service Providers (e.g., TIM, France Telecom, Unidata, Deutsche
Telekom, Fastweb, Interoute, Tiscali) hereinafter called ISPs. The links constitut-
ing the meshes of the net are links between ISPs (e.g., a link could exist between
Fastweb and Interoute or between TIM and France Telecom). For economic,
technical, and logistical reasons, these links are constantly changing over time.
In addition, the existence of each link is known, in principle, only to the two par-
ties who implement it. Some of these connections are made in places designed
to be meeting points (IXP - Internet eXchange Point) between ISPs, while others
are set up in places known only to stakeholders.
The presence of the myriad of connections set up as described above, using
the most disparate transmissive technologies (fibre optic, radio, satellite, etc.),
ensures that the internet is extraordinarily effective in adapting to faults and
failures and to the geomorphological characteristics of the sites. On the other
hand, the internet’s fully distributed nature and the lack of a global vision of
the network expose it to attacks which bring about two types of adverse effects:
the fraudulent diversion of traffic, in order to analyse it without the need for
direct access to equipment or terminal lines (with an obvious impact on the
confidentiality and/or integrity of data), and the disruption of critical services
(Denial of Service) for significant time periods. The asymmetric nature of the
threat, the complexity of the infrastructures involved and the porosity of the
security perimeter make it essential to strengthen the defence, containment,
and response capabilities of the system.
2.1.1 State of the art
The protocol used for routing traffic between internet ISPs is the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)1. Within the scope of monitoring methodologies, the collection
of the traffic routes defined by BGP is a key and enabling tool for improving
knowledge of the structure of the internet. At present, among the few BGP data
sources available on connectivity among the approximately 60,000 ISP internet
components are the Route Views project at the University of Oregon 2 and the
RIPE-NCC project3. The routing data made public by these projects are, how-
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271
2http://www.routeviews.org/
3https://www.ripe.net/analyse/internet-measurements/routing-information-
service-ris
26
ever, partial (as they mostly represent the point of view of large ISPs) and in-
complete, both in terms of the internet as a whole and in terms of the specific
features of the Italian internet infrastructure.
Considerations of this kind lead various organisations to carry out continu-
ous monitoring of the internet and to equip themselves with increasingly so-
phisticated analysis instruments, including tools for predictive analysis. For
example, in the USA the CAIDA (Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis) 4,
which is largely funded by the DHS and the NSF, continuously monitors the
internet with tools ranging from routing traffic control to the analysis of sus-
picious signals picked up by the network, with systems that recall the ones
adopted in radar signals analysis. In Europe, the RIPE-NCC provides a wide
range of services to the community, ranging from data on reachability of some
points in the network to data on the actual use of IP addresses.
2.1.2 Challenges
Unfortunately, there are no services that allow for the following actions to be
carried out at a national level:
• Continuous surveillance of particular portions of the internet considered
to be critical (e.g., related to energy, transport, transport, financial ser-
vices, information) in order to promptly detect early preparatory experi-
ments for targeted or large-scale malicious attacks;
• Highlighting internet traffic routing anomalies which may be caused by
operations aimed at information theft;
• Checking the status of key points in the network, such as IXPs or the land-
ing stations of the major intercontinental traffic routes;
• Detecting, in real time, actions aimed at preventing large sections of the
population from using the internet.
The realisation of services such as those mentioned above requires address-
ing numerous research challenges, encompassing both methodological and
technological-application issues.
First of all, there is a scale problem due to the impossibility, or extreme dif-
ficulty, in implementing traffic inspection and filtering controls and policies at
a central level (and therefore on a limited number of strategic points of the net-
work), as a result of the traffic volumes involved and the technological limits of
the current security enforcement equipment (NG firewall, Intrusion & anomaly
detector, etc.) with respect to transmission technologies. In other words, if on
4http://www.caida.org/home/
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the one hand it would be perhaps effective (although in many ways highly ques-
tionable) to introduce control points on trans-frontier links, limiting the size of
the intervention perimeter, the technologies used on such links (to the state-
of-the-art multiples of 100 Gbps, soon tera-speed connections), which by their
very nature are intended to support large volumes of traffic, make both an on-
line (and wire-speed) deep payload inspection of the packets transmitted and
any selective blocking/filtering of those packets unfeasible. In practice, at the
state-of-the-art there is at least one order of magnitude difference between the
processing capacity of security equipment and the forwarding capacity of trans-
mission equipment. The same applies to IXPs. This implies the need to shift the
focus of security, and therefore the control and intervention points, towards the
periphery of the network, typically on the distribution component, and there-
fore in greater proximity to the resources to be protected. This essentially intro-
duces three needs:
• to multiply the number of security monitoring and management devices,
with more pulverisation of the resulting architectures;
• to provide for the coordination of these systems with a view to imple-
menting defence and containment strategies and policies that are both
unitary and effective, and based on a sufficiently large scale;
• to introduce algorithmic intelligence and advanced analysis capabilities
in monitoring, detection of anomalies and threat containment activities,
in order to overcome the current technological limits through a better
vision and understanding of phenomena, through the adoption of a situ-
ation awareness logic.
Phishing – Internet fraud in which the attacker tries to deceive the victim by in-
ducing him/her to provide personal information, such as access credentials, bank
account and credit cards details. It is typically done by sending e-mails, which may
be more or less targeted, that imitate the graphics and settings of banking or postal
sites with which you are required to provide your personal data.
2.1.3 Objectives
It is important to develop a holistic, coordinated and multi-dimensional ap-
proach to protecting the internet infrastructure at a national level. This ap-
proach must also be characterised by a unity of intent among the actors involved
and must be able to automatically (or at least semi-automatically) detect, con-
tain and, where possible, prevent attacks in a timely manner, making it possible
to identify their real origins, facilitating backward tracking and the identification
of their responsibilities.
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Spear Phishing – A particular type of phishing carried out by sending fraudulent
e-mails to a specific organisation or person. The purpose of these attacks is typi-
cally to gain access to confidential financial information or to industrial, state, or
military secrets.
Three major design objectives are identified and described below, to be
achieved over a period of three to five years:
• Collection of the BGP routing of Italian ISPs — In order to eliminate po-
larisation problems and due to the lack of BGP routing information, it is
necessary to increase the number of routing collection points, involving
small and medium ISPs - which make up the leaf nodes on the internet
- in the process as much as possible. This is to outline the BGP peering
ecosystem by creating a complete description of the Italian internet net-
work from the BGP point of view. Achieving this goal means, therefore,
having reliable data to which algorithms can be applied for the correla-
tion and extraction of reliable and securely usable information.
To achieve this objective, a number of actions must be taken gradually.
The first step would involve building an architecture expressly aimed at
collecting the Italian ISPs’ BGP routes. At a later stage, it will be necessary
to set up a collection system on a statistical basis of the traffic exchanged
between ISPs, in order to get a clear and accurate picture of the Italian
BGP ecosystem, including peering data, and therefore of the paths actu-
ally covered by traffic among Italian ISPs.
Having acquired a solid knowledge of the Italian internet infrastructure
and the paths covered by the traffic that runs on it, it makes sense, in the
first place, to implement a monitoring and alerting system for the most
critical Italian targets. The alerts generated by this system must be col-
lected, analysed in real time, and correlated with each other in appro-
priate traffic control/monitoring centres able to reliably detect attacks
such as hijacks, route flaps, and hostile traffic routes and, consequently,
to apply threat mitigation and containment strategies. The BGP protocol
could still be used to implement deflection mechanisms by providing for
blackholing or cleaning and re-injection of affected traffic flows into the
network.
• Monitoring of traffic insisting on DNS — In order to improve the stabil-
ity and security of the Italian internet infrastructure, with modalities re-
lated to those described in the previous point, we need to monitor and
collect the traffic that insists on DNS, with the intent to detect phishing
campaigns and identify the traffic that can be traced back to botnets and
DDoS attacks. In Italy, a similar project has been started by the .it Registry
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of the Istituto di Informatica e Telematica of the CNR of Pisa, while, at the
European level, by the Dutch ccTLD organisation.
• Information Correlation — Methodologies and tools already available on
the market, based on data mining and machine learning techniques,
should be enhanced in order to enable the extracting information of
various kinds from the many available data sources. This information
should include traffic routing data, data from active measurement net-
works, data from passive readings, data related to DNS operation and
background activities on unused address areas (internet radiation), and
data on traffic flows. In addition, the proposed solutions should make it
possible to target anomalies in specific areas of the internet and/or spe-
cific traffic routes. Getting such in-depth data could involve, for example,
placing targeted active measurement devices in strategic points.
2.2 National Network of Data Centres
European public administrations are investing a large amount of resources to
digitalise all of their processes and services. In doing so, they are facing dis-
parate and sometimes antithetical challenges. In fact, governments need to in-
vest a significant proportion of taxpayers’ money to consolidate and expand
their service portfolio, but, at the same time, their budgets are increasingly
tighter. In order to strike a true balance between these requirements, it is im-
perative to provide services based on new technologies and on their effective
and efficient use.
Data Center Consolidation – The use of technologies, methodologies and strate-
gies to make IT infrastructures more efficient. In general, the objective is to re-
duce the footprint of one or more data centres, streamlining the use of hardware
resources in order to reduce operating costs and the chances of successful cyber
attacks.
Very often, however, the framework of the actual technological assets in use
is quite different. The reality is that the IT infrastructures available to many gov-
ernmental organisations are outdated and, in many cases, fragmented between
several local departments. In these instances, the technical staff in charge of
infrastructure management do not have access to an appropriate training pro-
gram to acquire the expertise needed to use next-generation technologies, and
there appears to be a lack of development projects in line with the latest techno-
logical and methodological innovations. In some cases, it is therefore difficult
to implement policies aimed at standardising the systems and applications used
in different territorial departments, a situation that often prevents even a mere
reliable census of the applications or the versions/setups in use.
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Similar considerations apply to the data acquired, processed, and stored in
the current IT systems of many government organisations. There is actually a
high degree of heterogeneity in the organisation and management of data, with
twofold consequences: on the one hand, it is difficult to make applications used
by different organisations interact and exchange data and, on the other hand,
the confidentiality and security of critical data are at risk from a procedural and
legal point of view.
A major challenge faced by the public sector, both at the national and Euro-
pean level, is therefore to undertake a process of digitisation aimed at the cre-
ation of a national network of data centres based on cutting-edge information
technology and methodologies. This process of infrastructure consolidation will
enable more consistent services, in which it will be easier to implement effective
management/evolution and security policies, thanks to the reduction of sur-
faces and possibilities of attack from the outside, while at the same time allow-
ing government organisations to implement interoperability processes that are
of real benefit to citizens. This consolidation process will furthermore signifi-
cantly reduce public spending.
Consolidation is already recognised as a key aspect for the modernisation
of public administrations. The Three-Year Plan for Informatics in Public Ad-
ministration 2017–2019, created by the AgID and by the Digital Transformation
Team5,6, coordinates a group of activities whose investment amounts to about
EUR 4.6 billion. In this plan, processes to consolidate the hardware and soft-
ware infrastructure are seen as one of the tools to reduce, earlier than expected,
the annual expenditure related to ICT infrastructure in the PA by at least 50%.
Consolidation is also a great opportunity to raise the quality standards of
the national IT infrastructure, with significant impacts on many fronts. In the
field of security, for example, moving applications to a confined environment
through consolidation can allow for the implementation of effective access con-
trol policies and reduce the number of attack vectors and exposure to vulnera-
bilities. When implementing these measures aimed at increasing the level of
security, care must be taken not to affect the responsiveness of applications and
services and the quality of the end-user experience.
2.2.1 State of the art
Technical tools such as virtualisation, which currently forms the basis for the
Cloud Computing paradigm and consolidation projects in a wide range of appli-
cation fields, have been available since the 1960s [42]. They allow you to put into
5https://pianotriennale-ict.italia.it/
6http://www.agid.gov.it/sites/default/files/documentazione/
circolare_three-yearplan_24.6.2016._def.pdf
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operation, on the same physical machine, multiple “virtualised execution envi-
ronments” in complete isolation, giving the impression that each application is
running on a dedicated physical environment. This is a fast-growing practice,
in the world of the PA as well, to the point where it can be estimated that by
2020 there will be a global increase of at least 16% in critical systems migrated
to Cloud environments, with the aim, among others, to increase security levels
[57].
Many of the major organisations providing services to large user bases are
concentrating the commissioning of their respective applications on no more
than 3-4 data centres, which in turn can be expanded. At the European level, by
the end of 2013, Spain and the UK had shifted more than 40% of their PA infras-
tructure to virtualised IT systems7. According to the same estimates, in the same
year, France had already begun a transformation process that demonstrated the
migration to centralised virtualised systems at more than 30% complete, while
Italy was only at 13%. However, Italy can aim for a reduction from more than
4,000 data centres to less than 100 in the coming years.
At the same time, implementing a consolidation project without knowing
in detail which applications should be consolidated and why is a process des-
tined to fail. It is estimated that in 2014 more than 30% of consolidation projects
worldwide did not achieve their objectives [27].
In Italy, as part of the three-year plan, the AgID has set stringent targets for
2018. In particular, it is expected that it will be necessary to identify the min-
imum requirements for SaaS solutions for the PA to be deployed on the Cloud
infrastructure by the end of the year. This infrastructure will be subject to a
strategic study during the year to define its technical and organisational require-
ments. At the same time, public organisations with an infrastructure that is el-
igible to be shortlisted to become a “National Strategic Hub” will be identified,
and a few of them will be selected to start a pilot project for testing the infras-
tructure and migration (or adaptation) of data centres.
2.2.2 Challenges
Consolidation projects for large scale applications and systems are difficult,
complex, expensive and not immune to failure. Their success typically results
from detailed and coordinated planning between key parties: network, applica-
tion, infrastructure and human resource managers.
Technically, there are a number of false beliefs that often undermine the
success of consolidation projects. An important aspect, in fact, is that consoli-
dating towards an infrastructure that is constituted by the theoretical minimum
7IDC: “Business Strategy: Western Europe Government Sector IT Cloud Computing
Trends”, 2012-2013,2013.
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of computational resources is not necessarily the optimal solution. Often, in
fact, acting in this way does not leave room for future growth, or it could be dis-
covered later that optimisation is not guaranteed, for example, by the number
of software licenses needed to support the operation of services. At the same
time, it is essential to identify the operating characteristics of the applications
hosted, in order to determine which and how many of them can be consolidated
on the same physical environment, while ensuring the non-interference of the
respective performance indexes. This characterisation must be performed ver-
tically, taking into account computational resources, storage space, bandwidth
availability at the level of the network infrastructure, available hardware and the
features of all middleware components that support the operation of a modern
portfolio of software applications.
Similarly, it seems important to rationalise the range of software applica-
tions used by PAs, in order to support the development of certified software
according to defined and integrated standards. To this end, Consip has al-
ready created guidelines 8 for the adoption of applications supplied according to
the Software as a Service paradigm, which takes into account the current tran-
sitional situation in which the technical/organisational directives for a single
market for the PA are still being defined.
When we talk about massive consolidation projects, it is critical to be able
to take complete inventory of what is necessary to migrate to the new infras-
tructure, document the metrics of the use of services and performance, and es-
timate the usage and load growth trends. It is important to consider solutions
that will limit the future expansion of the data center surface area from the out-
set, because such an expansion would entail critical security flaws. The “forward
consolidation”, i.e., the one that also takes into account future prospects, allows
for substantial savings and a high profitability index of the invested capital, even
many years after the conclusion of the consolidation plan.
2.2.3 Objectives
For the effective implementation of a multi-level national data centre network
for the PA, taking into account all the strategic and methodological possibilities
described above, several objectives need to be pursued:
• Carrying out a large-scale census of the physical infrastructures owned
by the PAs and the most common middleware components used to sup-
port the provision of offered services9. In this regard, the AgID explicitly
8Consip: “Provisions for the Procurement of Services “Software as a Services” for the
Cloud of Public Administration” October 10, 2017.
9http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/14/17A08400/sg
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clarifies10 the need to carry out a census in order to produce statistical in-
formation regarding the main IT installations at a national, regional, and
local level, to identify all the main hardware and software components
and to provide data/ information useful for the rationalisation of infras-
tructures. It will thus be possible to outline a medium-term strategy to
enhance and rationalise the information assets of PAs and to drastically
reduce infrastructure costs, so that efforts to secure applications can be
concentrated on a limited number of products.
• Developing new methodologies and techniques to assist experts in un-
derstanding the characteristics of the workload of applications that will
have to be involved in a consolidation process, considering the infras-
tructure vertically, from physical hardware to virtualised hardware, up to
the single application, including the various middleware components.
This can be done on several fronts, using both more traditional mod-
elling techniques, such as analytical or simulative, and techniques based
on machine learning.
• Promoting the training of new generations of system engineers (includ-
ing through the creation of ad hoc study tracks) who understand the
workings of complex systems in a vertical way and are familiar with the
characteristics of real systems (physical ones), who comprehend the sup-
port provided by Operating Systems for running applications in virtu-
alised environments and modern software stacks that allow for services
to be provided to PA users. This training path will allow public organi-
sations to make use of the skills of the new generations to maintain the
complex and critical infrastructure of a network of national data centres,
whose implementation is essential to allow significant economic savings,
provide increasingly higher security levels, and ensure responsiveness,
high performance, and scalability towards ever increasing growth.
2.3 National, Territorial, and Vertical Competence
Centres
This section presents all the structures deemed necessary to increase the re-
silience of companies, public organisations, and the country as a whole, in rela-
tion to cyber attacks. These structures will be the basis for the coordination work
needed to strengthen Italy’s cybersecurity. Specifically, three different types of
centres should be created:
10https://www.censimentoict.italia.it/it/latest/docs/circolari/
2017113005.html
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• National Centre for Research and Development in Cybersecurity (CNRSC)
— Its main tasks are advanced research, the development of architectures
and applications, and various kinds of actions on a national scale;
• Territorial Competence Centres in Cybersecurity — Distributed through-
out the territory, covering metropolitan, regional and interregional areas,
they should mainly manage innovation in the cyber field and take care of
technology transfer, training, consultancy, and support to local compa-
nies, local authorities, and citizens;
• Vertical Competence Centres in Cybersecurity — Each of them should fo-
cus on specific market sectors such as, for example, energy, transport,
financial markets, etc.
Cyber Range – Virtual ranges dedicated to the training of security professionals,
consisting in controlled environments and systems, typically based on virtualisa-
tion, that lend themselves to a wide variety of uses:
• Individual training and refresher courses on cybersecurity through practical
exercises;
• Training and assessment of the skills of operators’ teams through exercise;
• Design, development and testing of new cybersecurity tactics, techniques
and procedures;
• Evaluation of the defence capabilities of a system.
Territorial and vertical centres can include one or more elements, such as
CERT, Cyber Range (institutional, academic or specialist), cybercrime law en-
forcement structures, Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO),
certification laboratories, and Hardware Security and Trust specialist laborato-
ries (analysed in detail in section. 4.1). This would lead to the creation of specific
networks of CERTs, ISAO, structures dedicated to countering cybercrime and
dedicated and/or certification laboratories that should have, as their star point,
the appropriate national body: the postal police for combatting cybercrime, in-
telligence agencies in the case of ISAOs, MISE in the case of certification labo-
ratories, the unified CERT in the case of the CERT network, and the CNRSC for
dedicated specialised laboratories.
In addition to the territorial support centres, it would be desirable if, follow-
ing the example of the English, the French and the Germans (see chapter 8), a
number of research centres of excellence, located throughout the national terri-
tory, were identified and financed, whose star point would be the National Cen-
tre for Research and Development in Cybersecurity. These centres should also
focus on basic technologies essential for cybersecurity, such as artificial intelli-
gence, machine learning, data analytics, operating systems, compilers, software
engineering, distributed systems, hardware architectures, etc.
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2.3.1 National Centre for Research and Development
According to the provision in the executive decree by Gentiloni, it is imperative
to activate a National Centre for Research and Development in Cybersecurity: a
centralised, multidisciplinary structure, with an adequate critical volume of re-
sources and staff, partly governmental and partly linked to the world of research,
able to carry out activities that can only be implemented by such a structure, to
start the process of implementation of the National Plan for cybernetic protec-
tion and cyber security (illustrated in section 1.3.2). This centre should have no
commercial purpose and should assist the government in activities of analy-
sis, scientific research, technological scouting, and system engineering, follow-
ing the example of the US Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDC). Such a structure will have to attract researchers and public and pri-
vate (national) investors to develop cutting-edge research on topics of strategic
national interest in the cyber domain.
The CNRSC will have to work in close synergy with universities and scien-
tific research centres, cooperating with centres of excellence scattered through-
out the country, in order to make the best use of their expertise and to provide
highly innovative services to government organisations, public administrations,
and the research system. In doing so, it should take into account the interna-
tional reference landscape and the industry’s best practices.
The CNRSC must be the national flagship and work closely with its counter-
part centres in England, France, Germany, and the United States. In addition, it
should play the role of a National Centre of Excellence in Europe in the context
of the EU cybersecurity programmes as established, for instance, in the Cyber-
security package11 and in the EU cybersecurity certification framework12.
2.3.2 Territorial Competence Centres
In order to adequately support digital innovation in enterprises and in the pub-
lic administrations and to enable them to face the challenges that cybersecurity
poses, it is necessary to start effective mechanisms of technology transfer, train-
ing, consultancy, and support to local companies, local public administrations,
and citizens. To this end it is necessary to activate a network of Territorial Com-
petence Centres in Cybersecurity (CTCC) distributed throughout the territory, at
metropolitan, regional or interregional levels, according to the needs of the ter-
ritory in question.
11https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-
2017-477_en
12https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-cybersecurity-
certification-framework
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These centres will need to leverage the close partnerships established at the
local level between universities, public research institutions, private companies,
and public organisations. Such collaboration is certainly a key success factor,
as it is able to not only reduce the costs of the innovation process, but also to
extend the scope of innovative projects, taking advantage of the complementar-
ities of the involved realities, through appropriate synergies.
To achieve these objectives, it is necessary that each CTCC has an adequate
number of researchers, operators, and technicians able to guarantee the spec-
trum of multidisciplinary skills needed to face and master the complexity of in-
novation in the cyber environment. Each centre must have initial financial sup-
port guaranteed for staff and infrastructures for at least five years. This support
can then be scaled down, assuming that, from at least the third year onwards,
each centre will have acquired a significant co-financing capacity through ser-
vices to enterprises and the PA and through technology transfer activities.
The main tasks of each CTCC shall be defined according to the specific local
production activities and could include:
• Services and Consultancy — (i) Providing services and advice to compa-
nies, in order to support them in their innovation processes and help
them to protect their know-how, physical and virtual assets, and intellec-
tual property, as well as to improve their offering and competitiveness;
(ii) Managing local cybersecurity observatories for sharing information
on attacks between government bodies, ensuring proper data confiden-
tiality.
• Support — (i) Supporting operators/managers of critical infrastructures,
according to the criticality of provided services; (ii) Supporting the efforts
of businesses and local authorities, aimed at obtaining security certifica-
tions for hardware and software components.
• Strategic Territorial Projects — (i) Identifying and managing research and
technology transfer projects of local strategic interest, which may involve
setting up consortia of research institutions, universities, and industrial
organisations; (ii) Participating, including through the consortia men-
tioned above, in national and international initiatives and calls for pro-
posals.
• Training — (i) Organising various levels of local courses and seminars
and promoting lifelong learning activities for local businesses and local
authorities; (ii) Contributing to the increase of knowledge at all levels,
including citizens’ awareness of cybersecurity issues; (iii) Providing sup-
port to companies regarding the strengthening of their defence capabili-
ties, and the testing and evaluation of their defence tools, in part poten-
tially through the creation and management of local Cyber Ranges.
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2.3.3 Vertical Competence Centres
The Vertical Competence Centres in Cybersecurity (CVCC) are the answer to the
need, expressed by some specific sectors (energy, transport, healthcare, finance,
etc.), to have ad hoc centres for the development of dedicated activities, such as
CERT, ISAO, Cyber Range, Research Centres, Certification laboratories, cyber-
crime, business support, etc.
ISAC USA: Main sectors covered – Automotive, Aviation, Communication, Defense
Industrial Base, Defense Security Information Exchange, Downstream Natural Gas,
Electricity, Financial Services, Emergency Management & Response, Healthcare
Ready, Information Technology, Maritime, Multi-State, National Health, Oil & Gas,
Real Estate, Research & Education Network, Retail, Supply Chain, Transportation,
Water.
As an example, the tasks related to the development of an ISAO are sum-
marised below, while other activities mentioned above are dealt with in other
parts of this volume. Information sharing is the basis of any cybersecurity strat-
egy: the availability of timely, complete, and reliable information enables deci-
sions that are more informed and accelerates protection actions in steady-state
conditions, as well as detection, response, containment, and recovery actions
in times of crisis. For this reason, many countries have set up coordination
structures between the public and the private sectors, tasked with exchanging,
analysing, and sharing information on cybersecurity. Examples include the In-
formation Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC) established in the Netherlands13
and in the USA, the Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO)14
and the nodes of the British Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership
(CISP) program15.
ISAO USA: Interest Information – Key Factors Indicators, Vulnerability Informa-
tion, Courses of Action, Incidents, Threat Actors, Tactics Techniques and Proce-
dures, Campaigns, Analytical Reports, Threat Intelligence Reports, Security Advi-
sories and Alerts, Operational Practices.
In the United States, ISACs were first established as a private initiative
brought together by category to share industry information on best practices
and on security in general. Above the ISACs, the National Council of ISACs was
founded, which guarantees inter ISAC sharing and connection with government
bodies. President Obama then founded the ISAO, which are also sector-specific,
but coordinated by the federal government.
13https://www.ncsc.nl/english/Cooperation/isacs.html
14https://www.dhs.gov/isao
15https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cisp
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In Italy, the Italian Ministry of Communications founded in 2006, at the Is-
tituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni, a Telecommunications ISAC, which acted
as a third party guarantor and in which all Italian telecommunications operators
participated. This ISAC operated for one year in the form of a “pilot”, after which
it should have been officially regulated. The technologies available at that time
did not allow for automated anonymisation; sharing and analysis were therefore
carried out manually, which was feasible thanks to the limited amount of data
to be processed. These were problems that have now been overcome.
2.3.4 Objectives
Raising the level of protection of the cyberspace is a long-term operation, in
which it is important to act gradually, but within a clear and well-defined strate-
gical framework. Avoiding excessive redundancy is indeed one of the first ob-
jectives. For example, in the Italian financial sector we registered the important
birth of the CERTFin16; this does not, however, preclude the creation of specific
additional centres in the financial sector, characterised by one or more specific
elements, such as: ISAOs, cyber ranges, research centres, and certification lab-
oratories or structures for countering cybercrime. These centres could be de-
veloped by public, private or public-private stakeholders in a territorial context.
For instance, local or national production chains could be involved. In these
initiatives, it is essential to define clear objectives for each centre, in order to
avoid overlaps and a waste of resources. All of these considerations highlight
the importance of a national cybersecurity policy, which will be addressed in the
conclusions of this volume (chapter 9).
16https://www.certfin.it
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CHAPTER
3
Enabling Actions
Once the cybersecurity centre-based infrastructure is in place, enabling actions
should be developed to raise the level of security. These actions are aimed at
strengthening specific parts of the attack management cycle within a complex
system: from minimising the discovery time of the attack to data protection and
applications of national interest (which can be active or preventive), from the
creation of a of a national database of threats, capable of guaranteeing a certain
autonomy in the recognition of malware found within national organisations,
to forensic analysis and evidence management.
As far as the anticipation of the response is concerned, the chapter deals
with three types of situations: (i) the anticipation of the response to classical
cyber attacks, such as malware campaigns; (ii) the anticipation of the response
in case of attacks based on social engineering, whose most important evolution
has led to the deployment of fake news campaigns to accelerate polarisation and
the conditioning of citizens’ opinions; (iii) anticipating the response to physical
attacks, such as terrorist attacks, which exploit the potential of cyberspace to
carry out their actions.
Finally, three interrelated enabling actions are presented. The first concerns
forensic analysis and its explosion, in recent years, due to the exponential in-
crease in data and evidence sources due to the inflation of the number of IoT
devices (analysed in section 5.4). The second is the definition of a systemic risk
management process through new tools for the development of a comprehen-
sive framework of public-private governance for cyber risk. The third and last
enabling action focuses on active defence techniques, i.e., how to attack one’s
own systems to discover possible security flaws and then remedy them.
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3.1 Security analysis of applications and services
Networked applications and services are rapidly becoming the preferred chan-
nel for users to access digital services provided by PAs and businesses. Take, for
example, the services provided by the INPS (the Italian welfare national insti-
tute) and by the Agenzia delle Entrate (the Italian revenue agency) portals, the
digital ticketing service adopted by Trenitalia and the unstoppable rise in home
banking offered by banks. These applications make it possible to carry out oper-
ations that require high security standards, both because of the sensitivity to the
data processed, as in the case of the filling out of an on-line income tax state-
ment form, and because of the economic or reputational impact that an abuse
of the service by malicious persons would entail, as in the case of home banking.
It is not by chance that security certifications and assessments are identified as
priority measures within the framework of the National Plan for cyber protection
and information security (shown in section 1.3.2) and among these, the follow-
ing is explicitly mentioned:
the assessment of cyber defence measures applied by key service
providers, including the performance of periodic testing of pro-
tection systems and the definition of an independent assessment
system.
Consistently with this approach, the Italian Three-Year Plan for Information
Technology in Public Administration 2017–20191 provides a set of measures to
raise the level of security of the digital services provided, such as assessment and
testing, which include activities to verify the correct implementation and com-
pliance with the standards of security functions of system components or PA
service components. Of particular importance among these are the Digital Pub-
lic Identity Service – SPID2, the Electronic Identity Card – CIE3, and the service
for electronic payments – PagoPA4 for the “enabling” nature and centralisation
that they represent in the strategic model of evolution of the PA information
system.
Advanced services are often provided by combining different systems that
interact with one another, producing real ecosystems. A particularly relevant
ecosystem from different points of view is the healthcare ecosystem, where the
1https://pianotriennale-ict.italia.It/
2http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/infrastrutture-
architetture/spid
3http://www.cartaidentita.interno.gov.It/elements-
securityelements/
4http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/pubblica-amministrazione/
pagamenti-elettronici
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so-called patient empowerment5 promises to reduce costs and increase effi-
ciency thanks to the contribution of ICT technologies. A typical example is rep-
resented by the (often combined) use of the Electronic Health Record – EHR6 (in
Italy Fascicolo Sanitario Elettronico – Electronic Health File7) and of the Personal
Health Record – PHR8. The former conveys information generated by healthcare
professionals to the patient, while the latter allows the patient to share informa-
tion with physicians and specialists.
As data in ecosystems are generated by interoperable applications with dif-
ferent levels of sophistication, complexity, and security, the risks of their sub-
traction are amplified. The security analysis of these ecosystems is therefore
particularly complex, as security problems may arise due to the interaction be-
tween components even when each of them has been well designed, tested, and
implemented. In fact, even if all components have a specific security level, the
system resulting from their interaction may have a much lower one, due to ab-
normal or malicious interactions between the components themselves.
It is therefore important to have methodologies, tools, and environments to
assess, analyse, and measure the level of security of individual components, of
the systems obtained through their interaction, and of the ecosystems resulting
from the composition of other systems.
3.1.1 State of the art
With regard to the security analysis of interoperable systems, ANSSI9 supports a
particularly relevant initiative in France: the EIC (Environment for Cybersecurity
Interoperability and Integration)10 managed by the Institute for Technological
Research SystemX.
To analyse the security of applications and interoperable systems, a number
of approaches have been proposed; the main ones are:
• Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing — The Open Web Ap-
plication Security Project (OWASP)11 significantly contributes to the def-
inition of these checks, through the development and dissemination of
methodologies and tools for the production of secure software by the
5https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/2014-
12/media2499.pdf
6https://ec.europa.eu/health/ehealth/projects/nationallaws_
electronichealthrecords_en
7https://www.fascicolosanitario.gov.it
8http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2605603;jsessionid=
E16BF856642E785880C17373E53DA3CB?pdf=render
9https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/
10http://www.irt-systemx.fr/en/project/eic/
11https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project
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community of experts and developers. The OWASP Testing Guide is the
de facto standard for the “Security and penetration testing” guide to web
applications. Although it has brought important benefits, the proposed
methodologies still rely on manual execution by expert analysts. For this
reason, there is a strong interest in the development of new tools for the
automatic identification of vulnerabilities.
VAPT – Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing – It is based on
the systematic execution of procedures and test cases aimed at detecting
the presence of known vulnerabilities. By just interacting with the perime-
ter (inputs and outputs) of the target system, the methodology usually does
not require a particular knowledge of the running software (black box ap-
proach). The procedures can be partially automated under appropriate
conditions, but, in general, they require supervision and often the direct
intervention of an experienced penetration tester.
Static and dynamic analysis of applications – Techniques that analyse the
(source or executable) code of applications in order to assess the absence
of vulnerability and the correct use of the information they manipulate.
The static analysis performs these checks before executing the application,
while the dynamic analysis is based on observing the behaviour of the appli-
cation during its execution. In principle, static analysis allows the security
of the program to be proved for any future execution, while dynamic anal-
ysis only guarantees that the executions considered have not violated the
requested security requirements.
Formal Verification – Combining theoretical methods and results (coming
from logics, graph theory, automata theories, etc.) with advanced algorith-
mic solutions, formal methods allow to detect errors in the various phases
of the application life cycle (design, implementation, and execution) certi-
fying the absence of vulnerability with an extremely high level of reliability.
The common mathematical basis ensures the accuracy and completeness
of the analytical results. However, their application to large systems is par-
ticularly burdensome because of shared data, side effects, competition, etc.,
which lead to the increase of possible situations to be considered.
Another interesting initiative is the CBEST Intelligence-led testing guide12,
written by the Sector Cyber Team (SCT) of the Bank of England, which
12http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/
cbest.aspx
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defines guidelines and best practices for the evaluation of the security of
digital services, with particular attention to e-banking services. The guide
describes a multi-step process, including threat identification and pene-
tration testing, but does not define the technical details of the checks to
be performed.
• Static and dynamic analysis of applications — The most widely used
static analysis techniques to assess application security allow for the con-
trol of information containment (taint analysis), the assessment of the
non-interference between confidential and public data (information flow
analysis), and the analysis of the performed sequence of operations (con-
trol flow analysis). It is now possible today to apply these techniques to
mainstream programming languages such as Java, as shown in the case of
the OWASP [31] test security analysis. However, there are theoretical lim-
its (e.g., in terms of complexity) that curb the applicability of these tech-
niques. The dynamic analysis may overcome some of these limitations
and is applicable in most contexts. In any case, techniques based on soft-
ware execution cannot exhaustively cover all possible behaviours, thus
providing only partial guarantees. Recent developments are exploring
the benefits of hybrid techniques that suitably combine phases of static
and dynamic analysis.
• (Semi)automatic tools — System analysis, especially due to the increas-
ing use of concurrency for applications running on multi-processor ar-
chitectures, which may even differ from one another, is a major scien-
tific challenge. Recent developments in this respect, based on advanced
techniques and models, are already used by large IT companies such as
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. In order to minimise the costs associ-
ated with verification, the international scientific community is develop-
ing and testing increasingly sophisticated and effective automatic analy-
sis and verification techniques. For example, software tools for the auto-
matic analysis of authentication protocols have been successfully used
for the discovery of serious vulnerabilities of network services [6, 71].
Tools for automatic security analysis of mobile applications are already
on the market. In all cases, these tools use techniques capable of au-
tomatically carrying out an exhaustive analysis of application behaviour
when performed on malicious inputs and/or in hostile execution envi-
ronments.
3.1.2 Challenges
Among the most important scientific and technological challenges to be ad-
dressed are the following:
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• Verification costs — Verification methodologies necessarily entail a cost
in terms of time required and staff qualification. The higher the level of
warranty required, the higher the cost. This also depends on the preci-
sion of the techniques used: a technique that produces a high number
of false alarms (false positives) requires the manual intervention of spe-
cialised operators to identify alarms that require attention. For example,
the application of static analysis methodologies, besides being particu-
larly burdensome from a computational point of view, can produce false
alarms, requiring the additional analysis by an expert.
• Certifiability and verifiability of analysis — Some verification techniques
can formally guarantee the absence of certain vulnerabilities in applica-
tions and services. However, these guarantees must be made available so
as to facilitate the secure and verifiable integration of software and ser-
vices. In this sense, it is necessary to investigate new methodologies for
the certification of software security properties in order to foster the de-
velopment of an ecosystem of reliable applications and services.
• Limits of automatic tools — Automatic analysis tools must be able to anal-
yse complex applications in terms of size, heterogeneity of languages,
data flow and control. In particular, web and mobile applications pose
new challenges related to event-driven programming, which makes it dif-
ficult to track data within the application itself. The use of dynamic lan-
guages, particularly in web programming, makes applications more vul-
nerable to malicious external code insertion and, at the same time, makes
their security analysis more complex.
• Environments for the security analysis of interoperable systems — A signif-
icant shortage has been observed of environments that allow for the:
– integration of third-party cybersecurity products and solutions
with the existing ones, experimentally evaluating their security
level and the resilience to possible attacks to the resulting system;
– analysis of components and systems developed abroad and/or by
untrusted third parties, in order to verify that they do not carry out,
in addition to the intended tasks, unwanted, illegal, or fraudulent
operations.
3.1.3 Objectives
The following objectives should be pursued:
• Certification of applications with sensitive data — For applications that
capture and transmit sensitive medical and healthcare-related data via
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personal devices, it is necessary to initiate a project that implements all
the necessary measures to consider such devices as real medical devices,
subjecting them, consequently, to the appropriate certification regimes
before their use.
• Automatic Analysis Tools — There is a need to develop automatic
methodologies for security analysis, configuration, management and
testing, capable of analysing real applications, i.e., complex in size, het-
erogeneity of languages, data flow and control. The results of the analysis
shall be readily understandable (in such a way as to facilitate the iden-
tification of the most appropriate remedy or countermeasure) and inte-
grable with existing VAPT procedures, providing, where possible, an in-
dication of the risk associated with identified vulnerabilities. The project
should aim to include formal methods in the development process and
promote the definition of minimum safeguards on the security of appli-
cations and on-line services based on formal methods.
• Environments for security analysis of interoperable systems — It is neces-
sary: (i) to develop methodologies and tools for certifying integrity at the
level of both components (applications, operating systems, virtualisation
managers, security protections, embedded systems, etc.) and infrastruc-
ture (physical and virtual networks, cloud and edge computing, etc.); (ii)
to develop environments that allow the integration of cybersecurity prod-
ucts and solutions, with particular emphasis on the automatic manage-
ment of operational aspects, ensuring the protection of personal data in
the interaction between distributed systems such as those that manage
the digital identity federated with legal value (SPID) and commercial sys-
tems used, for example, for network or mobile applications.
• Integration with Cyber Ranges — It is desirable that the above environ-
ments are able to be placed within a suitably adapted Cyber Range (see
box on page 35). This is to allow, among other things: (i) the joint valida-
tion of defence capabilities of interoperable systems; (ii) the effectiveness
of the analysis methodologies developed when applied to real complex
systems; (iii) the training of new security experts in the use of state-of-
the-art tools.
3.2 Malware analysis and national database of
threats
Malware represent one of the primary threats in cybersecurity because they are
both means for accessing, controlling and compromising a remote system (Bot-
net), and tools for the removal or destruction of information on target com-
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puter systems. A typical example would include the compromising of the DNC
(Democratic National Committee) email accounts 13 during the last US election
campaign in 2016. According to the SANS Institute14, breaches caused by mal-
ware account for 69% of reported violations, with an annual increase of 10%.
In particular, according to the Symantec Security Threat Report 201715, in 2015,
there was a 30% increase in new malware not previously reported in 2014, with a
total estimate of over 350 million new malware found in 2015 alone and as many
in 2016.
These numbers suggest that behind the creation and deployment of new
malware there is a wide reuse of code. In fact, detailed analyses have shown that
many malware found are nothing more but diversifications or partial reengi-
neering of pre-existing malware. This process of code transformation and di-
versification means that traditional protection systems based on signature de-
tection are not able to detect new malware that, while capable of producing the
same effects as the original ones, have a different form.
Malware – Any program used to disrupt the operations of a computer, steal sen-
sitive information, access private computer systems, or display unwanted adver-
tising. The main mode of malware propagation is to generate parasitic software
fragments (code injection, see box on page 122) that are inserted into an existing
executable code.
Botnet – Network composed of devices infected by specialised malware (malicious
bot, described in the box on page. 60) and controlled by a so-called botmaster who
can remotely launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against other sys-
tems or carry out illegal operations, at times commissioned by criminal organisa-
tions.
One of the fundamental problems in cybersecurity rests in the attribution
of responsibilities, i.e., the determination of the identity or the place from which
an attack originates or where intermediate attacks [77] come from. The ability
to trace an attack backwards (traceback) results in more accurate attributions
and therefore more sophisticated forensic analyses.
Various methods exist to circumvent a network level traceback analysis, for
example by spoofing UDP and TCP packets, i.e., by disguising an identity by
13WikiLeaks’ DNC Email Leak Reveals Off The Record Media Correspondence. San-
Francisco.cbslocal.com. July 22, 2016.
14SANS Institute: “Incident Response Capabilities in 2016”. The 2016 SanFran-
cisco.cbslocal.com, SanFrancisco.cbslocal.com, June 2016.
15Symantec – 2017 Internet Security Threat Report, April 2017.
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altering the data that distinguish it, or by using a laundering host, i.e., compro-
mised hosts that are not directly attributable to the attacker.
Network evidence is therefore only partially relevant towards the attribu-
tion of responsibility for an attack, especially when it is carried out by malware.
More evidence can be obtained by evaluating the similarity with other known
attacks that recycle the same code. In this analysis it is therefore essential to
efficiently determine whether two programs are similar from a computational
point of view and whether they share syntactic structures. A classic case is the
established correlation between Stuxnet and Duqu malware [12]. The two mal-
ware, despite having completely different payloads, with completely different
aims (one targeted at compromising industrial control systems, the other to re-
motely access systems), share a good part of the code and are in fact considered
attributable to the same author.
The fact that a very large part of the malicious code distributed via the web
each year comes from already existing malicious code represents the Achilles
heel of malware-based attack systems. By analysing the code it is in fact possi-
ble to trace and correlate the actors who carry out cyber attacks through mal-
ware. In the analysis of the human genome, the possibility to trace different in-
dividuals back to similar genomes makes it possible to associate individuals and
thus correlate the possibility of them manifesting the same disease. In terms of
malware analysis, by analysing the similarity of codes, it is possible to corre-
late different attacks with similar code, thus providing a powerful tool for both
forensic analysis and attack prevention. In addition, as the possibility to trace
different genomes to similar phenotypes allows for the classification of geno-
types, the possibility of correlating different malware to the same attacks allows
for the classification of obfuscation techniques, thus providing a powerful tool
to detect and prevent attacks.
3.2.1 State of the art
The engineering of the analysis and prevention process of malware attacks re-
quires, by nature, an interdisciplinary approach involving code analysis tech-
niques and machine learning technologies for its classification. The state of the
art in malware analysis mainly consists of signature detection and behavioural
analysis techniques with the ultimate aim of classifying and preventing infec-
tions due to new malware.
In terms of classification, the most widespread methodologies in use are
machine learning (in particular supervised machine learning) and techniques
for the static and dynamic analysis of the isolated code in a sandbox. Little is
known in terms of early threat detection, i.e., prevention and monitoring of mal-
ware market trends through the prediction of new models and attack methods.
This is one of the areas in which the state of the art is lacking both in terms of
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available technologies and of their effective implementation and experimenta-
tion. Existing malware databases only permit a hash-based query of malware
(i.e., on the syntactic structure) without providing any semantic or similarity
correlations in terms of behaviour and/or code writing. This is one of the fun-
damental limits for the solutions available on the market (e.g., Virus Total16 by
Google. Expanding correlation tools is one of the major challenges. This would
make it possible to increase the value of the data available and at the same time
to improve the accuracy of malware analysis and understanding.
3.2.2 Challenges
Malware is constantly evolving, and the associated analysis and detection tech-
niques are progressing accordingly, inherently leaving a margin of advantage for
the effectiveness of new malicious software. The main research and innovation
challenges concern prevention (early threat detection) and malicious code clas-
sification. This can take place at departmental, corporate, regional or national
levels.
In terms of research, considering the continuous evolution of malware,
driven by the need to adapt them in order to impede the advancement of anal-
ysis and detection techniques that are continuously produced, it is necessary to
break this paradigm to avoid ultimately “following” the new variants of malware.
This requires flexible and adaptable tools, able to identify hostile behaviours,
both for what they do and for the ways in which they are carried out. The lat-
ter, in fact, can vary in a way that cannot be determined in advance, without
altering the purpose of the code. We are therefore faced with the possibility of
creating an unlimited number of variants of the same malware with few com-
mon syntactic structures. Knowing how to recognise and isolate similar struc-
tures makes it possible to reconstruct the phylogenesis of malware and pro-
vides tools to support attribution. Machine learning approaches can be used
to semi-automatically extract the main patterns employed to develop new mal-
ware, making it harder for attackers to build malware that bypass security coun-
termeasures.
To this end, it is essential to define updated models for the representation
of malware capable of accurately capturing aspects of interest for the analysis to
be carried out. To date, numerous representations have been proposed in the
scientific literature, divided into two large families: representation by means of
graphs that illustrate the functioning of malware, and representation by means
of quantitative parameters that show the presence or absence of certain con-
tents or their numerical consistency. Each representation captures a different
appearance and has a different level of resistance to malware blurring tech-
niques. Comparing the different solutions from a methodological point of view,
16https://www.virustotal.com/it/
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and proposing new representation models and integration modalities for the
different types of representation, allows for both a considerable improvement
in the capabilities of automatic analysis and an increase of the attackers’ diffi-
culty in evading the analysis with obfuscation techniques.
In order to be able to effectively defend oneself from malware, it is also nec-
essary to be able to identify how the inside of the computer or - more generally
- a company network, was reached. Perhaps, for example, through the opening
of a malicious attachment or by visiting a website containing malware. This re-
quires the monitoring of corporate networks, not only in terms of network traf-
fic, but also of the activity of individual terminals (PCs, tablets, smartphones) to
correlate the infection with the actions that have determined its installation and
activation.
A second major challenge is scale. The evolution of the malware market is
a case of Big Code. We are in fact faced with a huge quantity of code that is
put onto the net, with the same characteristics of speed, variety and volume as
Big Data. The volume of new malware that appears on a daily basis makes the
manual analysis of individual samples impossible. In this regard, the most effec-
tive solutions commercially available today adopt automatic machine learning-
based analysis techniques to group samples into families and restrict manual
analysis to cases that do not seem to belong to known families.
In this perspective it is important to create a national database of threats,
where one can transfer knowledge acquired over time thanks to the analysis of
new malware and from which useful information to effectively support these
same analyses can be extracted.
The code, compared to other data, has its own characteristics that pose new
challenges to both theoretical and applied research. The code (be it benevolent
or malicious) has an extensional aspect, which represents its syntactic form, and
a intensional one, which represents its functionality when it is executed. Both of
these characteristics must be taken into account in the classification and anal-
ysis of large amounts of malware. Extensional aspects allow us to understand
how a given threat occurs in a given malware, while intentional aspects allow us
to understand and reconstruct the phylogenesis, useful for assigning responsi-
bilities or early threat detection.
Honeypot – Security mechanism set to detect, deflect or in some way counteract
unauthorised attempts to use systems or data. Usually, it appears as part of a web-
site with data or resources of interest to potential attackers, but in fact it is isolated,
monitored, and used as ”bait” to understand the intentions or strategies of attack-
ers.
It is also necessary to integrate malware analysis into security analysis pro-
cesses. This involves the development of new organisational and process mod-
els, with adequate training and recruitment of technical personnel. To under-
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stand the evolution of malware, identifying those that are truly new is functional
to the deep understanding of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) (see box on
page 53).
3.2.3 Objectives
The main objectives to be pursued can be summarised as follows:
• The creation of a national database built on the basis of an infrastructure
that collects and coordinates incidents/responses in the event of a mal-
ware attack. There is a need to improve and adapt existing threat repre-
sentation schemes. See, for example, OpenIOC17, CybOX18, and STIX19.
In our country it is necessary to set up a national database of malicious
code where government agencies can compare threats involving national
systems and properly report on them. This requires collection tools (hon-
eypot) and tools for automatic analysis and code classification, as well
as the implementation of consultation and information sharing mecha-
nisms in accordance with appropriate security policies.
• To provide organisations and decision makers with tools for automatic
classification and grouping of malware based on: (i) similarity and code
sharing, (ii) sharing of remote command and control servers, (iii) target
attack platforms, (iv) target attack market, (v) malware objectives, such
as data theft and service interruption. These tools should enable those
responsible for a network to take short-term action, such as early iden-
tification of whom to report the attack to and the implementation of the
most appropriate countermeasures to prevent the large-scale spread of
infections. They should also make it possible to develop medium-term
actions aimed at identifying malware campaigns, attributing origin and
setting up stable defence systems.
• To equip organisations and decision makers with tools for identifying: (i)
vulnerabilities (process, systems, and software) exploited by malware, in
order to allow for the planning of corrective actions and to improve pre-
vention, detection, and defence capabilities; (ii) the malware’s aims, in
order to develop appropriate defence strategies, which must involve not
only the strictly technical areas, but also the organisational and procedu-
ral ones as well.
17https://www.fireeye.com/services/freeware.html
18https://cyboxproject.github.io/
19https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/
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• To develop an ecosystem of tools and methodologies for the automatic
surveillance of cyberspace through the monitoring and grouping of mal-
ware based on the communication channels used (for example, shared
Internet domains or domain generation algorithms), both for command
and control activities and data exfiltration. These tools should enable
the early detection of malware campaigns, potential links between differ-
ent types of malware, and the development of early warning techniques
based on traffic analysis.
• To develop tools and methodologies for infection prevention based on: (i)
awareness raising and training of people using IT tools (especially non-IT
specialists), (ii) the development of traffic monitoring systems on the cor-
porate network (e.g., web browsing) to identify ways of using the network
that increase the probability of malware infection.
3.3 Early response to cyber attacks
The last ten years have been characterised by a substantial increase in the num-
ber of very heterogeneous cybersecurity incidents: from identity theft to cyber-
espionage, from financial frauds to ransomware. This phenomenon is the con-
sequence of a paradigmatic evolution of the world of cybercrime, which today
acts according to a model of crime-as-a-service in which extremely powerful and
complex hacking tools become accessible at affordable prices and can be used
without requiring in-depth technical expertise.
Ransomware – Malware that restricts the use of a device, for example by encrypting
data or denying access to the device itself.
APT – Advanced Persistent Threat – Threats, represented by a hacker or, more of-
ten, by a group of hackers, whose objective is to hit a system through a series of tar-
geted attacks, characterised by advanced solutions, to acquire and maintain con-
trol of the system for long periods of time.
At the same time, the complexity of attacks has also increased. Attacks on
giant victims such as Target20 or Yahoo21 have shown that cyber criminals are
20https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-breach/target-
cyber-breach-hits-40-million-payment-cards-at-holiday-peak-
idUSBRE9BH1GX20131219
21http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/business/yahoo-breach-
3-billion-accounts/index.html
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able to infiltrate complex organisations, take full control of large-scale systems,
and stay in such systems for years, effectively hiding their presence and actions.
This kind of particularly complex and structured attack, typically known as Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat (APT), is now a fundamental problem for all large or-
ganisations (public and private) operating in a global context. The asymmetry
between attackers and defenders continues to grow: while the time needed to
penetrate a system is reduced thanks to increasingly effective attack tools, the
time needed to discover and eradicate the presence of a cyber threat grows, leav-
ing the assets of organisations at risk for long periods. Reducing this asymmetry
is a fundamental objective in order to protect systems, and the organisations
that manage them, from APT attacks.
Kill chain – Methodology for the characterisation of a cyber attack through its var-
ious logical phases: reconnaissance, weaponise, delivery, exploitation, installation,
command and control, and act on objective. In an initial phase, the attacker stud-
ies his victim (reconnaissance) to define an attack strategy and acquire all the tools
necessary to implement it (weaponise). In this phase the attack has not yet become
operational and the victim is completely unaware of it. The attacker therefore has
all the time he needs to design the attack as effectively as possible.
Recent attacks on big private corporations and public administrations have
shown that they often impact society on every level. From the unavailability of
essential services to the theft of identity, citizens are increasingly becoming the
last link in a long chain through which the victims of an attack are linked.
Each attack, complex or simple, passes through a series of steps that the
attacker develops to reach his final goal (the so-called kill chain). To anticipate
the attack, it is necessary to provide organisations with tools that can help them
acquire all the information necessary to trace the attack while it is still in the
reconnaissance and weaponise phases. Information must be aggregated, linked
and analysed with the aim of foreseeing potential threats. The automation of
this process is fundamental to anticipate the response to attacks and to raise
awareness within organisations of the threats they face.
Given the increasing complexity of attacks, it is necessary that their preven-
tion exploits heterogeneous and multi-level information. It is no longer suffi-
cient to rely solely on network traffic monitoring and connected devices to find
out known vulnerabilities; it is necessary to integrate these approaches with in-
formation that can be obtained at other levels. For example, information about
user interactions at the application level (their so-called social graph22) can aid
in the understanding of whether certain traffic flows between devices are more
or less suspicious.
22https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-one-social-graph-to-rule-
them-all/
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Finally, as highlighted in section 5.4, the introduction of IoT scenarios,
where a large number of mobile and pervasive devices communicate online,
opens up totally new attack scenarios, to be carefully considered for prevention.
In this instance as well, it is no longer sufficient to just monitor the traffic gen-
erated by such devices: this must, in fact, also be appropriately “interpreted” on
the basis of the specific devices involved and their owners/users.
An evolution of defence systems aimed at anticipating the response to at-
tacks in order to cancel or reduce their impact will have both direct and indirect
positive effects. Not only will it allow us to reduce the number and, above all,
the magnitude of accidents, but it will also increase the confidence of citizens
and businesses in the adoption of tools and processes increasingly based on the
intensive use of computer systems and interconnected networks. This trust, if
expressed in business world, will be fundamental towards fully realising the En-
terprise 4.0 vision and all of the related technological evolution programs.
3.3.1 State of the art
Many of the existing solutions are strongly based on teams of specialists able
to extract information useful towards defining potential impairment indicators
to be used in automatic defence systems from the data. These teams are ex-
tremely expensive and are unlikely to handle an enormous amount of informa-
tion, which is destined to grow by various orders of magnitude in the near future.
In addition to raw data, the analysis of the texts of message is also an in-
exhaustible source of information on planned attacks and, more generally, on
potential attack victims. However, this source requires a complex elaboration
that often involves almost all levels of linguistic analysis, from the morphologi-
cal to the lexical-semantic and pragmatic ones.
Threat Intelligence – The process to identify the features of an emerging threat,
with particular reference to context, indicators, mechanisms, and implications.
This process includes the collection and analysis of all information that could be
useful for the decision making process regarding how to respond to the threat.
At the commercial level, there are various threat Intelligence services that
provide tools and data on emerging threats. Many of these services have a gen-
eral target group and therefore offer information that is not always contextu-
alised. Contextualisation to the application case is offered as a service to be tai-
lored to the specific framework of the customer, but in fact it represents an as-
pect that cannot be overlooked by those who want to protect themselves from
targeted threats. The integration of natural language processing within threat
intelligence processes is recent: a project was recently presented by Crowd-
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Strike23 and other projects are being developed. However, with the exclusion
of the extraction of named entities, there is still no software for understanding
multilingual natural language at a semantic level.
The threat intelligence solutions available today offer dedicated function-
alities and only in rare cases are integrated into suites capable of supporting
operators in a complete process that, starting from the selection of information
sources, leads to the implementation of countermeasures. The lack of adequate
support for the integrated process is often compensated by human operators,
with the expected inefficiencies.
Finally, today very few solutions use heterogeneous data sources in an in-
tegrated way to identify possible vulnerabilities and evaluate the danger of spe-
cific observed phenomena, taking into account the context of the devices in-
volved and their use.
Deep and Dark web – The parts of the web containing data not publicly indexed or
whose access is protected through anonymous networks. It is believed that about
80% of the contents present today on the world wide web are hidden in these parts.
3.3.2 Challenges
The development of a process based on threat intelligence that offers the char-
acteristics described above necessarily involves a series of challenges that, to
date, prevent its complete realisation. Of these, the most important are:
• The acquisition of data from protected sources — Many of the activities
currently related to the development of new attacks require a strong col-
laboration between different criminal actors. Such collaboration often
takes place through protected and difficult to penetrate channels, mostly
represented by the deep and dark web or private chat rooms. The tech-
nologies usually adopted for the acquisition of information from the
open web collide with the “challenging” techniques designed to check
that only real persons get access to specific information. The integration
of these sources into automated intelligence processes requires the study
of new solutions to overcome these barriers without human operator in-
tervention.
• The creation and dynamic updating of knowledge bases on cyber-
criminals and their operations — These must include linguistic informa-
tion regarding the different names under which, even in different lan-
guages, concepts and entities are expressed, so that these subjects can be
linked together with the processed non-linguistic data for an integrated
analysis.
23https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNuPmxGakw0
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• Multilingual text analysis — The meaning of the texts must be unambigu-
ously explained and the semantics extracted from them must be aggre-
gated into topics and themes to obtain an overall picture of the thinking,
intentions and objectives of cyber-criminals, thus intersecting the infor-
mation in a way that is independent of the language, syntax and lexicon
they are expressed with.
• Lexical-semantic profiling — The profiling of the authors of texts and se-
mantic (not just lexical) analysis allows to identify and group deep and
dark web texts on the basis of the writing style, also at the content level.
• The automated distillation of indicators of compromise and rules for de-
tecting attacks — The collection of information related to potential attack
vectors, per sé, is not sufficient to make the systems safer. Rendering this
information usable requires the distillation of clear indicators of poten-
tial compromise and related rules for the identification of attacks. The
automation of this process is a necessary step to adequately cope with
the increasing number of attacks.
• The contextualisation of intelligence elements — One of the major limi-
tations of threat intelligence systems available on the market today lies
in their inability to automatically contextualise the information collected
within the specific context of interest. The definition of appropriate
methodologies for contextualisation is fundamental to correctly rank
threats according to their priority and, consequently, improve the effi-
ciency of defence systems, thus reducing their management costs.
• Vulnerability Characterisation and discovery of attacks through heteroge-
neous complex information — Many of the attack prevention monitoring
systems (e.g., traffic monitoring) do not take into account the type of de-
vice usage by their users, and the type of interactions that they typically
(or reasonably) perform when using the devices. Thus, to reduce false
positives and negatives, it is necessary to integrate multi-level informa-
tion, including the use of applications, the social network of users, and
the profiles of the devices they use. This will guarantee a clearer picture
of possible vulnerabilities, and improve the quality of prevention and dis-
covery.
• Vulnerability and prevention in pervasive environments — With the
spread of IoT technologies, attack scenarios expand enormously, as well
as the possible negative effects of attacks on end users, as amply illus-
trated in section 5.4.
• The assessment of the quality of the collected information, of the reliabil-
ity of the sources and of the effectiveness of the countermeasures — The
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amount of information available for intelligence processes makes it nec-
essary to study appropriate methods to evaluate the quality, reliability,
and effectiveness of the responses that derive from them. These methods
will play a key role in making the overall process less “noisy”, increasing
its effectiveness and efficiency.
• Integrated intelligence, monitoring and system protection processes — So-
lutions to the challenges outlined above will not provide satisfactory re-
sults unless they are framed within integrated processes that, starting
from the identification of information sources to the management of ac-
cidents, trigger a cycle of continuous security improvement.
3.3.3 Objectives
The main objectives to be pursued are the following:
• Advanced threat intelligence — The development of a threat intelligence
platform that allows acquisition from hidden and protected sources, with
the possibility of automatically overcoming barriers posed by evasive
or challenging systems, capturing the data reached and enriching them
with semantic content identified in an automated way. The ultimate goal
is to build a knowledge base for cybercriminal groups and the various ac-
tors related to this ecosystem.
• Vulnerability identification in complex environments — The develop-
ment of a framework for monitoring and analysing the behaviour of com-
plex systems for identifying vulnerabilities and possible attack pathways.
The framework will have to specifically target interconnected systems, IT
infrastructures for the management of supply chains, and complex com-
puter ecosystems.
• Automation of forensic investigations — The development of a suite of
tools for the automated analysis of attacked systems, in order to auto-
matically extract and correlate information related to attacker activities.
The objective of these tools is to support the forensic analyst’s work by
automating the identification processes of the attacker’s activities, with
particular reference to multi-step attacks.
3.4 Early response to social attacks
Protecting decision-making processes from disinformation and counter-
information activities is a vital task for any country. Historically, this is a job
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entrusted to intelligence services and has been set up such that the dissemina-
tion of information and knowledge occurred top-down, through newspapers,
political party authorities or academic hierarchies.
The internet has radically changed the way knowledge is created and ac-
cessed [72], overturning all mediation systems in favour of direct access to an
unprecedented array of content. The complexity of the phenomena of the re-
ality is apparently accessible to everyone, but not always in an understandable
way: our cognitive system struggles to adapt to new concepts such as uncer-
tainty, complexity, and probability, tending to favour simpler (or simplified) and
therefore reassuring syntheses and narrations. Against this changed backdrop,
the old problem of spreading false information and its consequences must be
faced.
The process of disseminating false information passes through a series of
cognitive mechanisms that leads us (everybody, no one can be excluded) to ac-
quire information in accordance with our world view and to ignore contrast-
ing arguments. We all tend to form, then, strongly polarised groups on shared
narrations [61]. This makes the dissemination of false information fruitful both
economically and in terms of special interests and influencing public thought.
The problem is serious and very delicate and science in general, and informa-
tion technology in particular, play a direct and fundamental role in this chal-
lenge. It is therefore necessary to put in place a number of initiatives and syn-
ergies on several levels to ensure a better understanding of the problem in the
current context and to develop effective responses24.
The advent of social media has radically changed the process of construc-
tion and access to knowledge, allowing an unmediated production and con-
sumption of information. In the next few years, given the growing emergence of
scientific processes with considerable impacts on society (automation of work,
biotech, etc.), it is expected that there will be a significant increase in the prob-
lems to be faced to meet the population’s information needs in a targeted and
timely manner, in order to avoid the proliferation of narratives that are mislead-
ing and potentially damaging to the democratic process.
Narrations that are perceived as harmful to an agency, entity or person are
often referred to as Fake News in the press and have become a topic of central
importance, both at political and institutional levels25.
At the European level, academic and institutional communities recognise
the problem of misinformation, fake news and information warfare as a high-
priority topic: the World Economic Forum has been reporting, since 2013, on
the massive dissemination of misleading and inaccurate information through
the internet as one of the most serious global threats, while referring to it as
24https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017
25https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017
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Digital Wildfire26.
The former President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Boldrini, conven-
ing experts from all relevant sectors for a survey, stressed the importance of
digital education and the central role of information in democratic processes.
The Italian National Regulatory Authority itself as guarantor for communica-
tions recognises the problem in the articulation and modulation of information
in a completely new environment and promotes and sponsors an initiative to
set up an observatory on the dynamics of misinformation on social media.
However, given the complexity of the phenomenon, a technological solu-
tion alone is not enough. The approach in the construction of solutions must
necessarily be strongly interdisciplinary and must aim at creating synergies be-
tween the different actors within the IT system. In this scenario, the establish-
ment of an observatory on information flows in social media could represent
a bridge between the various stakeholders, who could jointly design targeted
solutions and shared strategies.
To not recognise the interdisciplinary nature of the problem would mean
excluding Italy from the international debate on the subject, while with the es-
tablishment of such an observatory we would play a leading role in a pilot ini-
tiative that could then be replicated on a European scale.
3.4.1 State of the art
At present, the contrast strategy advocated by the debunkers makes maximal
use of online sites where flagrantly false news is reported. While this activity
is certainly useful for those who need to quickly check the veracity of a piece
of news, it has been shown that in the fight against disinformation, debunking
sites can even be counterproductive, leading those who believe in false news to
reinforce their own beliefs and to double down on spreading them [82].
Debunker – A person who analyses online news to highlight discrepancies, inaccu-
racies and groundlessness.
Bot – A software application, also called web robot, which performs automated
tasks. Examples of the proper use of bots include the transmission of useful in-
formation, the automatic generation of contents and automated responses. Exam-
ples of misuse include theft of personal data, spamming and spreading of improper
messages.
26http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/
digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/#read
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An alternative approach is algorithmic; it targets automated solutions
aimed at neutralising the vast amount of on-line information considered to be
false. While such an approach can help to identify bots [32] and false profiles –
for example by building “trusted” environments, in which the on-line identities
are most likely associated to real identities [19] – it is limited by the impossibility
to algorithmically decide if a statement is false, unless the expressive power of
the used language is brutally reduced [62]. It is no coincidence that recent at-
tempts to introduce automated filters on social media have highlighted both the
problem of false positives (often linked to an ironic or sarcastic use of language)
and the problem of false negatives (linked to changes in the use of language
by those who wish to hide their communications). But the greatest danger of
a purely algorithmic approach, in which the process of classification and re-
sponse to fake news is completely automated, rests in the risk of unwarranted
censorship, thus increasing already present polarisations and exacerbating the
conflicts between social groups belonging to different echo-chambers.
Echo-chamber – A digital location in which people end up talking only within
groups that have homogeneous ideas, with self-powering mechanisms. Commu-
nication within such groups tends to reinforce the shared beliefs and to attenuate,
if not eliminate, the dissonant ones.
From what has been said, it is clear that the road to a brute algorithmic re-
sponse to the problem is not practicable. To promise a software that is able to
distinguish true and false would belong to the realm of fake news itself. There-
fore, in terms of fact-checking and source verification, with consequent labelling
of the information, at the most it is possible to obtain a statistical classification
in which an exemplary set of elements considered truthful and/or reliable is
however identified a priori. For this reason, it is not necessary to demonise the
“partial” classification tools; they are useful to filter the enormous amounts of
data available on the internet before processing them with traditional methods,
i.e., by “real” people who decide what has to be done. At present, this is the
strategy adopted on some social media platforms. Although the results are not
completely satisfactory, this might be in part due to the inadequate specialisa-
tion of the employed teams of analysts.
Polarisation –The tendency to break off into distinct echo-chambers based on con-
flicting and opposite beliefs; such echo-chambers tend to reject a priori external
information.
3.4.2 Challenges
Users will continue to choose their sources of information based on the consis-
tency with their worldview. The main challenge consists in avoiding the sce-
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nario in which echo-chambers linked to the various world-views become so
“polarised” that debate, which is necessary for full democracies, stops. We must
therefore create synergies to design and implement ad hoc tools for monitoring
and sensing public opinion online that allow to understand current polarising
arguments, in order to timely intervene or, even better, to act preventively be-
fore the debate degenerates into a clash between two factions without contacts.
From this point of view, information technology has a central role to play com-
pared to other disciplines; at the same time, the need to lower disciplinary bar-
riers suggests complexity science as a possible interdisciplinary framework for
aggregating data and models, while maintaining a strongly quantitative compo-
nent that avoids excessive speculation.
Complexity science – A discipline developed from the successes of statistical
physics in interpreting the collective phenomena of matter; the possibility of
analysing large amounts of data has allowed phenomena from the social, eco-
nomic, biological sciences to be seen under a new light and reinterpreted, up to
the point of opening new perspectives on the understanding of the behaviour of
complex technological systems such as network infrastructures.
However, scientific activity alone risks not having any effects if synergies
are not established between information operators, who must be constantly up-
dated on the observed dynamics, allowing them to better understand the effects
of their actions in the infosphere. Training courses and meetings should there-
fore be organised, aimed at the media, to promote reciprocity and the pursuit of
common objectives both in general and on specific topics such as public health.
Finally, it is very important to train and update those responsible for pro-
tecting and regulating the intersection between the infosphere and the cy-
berspace, in order to provide insights on the evolution of processes and infor-
mation in these new spaces. This would help them towards taking effective and
timely actions to introduce forms of regulation in these virtual, and no longer
geographical, spaces. At the same time, it must be made clear that any interven-
tion must strongly protect the diversity of opinions, because even if not taking
into account obvious ethical implications, diminishing the richness of a system
means reducing its reaction and adaptation capacities.
For this purpose, the great challenge is not only to produce models consis-
tent with the observations of experimental data, but also to simplify and com-
municate such models so that they become useful tools in the hands of those
who have the task of protecting our society.
3.4.3 Objectives
In order to understand and verify the dynamics of social media information, it
is necessary to be able to continuously observe and analyse the large flows of
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information exchanged between users. The analysis cannot be purely algorith-
mic (due to the problems mentioned above) nor purely anthropic, if only for
the volumes at stake. Based on the state of the art and the level of knowledge
currently present in Italy, we must aim at achieving the following goals in a rela-
tively short time (the first results presumably from six months to one year from
the beginning of the project):
• Monitoring and sensing of the information space on social media — Con-
tinuous monitoring of social media should be carried out to identify top-
ics of interest and trends in order to understand users’ information needs.
Monitoring will be useful to identify and follow the dynamics (birth-life-
death) of the echo-chamber. Based on the data collected, it will be pos-
sible to carry out various evaluations based on metrics and/or machine
learning algorithms.
• Polarisation Degree — Polarisation separates the echo-chamber, decreas-
ing diversity and undermining democratic processes. It is necessary to
develop metrics and rankings of proven effectiveness, as has already hap-
pened in other fields for the analysis of competitiveness and develop-
ment potentials of [62, 20] nations. Being able to define a polarisation
rank would result in a quantitative indication for local, regional, national
and European newspapers on their performance on social networks, tak-
ing into account the accuracy and polarising effect (or lack thereof) of the
presentation of news.
• Early Warning of potential topics that could transmit fake-misleading-
specious information — The approach must be statistical, in which a clas-
sifier based on machine learning will use syntactic and semantic charac-
teristics, as well as the network of information flows, in order to make
accurate predictions on possible topics likely to convey or become fake
news.
• Benchmarking — For analysing and comparing the characteristics of in-
formation cascades related to certain news, it is necessary to measure the
effectiveness of the penetration of various types of communication re-
garding specific topics, such as immigration, vaccines, health, food, and
geopolitics.
Once these objectives have been achieved, it will be possible to integrate the
means and techniques developed in order to aim at a higher objective, namely
the protection of the biodiversity of online information ecosystems, where bio-
diversity signifies the coexistence of different animal and plant species in the
same ecosystem, achieving a balance thanks to their mutual relationships [54].
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The analysis of the echo-chamber and their interactions will allow us to evalu-
ate the robustness and biodiversity of information ecosystems at various levels,
from local to global ones.
3.5 Early response to physical attacks
The images and the videos that are posted on the web, or taken from surveil-
lance cameras, are becoming increasingly important to support national and
international territorial control agencies in their activities to fight terrorist or-
ganisations and organised crime. Moreover, public or private video surveillance
tools are increasingly becoming fundamental for law enforcement investiga-
tions.
At the national level, however, there is still a lack of coordinated and contin-
uous efforts to monitor the territory through the videos acquired by surveillance
cameras scattered throughout the territory, to process and analyse the data col-
lected, and to effectively use this information.
A similar situation is taking place in the context of automatic monitoring of
images and videos shared by users via their social profiles. Although the acqui-
sition and analysis of such multimedia content increasingly represents a valu-
able element for law enforcement agencies, such analysis is typically carried out
manually, without the support of automatic collection and analysis tools.
3.5.1 State of the art
The amount of video data produced by video surveillance cameras, especially
high-definition cameras, is growing dramatically. Just consider that a single HD
camera can generate approximately 0.7 TB of compressed video data per month,
and that there are tens of millions of installed ones: a study by IHS27reports that
there is an average of one camera, not necessarily HD, for every 29 inhabitants
of the planet. It can therefore be reasonably argued that video data generated by
these cameras are becoming the “biggest” Big Data [45]. It is not just a question
of volume: the problems posed by the very high speed of real-time collection
and the necessity to quickly analyse and understand video content must also
be considered. All this leads to new technological challenges ranging from the
compression, storage and transmission of videos, to the automatic analysis of
their contents, up to the development of analysis tools and metadata synthesis
able to make the results of these analyses available to specialised users.
The international funding agencies have identified these needs and many
international projects have been funded, both in Europe under Horizon 2020
and in the USA as part of the activities supported by the DARPA. Although
27https://www.ihs.com/info/0615/video-surveillance-methodology.html
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research in the sector is undergoing a great expansion, with strong interest
and economic support from large multinationals such as IBM, nVIDIA, Google,
Facebook, and Microsoft as well, Italy still lacks a specific plan of wide-ranging
and large-scale investments, able to involve the best and brightest from the Ital-
ian academic and industrial spheres to deal convincingly with these problems.
A virtuous circle between universities, business and the government has led
to the development of a world-class, competitive, state-of-the-art knowledge in
countries such as Germany and Sweden, that is also boosting their economy [65,
53].
3.5.2 Challenges
The main challenges regard:
• Collaborative visual intelligence at the urban level — The development
of visual intelligence systems designed to support the control of the ter-
ritory by law enforcement agencies requires integrated systems for the
acquisition and processing of videos, first and foremost, which tend to
come from: video surveillance cameras, aerial cameras from remote
sensing systems (from satellites to drones), mobile cameras on cars
and public transport which will increasingly be connected in vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure mode, self-centric cameras (linked
to the people who wear them), and smartphones possessed by citizens
and/or police forces. This will require the creation of integrated systems
and services, based on the collaboration between human competences
and Artificial Intelligence, tendentially through state-of-the-art neural ar-
chitectures, to process visual big data in real time. The objective is to pro-
vide: (i) results including visual analysis, (ii) classification and detection
of events of interest, (iii) automatic correlation between different views
from different sensors, (iv) identification and re-identification of individ-
uals, (v) automatic detection and prediction of behaviours and/or inten-
tions of groups of people.
• Automatic monitoring of visual content from the web — The development
of systems that can automatically analyse shared images and videos on
social media is extremely important in order to counter the threat of ter-
rorism. The great challenge in this area is that of identifying and report-
ing to law enforcement agencies contents of probable criminal nature. In
particular, an open problem is the automatic analysis of images/video to
identify cultural and religious symbols to detect content of potential ter-
rorist nature, such as videos used to recruit followers. A more subtle, but
equally important, aspect is to automatically understand the impact that
these visual contents are intended to have on social media users. The
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multimedia content shared in social media for propaganda is typically
chosen to attract the interest of the largest number of users (i.e., to be-
come viral) and to evoke strong feelings in the observers. Therefore, a
fundamental challenge to understand the strategy of terrorists, and hin-
der their efforts, is to analyse the relationship between visual content and
virality, as well as to provide tools that can infer the emotional content
evoked by images and videos.
• Managing, viewing and analysing visual content on a large scale — The
cardinality and complexity of visual data of interest make it necessary to
use solutions based on visual analytics that, by combining advanced vi-
sualisation techniques with automatic analysis, are able to extract infor-
mation from the analysed data and to present it in a timely and effective
manner to the operators who have to make national security decisions.
To this end, it is essential to provide the operators with aggregate and
filtered information contextualised to geographical, temporal and social
aspects. Automatic analysis allows repetitive or similar behaviours to be
highlighted (e.g., to detect suspicious persons who have been physically
in the same place in a certain time interval or who have made similar
movements). This analysis must be guided by the user who, on the ba-
sis of his exploratory activities, provides the algorithm with the necessary
parameters for its operation, e.g., the locations on which to carry out the
analysis, the time period, the individuals to be observed, and so on. An-
other challenge, orthogonal to visualisation, consists in the development
of techniques to reduce the data analysed, thus minimising its complex-
ity and cardinality while maintaining the richness of information, in or-
der to allow for a more effective visual exploration.
3.5.3 Objectives
The progress made in recent years in the field of artificial intelligence applied
to computer vision, with particular reference to the impact related to the use of
deep learning techniques, makes it prime time for the implementation of long-
term, national projects for:
• the acquisition and automatic analysis of videos from surveillance cam-
eras on the entire national territory, aimed at identifying suspicious be-
haviours and individuals, even for time frames of many months, inde-
pendently from changes of light, weather conditions and clothing;
• the automatic analysis of images and videos posted by monitored peo-
ple on their social profiles, in order to (i) identify the place from which
images come, without using metadata that are not always available, (ii)
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describe the emotional content of videos and/or photos posted and/or
shared with other users;
• the development of advanced visualisation techniques for the effective
use of the analysis carried out by algorithms on visual data, to make
timely use of such data by operators who have to make decisions related
to national security, both for terrorist attacks and natural emergencies.
In particular, projects must pursue the development of:
• automatic reconstruction systems of views integrated by fixed, mobile
and wearable cameras;
• systems for the detection of people and targets “in the wild”; their possi-
ble (re)-identification on a large temporal and spatial scale;
• predictive tracking systems for moving targets, with social behavioural
models for the analysis of crowd behaviour in case of critical events and
specific behavioural models for the analysis of relationships between
people;
• technologies to identify recurring symbolic elements in images and
videos, and analytical methodologies to evaluate the emotional content
of visual data in order to recognise images with a strong emotional impact
and to automatically predict perceptive attributes such as the “potential”
virality and popularity of specific visual data;
• systems for geographic and temporal visualisation of personal data and
metadata, catastrophic events and/or social media information, with vi-
sual mechanisms to parameterise automatic analysis algorithms;
• architectural models for the realisation of a new generation of video
surveillance systems for public safety and security.
3.6 Forensic analysis and evidence preservation
Computer forensics has been enjoying a period of extraordinary attention over
the past 20 years, frequently earning prime time attention in TV news and talk
shows. This is largely due to the fact that for a long time the main sources of ev-
idence have remained technologically stable and therefore have allowed for the
development and improvement of methodologies and tools for extraordinar-
ily effective forensic investigation. Digital evidence sources, that cannot be as-
similated to operating system artefacts, have long remained limited to (digital)
documentary sources such as databases (e.g., for accounting purposes), records
of telephone traffic and chronological records with various denominations, for
which effective investigation approaches have been developed.
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3.6.1 State of the art
However, this situation was destined to change: in as early as 2010 Garfinkel [37]
predicted the end of the golden age of forensic computing in the face of the
exponential increase in storage capacity, the diversification of digital evidence
sources and the spread of cloud computing and encryption.
The work of Karie and Venter in 2015 [49] summarises in a taxonomy that
includes almost thirty points the main challenges faced by computer forensic
science in terms of technological, legal, personnel and operational issues. These
include the problems already highlighted by Garfinkel and others related both
to the difficult interoperability between different instruments used in investiga-
tions and to the lack of personnel adequately trained to carry out digital forensic
investigations.
It is worth noting that some of the challenges have in the meantime been
exacerbated by a further increase in storage capacity and a marked diversifica-
tion of evidence sources. All this requires a profound rethinking of traditional
computer inspections, essentially based on the execution of an image copy (bit-
stream) of the media found and the subsequent laboratory analysis.
To date, it is no longer possible to follow such an approach, both due the
time needed to acquire copies of the supports (with consequent blockage of the
activities of the subject under investigation), and due to the technical impos-
sibility of making image copies of certain types of devices, such as the latest
generation of mobile devices, embedded systems and IoT devices, for which it
is necessary to resort to the so-called logical acquisition or to ignore a likely pre-
cious evidence source.
Accordingly, it is therefore of fundamental importance to develop new
forensic acquisition and analysis techniques that, combined with an adequate
legal consideration, allow to avoid or overcome the current impasse, bringing
the discipline back to the glory of golden age.
3.6.2 Challenges
The main challenges therefore relate to the following:
• The exponential increase in data volume — Reducing the time needed to
generate copies can also be addressed by implementing a so-called foren-
sic triage. Although different approaches to the preventive selection of
sources have been proposed, the problem persists, mainly because each
solution has to balance different interests. In addition, the preventive se-
lection of the source:
– apparently violates the principle of completeness of the evidence,
and a hypothetical defender could argue that the investigative and
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probative reasoning is flawed by the previously made selection and
therefore that the defence would be deprived of the possibility to
carry out further defensive investigations);
– is intrinsically exposed to anti-forensic actions, as a hypothetical
attacker would inevitably be aware of the artefacts under investiga-
tion and could alter or destroy them. In fact, some types of cyber
attacks have recently appeared to deliberately introduce fake evi-
dence in order to deflect investigations.
• The diversification of test sources — Upon first reflection it is evident that
it is not possible to imagine a generalised model of acquisition without
the effective collaboration of device manufacturers. In fact, in the impos-
sibility of directly accessing the stored information, it becomes necessary
to trust those voluntarily communicated by the device itself.
Furthermore, It should be also taken into account that, due to limita-
tions on hardware resources or confidentiality requirements, small de-
vices often do not allow access to information stored internally, except by
exceptional means. In the case of mobile devices, it is well known that
manufacturers tend to increase security measures towards external ac-
cesses that are not authorised by the device owner. The strategy is cer-
tainly commendable from the point of view of confidentiality, given that
a weakening of the protections would result in a sure advantage for both
legitimate investigations and abusive intrusions, but it also represents a
serious obstacle for the former.
However, the confidentiality argument does not apply in case of devices
(e.g. medical and diagnostic devices, embedded vehicle control units,
control systems of industrial plants, “smart” systems), for which it is not
just in the interest of the owner, but also of the entire society, to acquire
information that prove its correct functioning or - on the other hand - that
allow to detect possible abuses (recall of the recent case of the control
units of some car manufacturers that were “programmed” to falsify the
results of emission tests).
• The volatility of the sources and extension of the window of opportunity
for acquisition — A separate challenge that must be considered is the
so-called window of opportunity for obtaining the evidence source. Al-
though the information contained in the computer supports is not sub-
ject to natural degradation like biological samples, it is subject to stor-
age times that were explicitly or implicitly programmed during their de-
sign. In some cases, such as for accounting documents and phone traffic
records, the law establishes a retention time, i.e., the period within which
the information must be stored and beyond which it can, and in some
cases must, be destroyed.
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However, there are cases of logs whose retention time is linked to the rea-
sons that they were collected (i.e., for the diagnosis of device/system mal-
functions) and not, therefore, to investigative purposes. The question
therefore arises of defining and - possibly - regulating which informa-
tion must be compulsorily collected and as well as the related acquisi-
tion methodology, while respecting the legitimate expectations of privacy
and the needs of crime repression (often in the interest of the person who
owns the device to be examined).
A particular aspect that falls under this point regards how to correctly
generate and conserve logs, an area in which today total anarchy reigns.
While it is true that system logs are generally generated and stored cor-
rectly by IT infrastructure operators, who are also the main users, for di-
agnostic or performance optimisation purposes, it is also true that - as
anyone with minimal forensic experience can testify - application logs,
where available, rarely result in the answer to even the most basic in-
vestigative questions and are often not even documented. Moreover, for
more traditional evidence sources as well, such as the documentation of
telephone traffic, rendering semantically homogeneous the information
obtained from the various operators and enriching it with annotations
that allow them to be interpreted correctly at a later time are problems
that frequently arise, further complicated by continuous technological
evolution.
3.6.3 Objectives
The objectives of the project can be identified along three action lines, each cor-
relating to a specific challenge:
• The exponential increase in data volume — The development of method-
ologies and tools for forensic triage that are able to limit the time of ac-
quisition and subsequent analysis without compromising the quality and
reliability of the evidence;
• The diversification of evidence sources — The analysis of new evidence
sources and the development of more flexible, but equally effective, anal-
ysis methodologies than bitstream copying;
• The volatility of the sources and the extension of the window of oppor-
tunity for acquisitions — The development of guidelines for the correct
mode of generation and preservation of chronological recordings and the
definition of minimum retention periods, also taking into account the re-
quirements for the forensic analysis of the generated data.
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3.7 Risk management at systemic level
Risk management is a well-established discipline in the areas of financial invest-
ments, business, and project management. However, traditional risk manage-
ment methodologies cannot be applied to the field of cybersecurity. In particu-
lar, the dynamic nature of cyber risks (threats, agents, vulnerabilities, accidents,
and impacts) is not properly represented in the static and iterative methods of
current risk management models and standards.
It is necessary to develop an approach aiming at creating a dynamic frame-
work for cyber risk management (Dynamic Cyber Risk Management – DCRM)
capable of properly considering evolving ICT vulnerabilities across an entire or-
ganisation and mitigating related threats and risks. Such an approach requires
a new dimension compared to traditional risk management: the need to be dy-
namic and the ability to adapt continuously.
3.7.1 State of the art
Many efforts have been undertaken by the research community and industry to
develop a solid and coherent discipline applicable to cyberspace. Different ref-
erence frameworks and specific standards have been developed in recent years,
including ISO/IEC 2700528, NIST 800 3029, IT Risk (ISACA) 30, COSO31, ITIL32,
and OCTAVE33. However, all these frameworks rely on a static approach and
cannot be applied to the management of dynamic cyber risks. In addition, these
models are partially questionable when introducing and assessing risks based
on the probability of events. In particular, in large organisations this assess-
ment process can be complicated and time-consuming; due to vulnerabilities
and evolving threats, the results of a risk assessment can quickly become obso-
lete.
Critical infrastructure protection is becoming one of the cornerstones of na-
tional security. The European Commission already requires Member States to
raise their awareness and improve their mutual cooperation. The NIS Directive
(illustrated in section 1.2.1) in particular encourages the development of trust-
28https://www.iso.org/standard/56742.html
29http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-
30r1.pdf
30https://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Research/
ResearchDeliverables/Pages/The-Risk-IT-Framework.aspx
31https://www.coso.org/Documents/2017-COSO-ERM-Integrating-with-
Strategy-and-Performance-Executive-Summary.pdf
32https://www.axelos.com/best-practice-solutions/itil/what-is-itil
33https://www.cert.org/resilience/products-services/octave/
71
worthy relationships between public and private subjects and the enhancement
of a shared and cooperative culture of risk management.
3.7.2 Challenges
The tools to develop a global framework of public-private governance for cyber
risk need to be defined, introducing innovative intelligence tools and specific
methodologies. One of the main challenges is to strengthen reporting and in-
formation sharing policies and procedures between national authorities, par-
ticularly in the private sector, in order to keep a comprehensive overview of the
threat landscape and to improve response capabilities.
It is therefore important to define frameworks that outline methodological
approaches, policies, processes, and enabling technologies to be adopted by in-
stitutions and companies to address specific cyber risk management require-
ments and by governmental organisations to share information on key threats,
vulnerabilities, and accidents occurring in the cyberspace.
These frameworks will allow all institutions involved in risk management
to build a context of higher (situational awareness) at a national level, enabling
them to:
1. understand the current security position of all relevant critical infrastruc-
ture stakeholders;
2. assess and, if applicable, support progress towards proper positioning;
3. notify internal partners of cyber risks;
4. coordinate the public authorities responsible for responding to incidents
and taking appropriate mitigation measures;
5. determine the decision-making process of policy makers on strategic pri-
orities.
3.7.3 Objectives
The two main frameworks that are needed are:
Dynamic Cyber Risk Management – DCRM — The components of the
DCRM must be designed, developed, implemented, and validated in real-world
contexts taking into account the following important principles:
• the clear definition of the cyber risk management policy and related crite-
ria for risk assessment and management (organisational attitude to risk,
risk management criteria and tolerance level, articulation of roles and re-
sponsibilities);
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• a focus on the evaluation of dynamic risk management: the key aspects of
critical operations and critical services, the vulnerabilities, the presence
of dynamic threats, the probability of accidents, the impact of an ongoing
accident;
• applicability to the different companies and critical infrastructures;
• flexibility in relating to different and new legislation;
• clear processes and activities to support early detection (risk identifica-
tion) and rapid response to accidents (risk mitigation), enabling imme-
diate operational initiatives, providing feedback to corporate risk man-
agement and governance processes; this includes dynamic detection, as-
sessment, and management of new threats and vulnerabilities;
• the possibility to share information on dynamic cyber risks and accidents
within a secure framework to public bodies (see PPIS below);
• the use of clear indicators and metrics to support both the continuous
improvement of the DCRM framework and the revision of the security
guarantee model, related checks, and reference frameworks.
Public–Private Cyber Risk Information Sharing – PPIS — The compo-
nents of the PPIS must be designed, developed, implemented, and tested in in-
stitutional governmental organisations, taking into account the following fun-
damental principles:
• the alignment with the EU cybersecurity strategy, the specific national
legislation and the sector-specific requirements (e.g., energy, telecom-
munications, water, etc.);
• the clarity of roles and responsibilities regarding information sharing and
collaboration between the public and private organisations involved;
• a focus on the “need to know and share” and on the specific security re-
quirements of all stakeholders and players for sharing information, col-
laboration and mutual trust;
• the use of clear indicators and metrics to assess and monitor risk trends
at the national and sectoral level;
• a focus on early detection and rapid response to accidents.
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3.8 Active Defence
The improvement of computer attack techniques often implies that victims re-
alise too late that an attack is taking place. Correcting a vulnerability may pre-
vent a new exploitation, but cannot do anything with respect to the attack that
brought it to light. A proactive approach is therefore needed to set up a so-called
active defence.
Active Defence – The use of hacking and penetration testing techniques (see box
on page 44) to detect vulnerabilities of systems before they can be exploited for
attacks; the use of counter-attack techniques and malware generation to identify
and stop ongoing attacks.
In general, the concept of active defence is intended to play an increas-
ingly central role in the protection of national strategic infrastructures. With ad-
vanced technologies and automatic tools for strengthening their own defences,
the companies involved will be able to guarantee a greater protection of their
strategic assets. Consequently, the delicate management of sensitive data and
critical infrastructures will also be strengthened, improving the country’s de-
fence against cyber attacks.
It has never been more urgent to launch appropriate training campaigns to
increase active defence capabilities. Understanding attack techniques and their
practical applications is useful not only for the training of qualified personnel,
but also for those who intend to start new careers, e.g, as system programmers.
3.8.1 State of the art
Among the most popular active defence training initiatives there are Capture-
The-Flag (CTF) style competitions, used by an increasing number of compa-
nies and government agencies, following the example of companies like Google,
Facebook and the GCHQ.
CTF – Capture-The-Flag – A competition with simulations of realistic scenarios in
which participants carry out active defence activities for complex computer sys-
tems, application attacks to applications, and development and analysis (reverse
engineering) of malware.
Bug Bounty – A reward program aimed at detecting vulnerabilities in computer sys-
tems or services (bug hunting phase) and immediately reporting them confiden-
tially to the owners of the target systems, with clear legal safeguards for all stake-
holders.
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At the international level, it is worth mentioning the initiatives taken in the
USA by the DARPA which, in addition to having launched a specific defence pro-
gramme, has recently organised the first CTF competition between autonomous
systems, called the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC)34. The teams’ participants
combined the most innovative active defence techniques and artificial intelli-
gence to develop systems capable of identifying vulnerabilities in the supplied
software, to generate patches and to attack rival systems without any support
from analysts.
In Italy, the CyberChallenge. IT is worth mentioning. It is a project of the
CINI National Laboratory for Cybersecurity, presented in Section 6.2.1.
Other projects involve the Digital Transformation Team, the National CERT
and CERT-PA to define national “responsible disclosure” policies in order to fa-
cilitate the rapid resolution of PA security issues and to minimise risks for the
people. This initiative is connected to European projects such as the EU Free
and Open Source Software Auditing (EU-FOSSA)35 that studies the identification
of vulnerabilities in critical software, through Bug Bounty initiatives as well.
3.8.2 Challenges
In the field of active defence, new methodologies need to be defined for the
prevention and mitigation of attacks. They must go beyond the traditional con-
cept of passive defence in order to identify and respond promptly to emerging
threats, such as zero-day vulnerability. In fact, because of the nature of hetero-
geneous and highly dynamic modern hybrid systems, it becomes necessary to
anticipate hostile actions by putting into practice the same operations of a po-
tential attacker. The main purpose of this activity is to identify possible flaws
in the system security, in order to strengthen the defence where this is more
necessary or convenient. In addition, actions should be developed in a mul-
tidisciplinary framework, taking the specific operational context into account
and involving experts from the different application domains.
Zero-day – The software vulnerabilities that are unknown to system operators in-
terested in defending against attacks, but known to attackers. Until the vulnerabil-
ity is known, attackers can use it to compromise the system itself or other systems.
An attack that exploits a zero-day vulnerability is called exploit zero-day.
Such methodologies must lead to the development of innovative products
for the analysis and protection of services and infrastructures. This process
should take place by involving the main national industries active in the field
34https://www.darpa.mil/program/cyber-grand-challenge
35https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/eu-fossa
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of cybersecurity, and by creating innovative start-ups with strong vertical com-
petences.
In addition, in order to ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives, legisla-
tors must define and regulate security protocols for critical infrastructure op-
erators. It will be necessary to define codes of conduct and engagement to al-
low active defence operations, such as penetration testing (see box on page 44),
without putting the security of the infrastructures at risk.
Finally, procedures must be defined for threat prevention, mitigation and
reporting. These procedures should refer to appropriate CERTs (see box on
page 17) dedicated to the protection of specific infrastructures of interest, such
as transport, energy and telecommunications.
3.8.3 Objectives
Among the main objectives, the following should be included:
• Active Defence Practices — In this regard, it is appropriate to “institu-
tionalise” initiatives such as the CyberChallenge. IT project of the CINI
National Cybersecurity Laboratory (presented in section 6.2.1), extend-
ing them to all potentially interested students from all age groups.
• Bug Bounty programs — With the dual goal of training and improving
national information technology security, it is necessary to promote the
growth of the Bug Bounty programs (see box on page 74. Universities will
deal with training, usage, and ethics, while companies have the task of
increasing the use of such tools, still looked at with scepticism. Com-
mon initiatives may consist in the practice of “bug hunting” by university
students as part of exams for cybersecurity laboritories, in close collab-
oration with partner companies, guaranteeing full the confidentiality of
detected weaknesses.
• Legislation on the subject of “white-hacking” — The legislator is respon-
sible for considering the legal implications of such practices, providing
safeguards for white-hat hackers who participate in penetration testing
and bug hunting campaigns. An understanding of the phenomenon is
necessary, in addition to the introduction of clear legal distinctions be-
tween those who exploit vulnerabilities and those who communicate
them to the operators of the systems/services analysed in a timely man-
ner. Tools such as responsible disclosure should become part of initiatives
of law proposals, aiming at protecting on the one hand companies and
PAs and their interests and on the other hand those who find the vulner-
abilities and are committed to confidentiality. These people should not
be targeted by legal actions.
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• Incident Response — An important step towards defending national in-
terests and strategic infrastructures and industries is the creation of “ver-
tical” CERTs dedicated to a specific aspect (such as energy distribution,
transport, financial markets) with state, industrial and academic part-
ners. Another additional responsibility of these consortia should be the
definition of the boundaries of the digital counterattacks, (a topic that is
becoming increasingly relevant, as highlighted by the proposed US law
Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act36), that is aimed at actively defending
against ongoing attacks and identifying the perpetrators.
White Hacking – Activities of IT experts, also called ethical hackers or white hats,
who oppose the criminal use of computer systems. These experts specialise in pen-
etration testing and in all methodologies for testing system security, they differ from
black hats due to their positive and altruistic aims.
36https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4036/text
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CHAPTER
4
Enabling Technologies
Enabling technologies increase the cybersecurity level of a complex system. In
this chapter we consider some of the key ones.
The challenges posed by hardware architectures are analysed first. Unfor-
tunately, they have not been considered nationally for some time, despite the
fundamental role they play in terms of the so-called national technology.
Next come vertical systems, such as encryption (in particular post-quantum
cryptography), biometric systems, and quantum technologies. They are known
as technological cornerstones for which Italy has a great scientific and indus-
trial tradition, which should be transformed into an international competitive
advantage.
Afterwards, we consider Artificial Intelligence and discuss the ways intelli-
gent agents can be used maliciously and how they can be exploited to guarantee
better defences.
We conclude the chapter by considering an enabling technology in which
we think Italy should invest in order to build an additional competitive advan-
tage: the construction of a national blockchain.
It should be noted that in this chapter, technologies such as machine learn-
ing, big data and data analytics are not considered to be “enablers” as they are,
in fact, transversal to many security systems and widely used by them. In this
light, the algorithms underlying data analytics as well as those used for machine
learning must be protected and their protection is considered in chapter 5.
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4.1 Hardware Architectures
As with software, data and communication infrastructure, the hardware must
be designed, built, tested, used, and maintained taking into account possible
cyber attacks and their consequences. The main security issues arising from
hardware components within the IoT and Industrial Control System devices will
be analysed in sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. This section considers hardware
systems in their complexity, with particular attention directed to their impact on
the so-called National Technology.
Design Bug – This error is mainly attributable to the fact that, during the design
phase, attention was paid to functional aspects but not security ones, rendering
the device vulnerable even though operating correctly.
Hardware Trojan – An additional or modified component with respect to the initial
design, aimed at introducing various kinds of vulnerabilities. Modifications can be
made either during circuit design, by unreliable suppliers of functional blocks (IP
cores) available on the market or by malicious designers, or during the manufac-
turing process by unreliable manufacturers.
Side-Channel Effect – The possible vulnerability of a circuit or system deriving
from the possibility to measure (from the outside) and analyse the values of spe-
cific physical aspects of hardware, such as timings, voltages, currents, induced elec-
tromagnetic fields, temperatures, energy consumption, etc. These values can be
correlated with data retrieved from the software in order to fraudulently exfiltrate
secret information.
Counterfeited hardware device – A device that, taken from a decommissioned ma-
chine (e.g. by desoldering them from their motherboards), is illegally recycled and
fraudulently put back onto the market, possibly after having suitably counterfeited
the package. Beyond the economic damage, the use of recycled components can
have serious consequences on the safety of the systems in which they are used (due
to their high failure rate) and great impact on security.
The hardware runs the software and is, in fact, the last line of defence: if
the hardware is corrupted, all the mechanisms introduced to make the software
secure (at any level) can prove useless. Unduly protected hardware can be the
weak link in the chain, becoming an easy gateway to the system, its functionali-
ties and data.
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As with software, hardware vulnerability may result from project bugs (De-
sign Bug) or intentionally inserted faults (Hardware Trojans). In addition, unlike
software, hardware can be observed and controlled (and therefore also physi-
cally attacked) from the outside, through physical quantities and/or its physi-
cal interactions with the real world (Side-Channel effect). Furthermore, in the
case of hardware, in addition to the typical software attacks and those directed
towards the misappropriation of data and service interruptions, there are also
attacks aimed at the theft of intellectual property intrinsic to the technological
solutions used for counterfeits through the fraudulent re-entry of decommis-
sioned and therefore typically worn out devices back onto the market (Hardware
Counterfeiting).
Physical attack – The physical interaction with a hardware device to access its in-
ternal elements (e.g., via probing) or to inject faults during the execution of a se-
curity algorithm. Injected faults can, for example: (i) force the value of a processor
register in order to modify the running flow of a program, forcing it to skip security
control functions; (ii) alter the quality of a random number generator; (iii) discover
the value of the secret key used in an cryptographic algorithm. Faults can be in-
jected via laser pulses, electromagnetic pulses, abnormal values on supply voltages
and/or timing signals, operating temperature variations.
4.1.1 State of the art
Many papers and books can found in the literature that contain detailed anal-
yses of the state of the art on hardware security; the reader could for example
consider [68, 63, 48].
The use of Design for Testability solutions, such as scan chains (which were
introduced to allow device testing at both the end of the production process
and in the field), without taking security into proper consideration, entail crit-
ical issues that have been known for years. In addition, in early 2018, two at-
tacks, known as Meltdown1 and Spectre2, also found widespread resonance in
the mass media, exploiting bugs in the hardware design of advanced proces-
sors. These bugs make it possible to take advantage of the side effects of execut-
ing out-of-order machine instructions (unauthorised loading of cached data) to
read the contents of memory locations that should not have been accessed. Ex-
filtrated data may include, for example, passwords, secret keys, sensitive data,
permissions to access other services, and so on.
The Meltdown attack (known as CVE-2017-57543) creates a software excep-
tion (trap) that aborts instructions executed in advance and then gets a privilege
1https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf
2https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf
3https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2017-5754
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escalation (see box on page 122) specific to Intel processors. The Spectre attack
(CVE-2017-57534 and CVE-2017-57155) is based on the classical technique of
branch-prediction. and, thanks to its generality, can be successfully run on In-
tel, AMD and ARM processors.
In both cases, the design flaws do not affect the operations of the proces-
sors involved in any way, but they do introduce security vulnerabilities. Under
certain conditions, it is in fact possible for a “normal” user (process) to fraudu-
lently access information that should instead only be accessible to “privileged”
users. Although developing attacks such as Spectre or Meltdown is extremely
complex (and therefore unlikely to take place in practice), they are a further
demonstration of how by corrupting the hardware or exploiting its vulnerabili-
ties, any mechanisms introduced to secure software (at any level) can turn out
to be useless. In this respect, the impact of Meltdown and Spectre on the Cloud
is analysed in section 5.2.
In conclusion, it is important to stress the need to consider the security as-
pects and the different vulnerabilities of hardware and software in an integrated
way. In some cases, such as that exploited by Meltdown and Spectre, the hard-
ware vulnerability can only be eliminated by modifying the design of the next
versions of the processors, thus the only way to remedy (“put a patch”) on ex-
isting processors, which will remain flawed forever, is to take software-level ac-
tions or to modify all the operating systems that use the faulty processors. In
other cases, it is the hardware that “comes to the rescue” of software vulnera-
bilities, carrying out a series of checks and operations directly at the hardware
level, rather than at the software level, in a safer and less attackable way.
4.1.2 Challenges
The following are among the main challenges to be addressed in this area:
• Hardware Security — In analysing hardware security issues (Hardware Se-
curity) one has to consider various aspects, such as: (i) the implemen-
tation technology used; (ii) the hierarchical abstraction level considered
(logic blocks, IP-core, chips, plates, systems, etc.); (iii) the various types of
components used (processors, memories, input/output devices, sensors,
actuators, interconnect networks, custom devices, devices with reconfig-
uration capacity, etc.); (iv) the application domain (automotive, indus-
trial, consumer, etc.); (v) the complexity of the system (integrated, mo-
bile, personal, server, cluster, HPC, etc.).
• Hardware Trust — Security issues should be considered at all stages of
the life cycle of a hardware device (Hardware Trust): from design to man-
4https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5753
5https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5715
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ufacture, from testing (both at the end of production and field) to decom-
missioning.
• Length of life cycle of hardware devices — Except for very special cases
(such as FPGA-based systems, with or without partial dynamic recon-
figuration mechanisms), the operational life of the hardware is typically
much longer than that of the software, which can be periodically up-
dated, even remotely. Hardware can also pose security problems beyond
the end of its operational life, as discarded components and devices can
be attached to extract stored data or used as counterfeit devices. While in
the first case there are obvious data protection problems, in the second
case, in addition to the already mentioned safety problems, there may
be security problems, as well. For example, security issues may come
from the use of a device, assumed to be of last generation, but in reality
of a previous generation that was known to contain some vulnerabilities,
which have been eliminated in the latest releases of the same family of
products.
• Vulnerability tolerance — As noted above, hardware vulnerabilities, re-
gardless of their nature, can only be corrected by modifying the design
and are therefore bound to remain permanently in the devices. To con-
tinue using vulnerable devices safely, it is necessary to develop archi-
tectural solutions capable of tolerating the vulnerabilities by preventing
their exploitation by malicious attackers. Several different solutions can
be considered, depending on the type of vulnerability and the level of
criticality of the system that uses the devices. By way of example, there
may be: (i) solutions based exclusively on software and aimed at pre-
venting malicious attackers from exploiting known vulnerabilities. This
is the solution adopted, in the case of Meltdown and Spectre, by many
operating systems that are modified to prevent the exploitation of certain
functions; (ii) solutions in which, in a way conceptually similar to smart
cards, the affected devices are “confined” in protected (trusted) zones and
are allowed to run only secure code, developed and loaded in protected
and guaranteed environments, making it impossible to inject the mali-
cious code that could be used to launch attacks of any kind; (iii) solutions
based on the interaction of appropriate combinations of different com-
ponents, such as processors, FPGAs, Smart Cards, dedicated hardware
devices; (iv) solutions aimed at tolerating byzantine behaviour [50] in the
case of complex systems with many interacting devices.
• National Technology — The need to develop a national technology will be
discussed in the conclusions of this volume (chapter 9). Here it is impor-
tant to note that, when setting up a “national” production of hardware
devices, the entire production chain must be trusted (and therefore de-
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veloped in protected environments): from the design process (the people
involved, design support tools, IP core providers) to the production, test-
ing, installation, and maintenance processes. Careful planning and man-
agement would ensure the project’s viability at a cost that is compatible
with Italy’s financial resources.
• Certifications — In the case of hardware certifications, it should be
pointed out that, with respect to the vulnerabilities analysed above, the
limitations resulting from the difficulty (or impossibility, in many cases)
of measuring the level of resilience of a device towards a certain type of at-
tack should be taken into account. Design errors, such as those that make
Meltdown and Spectre attacks possible, are extremely difficult to identify
and no certification of the processor security level would be able to cer-
tify their absence. Identifying a“well-known” trojan hardware is theoreti-
cally possible, although it is both costly and time-consuming. This type of
analysis could not, however, guarantee the absence of any unknown tro-
jans. It is possible to measure a device’s resilience to side channel attacks,
if quantity and quality of the resources used in the attack are defined in
advance. For certifying the impossibility of physical attacks, it is neces-
sary to define accurate models of the behaviour of the target technology
with respect to the means of attack, such as current injection, light, laser,
electromagnetic sources, etc. Models will then have to be developed at
different hierarchical levels of abstraction (electric, logical, RT, system) in
order to integrate them into simulators capable of assessing the resilience
of the devices and the effectiveness of any countermeasures against this
type of attack.
• Root causes analysis of a vulnerability — In case of discovery of a success-
ful attack, understanding whether the vulnerability that made it possible
is ultimately attributable to hardware can be very complex and tracing it
back to the root cause can be even more complex. The difficulty in identi-
fying design errors that made Meltdown and Spectre possible is emblem-
atic.
4.1.3 Objectives
In order to address the challenges summarised above, it is necessary to imple-
ment a set of actions aimed at attaining the following objectives:
• Awareness and training — (i) awareness among policy makers and stake-
holders of the severity of the threat and of the significance of the issues
associated with hardware security, including from an economic point
of view; (ii) actively raising the awareness of whomever, at the national
level, is involved in various ways in the design, production, and testing
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of hardware systems, through the set of actions and projects extensively
illustrated in sections 6.2 and 6.3. In this regard, it should be pointed
out that it is necessary to act at the university level, within the courses
aimed at training hardware designers: the aspects of Hardware Security
and Trust are nowadays almost completely absent in the Italian univer-
sity panorama. However, it is also necessary to have refresher courses for
designers operating in the Design Center throughout the country, and for
whoever uses FPGA components in the most diverse architectures and
applications.
• Specialist laboratories within the Competence Centers — Similarly to what
already happens in many other countries, departments focused on Hard-
ware Security and Trust should be created within the to-be-instituted
Competence Centres in cybersecurity (considered in section 2.3). In par-
ticular, actions should be undertaken in order to create specialised labo-
ratories within the National Centre for Research and Development in Cy-
bersecurity, focused on research, development, and technology transfer,
capable of providing the following to both public and private national
stakeholders:
– Analyses, qualitative and quantitative evaluations, measurements
of resilience to physical attacks of hardware systems, at all levels of
abstraction, for the various types of components, and for the varie-
gated complexity of systems;
– Analysis of the impact on security of different technologies, from
the so-called “emerging” technologies to established microelec-
tronics and packaging technologies;
– Support for the National Evaluation and Certification Centre in its
various phases and for the different types of certifications discussed
in section 6.5;
– Support to policy makers in the drafting of rules relating to security
issues arising from the disposal of hardware equipment;
– Advice on security issues in the management of all phases of the
life cycle (definition of requirements, procurement, design, pro-
duction, testing, analysis, etc.) of hardware infrastructures.
• Support to the CERT network — Establishing a close collaboration with
the network of national CERTs to support them in all phases of vulnerable
root causes analysis.
• Development of “national” vulnerabilities-tolerant architectures — Devel-
oping national architectures capable of guaranteeing pre-defined secu-
rity levels, even in the presence of hardware devices containing vulnera-
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bilities of varying nature, known and/or not yet revealed. The proposed
solutions should be adaptable to the criticality of the target systems.
• Support to “national” productions — Following the definition, by policy
makers, of “national” productions considered strategic for national se-
curity and those to be found, instead, on the foreign market, the Lab-
oratories mentioned above must provide the necessary support for the
implementation of the relevant security policies.
4.2 Cryptography
In the area of communications security, encryption is the basic technique to
ensure secure information exchange by guaranteeing the indecipherability of
messages. It is one of the fundamental mechanisms for data protection and
identification. It now used pervasively, for example, when we connect to our
bank via the web, disable the device to immobilise our car or when we use ATMs,
credit cards, smartphones, and even keys for coffee machines. New technolo-
gies like the blockchain (presented in section 4.6) are also based on encryption
techniques to ensure the integrity and security of transactions.
It is well known that, in recent years, the number of vulnerabilities of en-
cryption systems has increased considerably [15, 69, 7]. Encryption-based at-
tacks, once considered possible only by government agencies, are in fact now
part of the standard hacker skill set, as demonstrated by the presence of various
types of hacker training sessions and technical presentations on cryptographic
attacks in latest editions of Black Hat6,7,8 and DEFCON9,10.
The security of a cryptographic system is not only dependent on the ways
different algorithms are combined and implemented, but it is also strongly
linked to the security of the algorithms themselves. Systems which were consid-
ered inviolable just a few years ago are now considered insecure. For instance,
it has been proven that it is possible to compute collisions for cryptographic
hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 and, consequently, any digital signatures
based on these functions can be falsified [69, 70]. The introduction of quan-
tum computers will undermine standard encryption systems such as RSA; it is
6https://www.blackhat.com/us-16/training/crypto-uses-and-misuses-
how-to-use-cryptography-properly-and-attack-those-that-dont.html
7https://www.blackhat.com/us-17/training/schedule/index.
html#beyond-the-beast-a-broad-survey-of-crypto-vulnerabilities-
57601483747943
8https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/training/crypto-attacks-and-
defenses.html
9https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTngMxmymX4
10https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-25/dc-25-workshops.html
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therefore of paramount importance to study post-quantum algorithms, capable
of withstanding technologies that will likely be available in a few years.
Finally, it is necessary to highlight how the hardware that executes the cryp-
tographic algorithms constitutes, in fact, the last line of defence: if an attacker
corrupts the hardware, all the mechanisms introduced to make the software safe
(at any level) may prove to be useless. Even in the presence of the best crypto-
graphic algorithms, a hardware that is not adequately protected, regardless of
the context in which it operates, can constitute the weak link in the chain, be-
coming an easy access door to the system, its functions, and its data.
Cryptographic systems must therefore be be set up correctly, in order to en-
sure their robustness, with regard to both algorithms and to their software and
hardware implementation; this section highlights the main challenges and lines
of research in this area.
4.2.1 State of the art
In recent years, many companies have adopted an “imaginative” approach to
cryptography, by developing proprietary systems that have been regularly vio-
lated. One such example is represented by the automotive protection systems
(see, for instance, [36, 75]). These failures have brought about a fundamental
change, with the increasing adoption of standard cryptographic systems. How-
ever, as we have pointed out, in many cases is not easy to choose and configure
the cryptographic mechanisms in order to provide the desired guarantees. Re-
search on cryptography has produced excellent results since the 1970s, but the
growing pervasiveness of cryptography requires us to face new challenges. New
solutions need to be provided to ensure that the theoretical security of crypto-
graphic algorithms is preserved from their implementations and that they re-
main secure over the years even in the face of revolutionary technologies, such
as quantum computing.
Security of cryptographic systems Recommendations on the correct use
of cryptographic systems are regularly issued by important bodies such as
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)11, the European
Union Agency for Network and the Information Security (ENISA)12, the PCI Se-
curity Standards Council13, the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systemes
d’information (ANSSI)14, and the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Information-
11http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/key_management.html
12https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/
library/deliverables/algorithms-key-size-and-parameters-report-2014/
13https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library
14http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2015/01/RGS_v-2-0_B1.pdf
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stechnik (BSI)15. Nevertheless, translating the recommendations into secure
configurations and implementations is not always immediate. Public and pri-
vate initiatives such as Better Crypto16 and Cryptosense17 are trying to fill in the
gap between the theoretical recommendations and their practical implementa-
tion.
Postquantum encryption TheEuropean Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI) has set up a working group18 and published a White Paper19 on
the possible impact of the quantum technologies on current IT security solu-
tions. In 2013, the European Commission funded the PQCRYPTO project (Post-
quantum cryptography for long-term for long-term security)20 on these issues.
NIST has recently issued an international call for tenders21 for encouraging the
design and development of asymmetric cryptographic systems that are resistant
to cryptanalytic attacks performed with both quantum and conventional com-
puters and that, at the same time, can interact with existing protocols and com-
munication networks. In Italy research on post-quantum cryptographic systems
has focused on solutions that use codes for error correction [52, 8, 55].
4.2.2 Challenges
The exponential increase in attacks made on systems that adopt cryptographic
solutions has highlighted the need for a systematic analysis of the applied en-
cryption algorithms, i.e., how a cryptographic system is created and configured.
There is extensive literature on cryptographic protocol analysis, at the logical
level of message exchange (e.g., [5, 17, 30]) and specific protocol implementa-
tions have been analysed (see, for instance, [14, 13]), but it is necessary to devise
systematic and repeatable solutions to the problem of building and configuring
secure cryptographic systems.
• Security of existing cryptographic libraries — To understand the level of
security of applications it is necessary to analyse the security of the cryp-
tographic libraries and APIs used. In fact, in many cases it is not possible
15https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR02102/BSI-TR-02102.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile
16https://bettercrypto.org/
17https://cryptosense.com
18http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/quantum-
safe-cryptography
19http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/quantum-
safe-cryptography
20http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/194347_en.htm
21http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/documents.html
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for a developer to understand whether the use of a certain cryptographic
mechanism can provide the security guarantees required by the applica-
tion. Likewise, it is not possible for the end user to understand the level
of cryptographic security of an application. A case in point is represented
by home banking apps: The user must trust the developers and has no
visibility with respect to the actual level of protection. It is therefore es-
sential to perform a systematic analysis of standard libraries and to de-
velop tools and techniques to assess the cryptographic security level of
applications. An accurate monitoring of “typical” cryptographic errors is
also required in order to prevent future attacks. This will make it possi-
ble to move towards a certification of cryptographic systems based on the
recommendations of the international bodies mentioned above.
• Security of a cryptographic algorithm as part of a hardware/software sys-
tem — Cryptographic algorithms are typically built in complex ecosys-
tems that, if poorly configured or implemented, could compromise the-
oretical security. Recent attacks have shown that it is very important to
pay attention to the system as a whole. The KRACK [74] attack on WPA2
shows how a protocol error can completely compromise the security of
data parameters in input to cryptographic algorithms. Some vulnerabil-
ities of Java keystore22 that allow one to extract keys and cryptographic
certificates used by applications written in Java are illustrated in [33]. An
unsafe implementation of the key generation for RSA encryption is de-
scribed in [58]; for some devices on the market, it allows to determine
the prime factors and therefore to completely break the cryptographic
scheme. As far as traditional encryption is concerned, it is therefore of
fundamental importance to investigate the security of cryptographic sys-
tems as a whole, rather than investing in the search of new cryptographic
algorithms.
• Post-quantum encryption systems — The robustness of the main asym-
metric cryptographic systems currently used to digitally encrypt and sign
data and communications is based on the difficulty of solving, in a com-
putationally efficient way, the problems of integer factorisation and ex-
tracting discrete logarithms. However, these systems are increasingly at
risk of decryption due to the growing computing power available. In 1994,
P. Shor [66] introduced an algorithm, specifically designed to be run by a
quantum computer, that can solve the problems of integer factorisation
and extracting discrete logarithms much more efficiently than the equiv-
alent algorithms designed for conventional computers. When the first
quantum calculators will be available, as their ability to factor integers
22CVE-2017-10345 and CVE-2017-10356 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/
security-advisory/cpuoct2017-3236626.html
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into prime numbers will be much faster than that traditional comput-
ers, any encryption system that uses keys of practicable size will become
vulnerable, and therefore practically no longer usable [59]. Considering
the growing development of quantum technologies for electromechani-
cal and optical systems, it is easy to anticipate the introduction, within a
few years, of quantum machines with computing power in line with the-
oretical forecasts.
A recent report by the Global Risk Institute23 states that there is a
One in seven chance that the basic tools of public key encryp-
tion will become obsolete by 2026, with a 50% of of this hap-
pening by 2031.
It is therefore extremely important to define alternative post-quantum
schemes that can guarantee an adequate security margin even in the face
of quantum processors.
• Quantum cryptographic systems — Unlike post-quantum cryptographic
systems, quantum cryptographic systems create cryptographic primi-
tives based on the properties of quantum mechanics. Quantum cryp-
tography represents an important area of research developed by S. Wies-
ner [76]. One of the main the challenges of this discipline is undoubtedly
its feasibility in practice. However, interest in this technology is always in-
creasing and there are now several companies that that develop and mar-
ket systems based on quantum cryptography. Among these we have IDs
Quantique (Geneva, Switzerland)24, MagiQ Technologies Inc. (Boston,
MA, USA)25, and QuintessenceLabs (Canberra, Australia) 26.
• Homomorphic cryptographic systems — The most complex challenge is
using and analysing encrypted data directly on the cloud: today it is first
necessary to decrypt them or move them to local systems, without taking
full advantage of the capabilities offered by the cloud. There are new ap-
proaches that would solve this problem, such as homomorphic scratch
by C. Gentry [38], which allows users to work on encrypted data, ob-
taining the same results as the same operations performed on plain text
data. These techniques permit running applications on data stored in the
cloud without ever having to decrypt them. Unfortunately, these tech-
niques are computationally very complex and therefore remain of purely
23http://globalriskinstitute.org/download/a-quantum-of-prevention-
for-our-cybersecurity-1-pdf/
24https://www.idquantique.com/
25http://www.magiqtech.com/
26https://www.quintessencelabs.com/
90
theoretical interest. Experts predict that in the future homomorphic en-
cryption implementations of practical interest will be available for use in
concrete scenarios.
4.2.3 Objectives
The main objectives to be pursued are
• to develop tools and techniques to (i) assess the level of cryptographic se-
curity of cryptographic applications, libraries and APIs; (ii) monitor typi-
cal cryptographic errors in order to prevent future attacks; (iii) investigate
“applied written analysis” techniques capable of circumventing the secu-
rity guarantees of cryptographic algorithms. All this in order to prepare
new quality certifications of cryptographic systems.
• To advance the current state of cryptoanalysis of systems based on math-
ematical problems other than integer factorisation and extracting dis-
crete logarithms. Design new cryptosystems whose security level is ac-
curately quantifiable, in relation to both quantum and classical comput-
ers. Investigate the feasibility of post-quantum cryptosystems on general
purpose and/or dedicated computing devices.
At the national level, the main objective of this area remains the establishment
of a National Cryptography Laboratory, as established by the DPCM Gentiloni.
This laboratory will have to face the fundamental challenge of understanding
where our country will have to invest in cryptography, launching projects of na-
tional importance. The important issues to be considered are: (i) the risks and
opportunities for the development of national encryption algorithms and (ii)
how to deal with the emergency related to the arrival of quantum computers.
4.3 Biometry
Digital identity verification is an essential element for the security of IT and non-
IT systems. The importance of digital identities is evidenced by the fact that
their theft is one of the most widespread digital crimes. In addition, the theft
of a legitimate user’s digital identity is often the first step used by hackers and
criminals to undertake very complex attacks.
Traditional methods for the recognition of individuals are based on keys,
tokens, identity documents and passwords. These approaches, although still
valid, are about to show all their limitations in terms of safety and security and,
above all, usability. In fact, there are more and more common devices with
touch-screens or, more generally, with interfaces that do not rely on traditional
keyboards.
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For this reason, in addition to the authentication tools mentioned above,
biometric recognition technologies that assess physical or behavioural traits of
the person, such as fingerprints or faces, are rapidly spreading. Through accu-
rate acquisition sensors, biometric systems digitise a user’s biometric trait and
create a representation, called a template, which summarises the unique and
constant characteristics of the specific individual.
The template is specially designed to be effective and efficient in subse-
quent comparisons. In an initial recording phase, called enrollment, the tem-
plate is stored in a document or archive. During the subsequent recognition
steps, the template acquired from a person undergoing verification is compared
with stored templates. The biometric system decides whether the recognition is
successful using a measurement of similarity or difference between the tem-
plate and the archived one.
Biometric traits cannot be lost, they are difficult to share, are not prone to
theft and guarantee excellent results in recognition accuracy. These features are
leading to an increasing use of biometric systems in several operational con-
texts, such as the control of physical and logical access to data, applications and
tools (including computers and mobile phones), and the intelligent monitoring
of environments.
The performance of a biometric system can vary considerably depending
on the biometric trait used and the level of cooperation required from users.
The choice of the biometric trait to be used for specific applications is based
on an accurate analysis of operational and security requirements, taking into
account the laws on the protection of personal data.
4.3.1 State of the art
Biometric technology, by automating the passport screening process through
automated kiosks, helps to make the task of law enforcement agencies easier
when identifying passengers. In the banking sector, biometric methods such as
fingerprints, irises, voice, palm veins pattern, and behaviour, alone or in a com-
bined way, are used to block accounts and repress fraud. Biometric applica-
tions are also present in the judiciary system and many important innovations
in identity management have arisen in this area. Today, the biometric appli-
cations used by police forces are truly multimodal: fingerprints and facial and
voice recognition play a fundamental role in improving public security and in
finding wanted persons.
Furthermore, on the assumption that “identification provides a basis for
other rights and give voice to those who have no voice”, the World Bank Group
has launched projects and initiatives to use biometrics to ensure targeted ser-
vices and assistance (medical care, education, . . . ) in developing countries.
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Biometrics have already been the subject of many European projects in the
various Framework Programmes that have followed one another over the years,
up to the current H2020. Some examples are Tabula Rasa27 project, which in-
volved twelve partners. focusing on the vulnerabilities of biometric systems;
the BEAT28 project, aimed at standardising the current experimental protocols
in order to ensure the repeatability of experiments on the basis of scientific and
technological advancements in all biometrics-related areas; the PROTECT29,30,
project, oriented towards research on possible emerging biometrics; the IDEN-
TITY31 action oriented towards the exchange of researchers active in this area.
4.3.2 Challenges
The main challenges concern, in particular, the following aspects:
• Behavioural Biometry — The so-called Behavioural biometrics have al-
ways existed, but have been poorly considered for their limited identifi-
cation capabilities and high implementation costs. The hardware inno-
vations in recent years have made it possible to build very sophisticated,
low-cost sensors and install them in the most advanced devices.
• Improvement of acceptability and usability — Biometric technologies are
often perceived as being excessively invasive, difficult to use, or danger-
ous for privacy, e.g. due to the risk of template theft.
• Interoperability — Current biometric systems use different acquisition
sensors and recognition algorithms. Implementation and maintenance
of biometric databases and complex information systems therefore re-
quire the adoption of interoperability management techniques. This
theme becomes particularly important with the development of new
forms of authentication.
• Personal data protection — We must ensure the protection of templates
through the joint use of encryption and biometrics, using erasable bio-
metrics as well.
• Homomorphous classifiers — It is necessary to create homomorphous
classifiers, able to work therefore directly on encrypted templates, bor-
rowing the necessary technologies from homomorphic encryption.
27https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/news/eu-funded-
project-take-biometric-security-systems-next-level
28https://www.beat-eu.org/
29http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/202685_en.html
30http://projectprotect.eu/(BES)
31http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/dcs/research/df/projects/
identity/.
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4.3.3 Objectives
The main objectives of the project include:
• Building appropriate datasets for all biometrics deemed “mature” and
making them available, scalable, and usable as common references for
security validation.
• Developing metrics to validate biometric systems against key criteria
such as usability, resistance to sophisticated attacks aimed at replicat-
ing biometrics or behaviours of an individual, interoperability, costs, and
performance.
• Starting experimentation on the definition of behavioural traits to be
used in behavioural biometrics that are at the same time biometric and
secure, as they cannot be replicated.
• Developing “usable” technologies in order to increase the commercial
implementation of biometric systems with particular reference to acqui-
sition techniques that are non-contact and at a greater distance.
• Developing techniques for accessing multiple databases and exploiting
other comparison methods, managing multimodal fusion methods in a
flexible way on the basis of the available biometrics.
4.4 Quantum Technologies
The development of Quantum Technologies, over the last two decades, has cre-
ated the foundations for a new scientific and industrial revolution. In particu-
lar, the application of quantum technologies will represent a game-changer in
strategic areas such as secure communications and novel computing paradigms
(quantum computing).
Fundamental developments to create intrinsically secure communication
systems are in progress using quantum cryptography, in particular the quantum
distribution of cryptographic keys (Quantum Key Distribution, QKD), which, by
using the quantum properties of light, allows for the detection of attacks and
violations of the communication channel in real time, thus guaranteeing trans-
mission security. The QKD generates secure encryption keys, shared only be-
tween the transmitter and receiver and unknown to third parties, through the
transmission of single photons via conventional and unprotected communica-
tion channels (e.g., fibre optic or in free space). The cryptographic keys, whose
security is guaranteed by the laws of physics, can then be used to encrypt mes-
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sages between two users, or for other cryptographic protocols, see [39, 64] and
ETSI32.
Quantum technologies are strategic for this country and it is therefore fun-
damental that Italy strengthens its scientific and technological capacity in this
sector in order to limit, if not eliminate, its dependency on foreign countries
and companies in such a strategic field. In the short/medium term it is unlikely,
due to its high costs, that QKD will be used by private citizens. The expected
groups of users of this technology are, rather, government, diplomacy, secu-
rity, defence, health, financial institutions, banks and multinational companies.
Many of these potential users act at a global level and, therefore, their interest
in this technology will grow proportionally to the development of QKD systems
on a global scale.
It is, therefore, important to perform field trials of the new, intrinsically se-
cure, communication technologies based on the principles of the quantum me-
chanics, and to connect them with the most advanced cyber-security and data
protection techniques. The project is very ambitious and not without risk, but
it offers the possibility of carrying out research which might have a significant
technological and economic impact in the near future. The objective is to ex-
ploit, to the maximum potential, the specific skills and foundational results of
Italian research, to promote the transition from quantum science to quantum
engineering, and to develop the quantum technology required by the country.
4.4.1 State of the art
Experimental QKD networks using optical fibres were built in various areas in
different continents, for example in Vienna33, Tokyo34, and in China. Of partic-
ular relevance is the current Chinese project35, for the construction of a 2,000
km QKD link from Shanghai to Beijing, supported by a QKD ground-to-satellite
link to reach extremely distant areas. QKD links in optical fibre have already
been used during the elections in Switzerland36, for the secure transmission
of voter information, during the Football World Cup 201037 and in Australia38
for government communications. The applicability of QKD systems to existing
32“Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security: an introduction, benefits, enablers and
challenges”, ISBN 979-10-92620-03-0 – https://docbox.etsi.org/workshop/2014/
201410_crypto/quantum_safe_whitepaper_1_0_0.pdf, 2014.
33http://www.secoqc.net/html/technology/network.html
34http://www.uqcc.org/QKDnetwork/index.html
35http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7607012
36https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn12786
37https://phys.org/news/2010-06-world-cup-physics-thwart-hackers.
html
38https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/278658/
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optical fibre networks has been demonstrated in [24], and recently QKD point-
to-multipoint connections have also been established in optical fibre networks.
Today commercial products or industrial prototypes are available for the imple-
mentation of QKD point-to-point systems in optical fibre. These systems are
produced by both small-medium enterprises and large companies such as, for
example, ID Quantique SA (Switzerland), QuantumTech (China), Toshiba Re-
search Europe (UK) and QuintessenceLabs (Australia).
Many European countries have launched ambitious research programmes
to transform laboratory prototypes into commercial products. In the UK39, the
government has invested GBP 270 million in a five-year programme, with the
goal of reaching 1 billion in funding in the long term, for the further develop-
ment of quantum technologies and their transfer to the industry. Research pro-
grammes have also been launched in the Netherlands40 (EUR 135 million for a
10-year programme), in Germany41 and outside Europe, primarily in China and
the United States.
In Italy, the research in this field is prominently recognised on an interna-
tional level. In particular, recall the collaboration between the INRIM and the
CNR for the creation of a quantum communication backbone across the coun-
try (project Q-SecGroundSpace, in progress), and the collaboration between the
University of Padua and the ASI that led to the first quantum communication via
satellite [78, 73].
Thanks to the impetus provided by the European Quantum Flagship ini-
tiative, a national plan is under development to promote the transition from
quantum science to quantum engineering.
4.4.2 Challenges
The main challenges are related to the design, implementation and experimen-
tation of a communication infrastructure, which exploits the QKD technology
on a global scale, to support critical services such as financial transactions,
telemedicine, industrial control systems, and energy control systems (smart
grids).
QKD point-to-point connections in optical fibres will be limited to maxi-
mum connection distances of the order of a few hundred kilometres, despite
the planned improvement of single photon devices. For transmissions over
longer distances, it will be necessary to develop quantum repeaters42, instru-
ments which are currently only available as laboratory prototypes. In the short-
term we envisage that a QKD network on a global scale can be achieved with the
39http://uknqt.epsrc.ac.uk/
40https://qutech.nl/investmentquantumtechnology/
41http://www.qutega.de/en/home/
42http://quantumrepeaters.eu/quantumrepeaters.eu/index/
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exchange of cryptographic keys over relatively small distances (from a few hun-
dred to a few thousand kilometres) using optical fibres and exploiting trusted
nodes to switch from a point-to-point optical link to another, coupled with QKD
connections in free space via satellite for exchanging the cryptographic keys
over intercontinental distances.
The challenges, therefore, concern the development of QKD platforms on
optical fibres, QKD space platforms and their interconnection for ensuring se-
cure intermodal operations on a global scale. In addition, as noted in ETSI’s
White Paper, it is fundamental the interaction between quantum and classical
cybersecurity techniques to guarantee the continuity of the protection levels.
For QKD point-to-point connections over optical fibres, significant techno-
logical developments have already taken place, and the first commercial solu-
tions are already available. However, for the widespread use of this technique for
the protection of the communications, it is necessary to validate the reliability
of this technology “in the field” and to develop an accurate and reliable instru-
mentation which can be used by the operators of telecommunication compa-
nies, and not only in research laboratories.
Current commercial QKD systems use single photon devices (sources and
detectors) which can be improved in terms of performance and the quantum
protocols implemented. For example, single-photon detectors are currently
being developed in laboratories, based on semiconductor or superconducting
technologies, with high temporal resolution and low background noise, which
seem fundamental to ensure a high (effective) bit rate over long distances.
Satellite QKD systems are an advanced research topic, and important sci-
entific and technological efforts are still needed to make them commercially us-
able. It is necessary to verify their experimental feasibility, to develop the mea-
surement technologies and infrastructure needed for the satellite-earth QKD
links, and to investigate the satellite-satellite QKD connections. At the same
time, an intermodal trusted node to connect the QKD free-space system with the
QKD fibre optic system and to demonstrate the interoperability of the two QKD
systems also needs to be developed.
In parallel, in order to respond to a primary requirement of the emerging
quantum communications industry, it is also necessary to develop standardis-
ation criteria and control techniques to ensure the traceability of single photon
measurements and the security of their protocols.
Finally, for both terrestrial and free-space quantum communications it will
be fundamental to identify the best type of information encoding to maximise
efficiency and security. In the last few years, in addition to the standards based
on single photon and binary coding of quantum information (generally in the
polarisation of the photon), new proposals have been developed, based on clas-
sic light pulses and continuous variables [47] and on a coding deriving from the
spectral and temporal degrees of freedom [60]. These alternative schemes have
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great advantages in terms of high efficiency and selectivity of detection (using
homodyne type systems). They also offer the possibility of manipulating the in-
formation in a deterministic way in advanced protocols such as teleportation,
entanglement swapping and quantum repeaters [34], of which the project will
study possible implementation schemes. It is therefore essential to complement
existing sources and detectors with the new ones that make it possible to exploit
the best information coding schemes in the various sections of a global quan-
tum communication system.
4.4.3 Objectives
The project aims to achieve the following objectives and sub-goals:
• The development of an Italian QKD experimental platform on a global
scale based on optic fibre and free-space QKD systems:
– Designing, commissioning, and testing a QKD system in optical fi-
bre;
– Developing a prototype transmitter and receiver for a QKD system
via satellite;
– Studying coding schemes based on discrete and continuous vari-
ables with an adaptive configuration, based on channel character-
istics;
– Integration of components in photonic circuit platforms;
– Designing, developing, and testing a trusted node for exchanging
secure encryption keys between fibre optic and free space links;
– Developing a metrological infrastructure for the characterisation of
single-photon devices in QKD systems.
• Integration and interaction between legacy cyber-security and QKD tech-
niques.
• The development of new schemes and technologies for the next genera-
tion QKD systems:
– Designing and testing of innovative single photon sources and de-
tectors;
– Studying and developing information coding schemes for QKD sys-
tems that allow maximum efficiency and security;
– Designing and implementing advanced quantum communication
protocols such as quantum teleporting, quantum repeaters and en-
tanglement swapping.
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4.5 Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence and machine learning have been playing a fundamen-
tal role in many applications, ranging from medical image analysis to con-
versational agents. However, less attention has been paid to the ways intelli-
gent agents can be used maliciously and to the new, possibly severe, emerging
threats. It is needed to address the issue of the equilibrium that is likely to be
established between attackers and defenders, and to look for a systematic ap-
proach to services protection that is not simply based on tracking attackers to fix
security issues. While it looks hard to come up with a single general recommen-
dation, there are cases in which the appropriate pushing on the establishment
of the right battlefield in the never-ending competition between attackers and
defenders has a strong consequence on the evolution of security policies. As an
example, the development of spam filters in the case of large centralised systems
typically benefits from the expertise gained in facing similar attacks, as well as
from the large amount of data that can be used for training the spam classifiers.
The field of artificial intelligence has flourished by exhibiting the growing capa-
bilities of challenging human intelligence mostly with classic games, like chess
and Go, and linguistic games.
To some extent, the field of computer security can be regarded as a rich col-
lection of challenging games, where we must clearly arrange things in such a
way as to favour the defender. This is opening new exciting scientific challenges
where, from one side, the expertise in more traditional computer security can
contribute towards setting up the “game” properly so as to play on a biased bat-
tlefield. We need to devise guidelines to bring models of AI containment into the
world of cybersecurity with the purpose of developing software and procedures
for checking the vulnerabilities
The research and the development of security policies related to the ris-
ing impact of artificial intelligence is likely to be reflected in the dynamic es-
tablishment of an equilibrium between attackers and defenders. A systematic
approach to security, which is increasingly required to protect services, cannot
simply track the attackers and patch up security issues, but must be driven by a
long-term view on the evolution of the interactions of intelligent agents, where
we must place the defender in the more advantageous battlefield.
4.5.1 State of the art
At the end of the eighties, D.E. Dennings published a seminal paper [29] where
he framed security as a truly AI problem, mentioning before others the role of
expert systems and statistical approaches to learning to deal with security is-
sues. The DARPA IDS challenge and, immediately after, the KDD Cup IDS de-
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sign challenge43 opened the doors to a new field at the crossroad of computer
security and artificial intelligence. Years later, at the ACM SIGKDD international
workshop on “Privacy, Security, and Trust”44 an important list of contributions
was selected that covered a wide range of AI approaches. Other relevant KDD
workshops took place in 2010 and 2012, while more or less at the same time the
field of “Adversarial Machine Learning” was definitely established at the ACM
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security [44]. A fundamental step to-
wards new foundations on the field of computer security with emphasis in arti-
ficial intelligence is the “Manifesto from Dagstuhl Perspectives” on 201345 while
the field has also quickly spread to traditional AI and ML events like ICML 2014
(workshop on Learning, Security, and Privacy) and AAAI 2016 (1st Artificial In-
telligence for Cyber Security workshop).
The presence of the subject in both computer security and artificial intelli-
gence events is clearly indicating that the state of the art of most important ap-
proaches relies on the establishment of tight links between the traditional com-
munities of computer security and on artificial intelligence, particularly ma-
chine learning. Interestingly, while there are currently visible signs of quick evo-
lutions of symbolic models that are based on formal methods and knowledge
representation to machine learning approaches, the field in general is likely to
make additional progress in the near future. In particular, there are problems
of computer security where one can benefit from the appropriate integration of
symbolic and sub-symbolic models of computation (see, for instance, the IJCAI-
2018 tutorial on “Neural-symbolic Learning and Reasoning with Constraints” by
Luis Lamb et al.46
4.5.2 Challenges
As already pointed out, models based on artificial intelligence are, in fact,
transversal to most modern security systems. Interestingly, the dramatic growth
of network-based services is gradually exposing systems to new threats that very
much depend on a new population of algorithms that adopt intelligent tech-
niques. The time has come in which intelligent agents can concretely be de-
signed to fool other agents charged with protecting critical information, and
even to deceive humans. The vulnerabilities of AI systems are somewhat differ-
ent with respect to the traditional software vulnerabilities. As we will see in more
detail in section 5.3, the learning algorithms can be deceived to drive learn-
ing agents to undesirable states. This poisoning of the learning environment
43http://www.kdd.org/kdd-cup/view/kdd-cup-1999
44https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783540784777
45http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/dagman-complete/2013/
dagman-v003-i001-complete.pdf
46https://www.ijcai-18.org/tutorials/
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can take place in different contexts, including computer vision and natural lan-
guage understanding. Here are some novel challenges connected to different
approaches to artificial intelligence, that lead to the birth of truly new security
problems:
• Threats from automatic text generation and fake news — Machines can
autonomously generate and post text on the internet with such quality
that it can hardly be distinguished from human-produced content. This
can give rise to critical issues, including the spread of fake news and calls
for the development of associated agents purposely designed to discover
misleading information and capable of identifying the presence of auto-
matic generation; see section 3.4.
• Poisoning of learning environment and chatbot induction to offensive
tweets — The explosion of conversational agents might gradually increase
their impact on the interfacing of nearly any service for personal and
business purpose. While the protection of services on the internet al-
ready has a solid scientific and technologic tradition, the exposition of
novel services based on chatbots opens the doors to a truly new scenario
where the construction of security-by-design schemes seems to be very
difficult to reach. Tay, an artificial intelligence chatbot designed by Mi-
crosoft, caused quite the controversy when it began posting racist and
sexist tweets, thus forcing the company to shut the service down just a
few hours after its launch. This suggests that the release of similar bots
requires reasonable levels of security. An open problem with modern
chatbots that are driven by machine learning techniques is that humans
or other machines can poison the learning environment by strongly bi-
asing the interaction. This is what happened with Tay, which was arti-
ficially stimulated in the framework of an offensive conversation, from
which it learned to reproduce similar behaviour. This is a good example
from which we can see the importance of an appropriate integration of
knowledge-based reasoning schemes with learning, that can potentially
reduce the risk of similar a degeneration.
• Adversarial Learning — The explosion of multimedia information also
comes with new threats for humans and machines. The emerging wa-
termarking security brings new challenges to the design of watermark-
ing systems. The recent trend regarding the automatic generation of im-
ages/videos does not only bring forth issues related to the presence of
counterfeits, but it opens the doors to the automatic creation of non-
real visual environments. As an example, from a given book of faces
one can construct new faces where some features are emphasised and
modified, to the point where even the age and sex can be changed. In-
terestingly, other learning systems can be designed with the purpose of
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distinguishing faces that are automatically generated from those coming
from a book of real faces. In the last few years, this duality has led to the
development of the new field of adversarial learning. As an example, in
addition to the more traditional security issues connected with car infor-
mation systems, the emerging field of autonomous driving leads the way
to an impressive range of possible threats. The most noticeable example
is the possibility of changing a few bits in images to significantly change
the associated category and the corresponding actions.
• Identity detection — When enabling AI systems in different facets of or-
dinary life, we must realise that we are dramatically nearing the scenario
that Alain Turing had foreseen at the dawn of computer science. In many
cases, the set up of appropriate security policies does require the disclo-
sure of the identity of the agent offering the service. This is interwound
with the inherent structure of most models of intelligent behaviours and
seems to be a never-ending challenge that must properly be faced.
• Social engineering attacks — Phishing attacks are assuming a truly new
form with attackers that can fully exploit the trend of interacting by
means of social networks. The growing amount of personal information
that is spread in different sites makes it possible to gather users’ profiles
that can be very useful to set up deceiving policies with malicious objec-
tives. Social engineering attacks are now able to employ malicious agents
able to impersonate people and acquire critical information. This is be-
coming a very serious threat, considering the growing capability of intel-
ligent agents able to mimic the human voice, which allows them to is-
sue deceiving calls with malicious purposes. Although in a different field,
a somewhat similar scenario is that arising from swarm attacks where
autonomous robots cooperate with and monitor large areas, potentially
also coordinating actions.
• Automation of vulnerability discovery — In the initial phase of computer
security studies, scientists and engineers were are mostly concerned with
the identification of attacks that were carried out by hackers. As time goes
by, AI and ML methods are depicting a new scenario in which we prospect
the automation of vulnerability and hacking discovery, that is clearly ac-
celerating the search for fallacies and pitfalls of computer systems, as well
as the possibility of automating human-like denials of service.
Web spamming – The action intended to mislead search engines into ranking some
pages higher than they deserve.
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4.5.3 Objectives
In order to face the above mentioned challenges, in the following passages we
list some recommendations and objectives to pursued:
• Diffusion of ethics principles — Scientists in the field of artificial intelli-
gence should constantly bear in mind the importance of the ethical side
in the development of their ideas and on their concrete implementation.
In particular, they should promptly share the risks connected to harmful
applications.
• Biasing the battlefield — Studies in computer securities can benefit from
the progressive set up of conditions that favour the intelligent agent in-
volved in defence with respect to the one which carries out attacks. An
important foundational issue is that of studying the conditions and the
modalities to push the establishment of a stable bias towards the de-
fender.
• Development of symbolic / sub-symbolic systems — While there is no
doubt regarding the crucial role of machine learning in the spectacu-
lar development of new applications and useful services, the black box
nature of many of the underlying models offers at the same time quick
methodologies for the construction of systems to prevent security at-
tacks, and new fallacies and pitfalls that can be used by attackers. This
calls for the promotion of foundational studies aimed at shedding light
on these models with the purpose of better facing the rising threats of
learning-based systems.
• Diffusion of security risks coming from AI — Policymakers, scientists, and
engineers should collaborate to face the malicious uses of AI at differ-
ent levels and should also be involved in the construction of appropriate
policies of diffusion of awareness on the risks connected to these novel
threats.
• Bridge with traditional approaches — Some mature approaches to com-
puter security should be properly adapted to the novel framework of
transactions regulated by intelligent agents.
• Promotion of Openness — Scientists are strongly encouraged to promote
and explore open models of diffusion of AI and ML culture by emphasis-
ing pre-publications and favouring approaches that privilege safety and
security. This should be joined with the promotion of a culture of respon-
sibility associated with the nature of scientific discovery.
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4.6 Blockchain and Distributed Ledger
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies fill the pages of newspapers every day. They
are based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), also known as blockchain, of
which cryptocurrencies represent just one of the possible applications.
DLT – Distributed Ledger Technology – Technology based on a distributed
database called a blockchain, which contains transaction blocks. Thanks to pub-
lic key cryptography and consensus algorithms, it can guarantee its irreversibility
and integrity (over time).
It employs a naturally decentralised approach and does not require intermediaries
to validate or authenticate transactions. Each node in the network maintains its
own copy of all transactions and the nodes work to verify the validity of a new
transaction through a process called consensus. Each of these transactions is sent
to all nodes within the network to be verified and grouped into transaction blocks
marked with a timestamp.
There are two main categories of the DLT: unpermissioned (open) and permissioned
(regulated). The first is maintained by public nodes and is accessible to anyone
(Bitcoin is the best known example). The second (for example, the Corda platform)
involves only authorised nodes and thus facilitates faster, safer and cheaper trans-
actions.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse opportunities, risks and challenges of
adopting a national infrastructure, which provides the Italian system with the
technology for an informed and controlled use of DLTs.
4.6.1 State of the art
The future of financial infrastructure report published by the World Economic
Economic Forum in 201647 forecasted that 80% of banks would start DLT-based
projects by 2017. More than 24 countries and more than 90 central banks are
investing in, or discussing, the adoption of DLTs. In the last 3 years alone, more
than 2,500 patents on DLTs have been registered and more than USD 1.4 billion
invested. Multiple countries and both national and international organisations
are analysing the opportunity to support the development of DLTs as a basis for
public and private sector applications. These include the Singapore Monetary
Authority (MAS)48, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)49, the Bank of
47www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financial_infrastructure.
pdf
48http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/ProjectUbin/Project%20Ubin%20%
20SGD%20on%20Distributed%20Ledger.pdf
49http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/finanical-
infrastructure/Whitepaper_On_Distributed_Ledger_Technology.pdf
104
England (UK)50 51. The European Parliament 52, and the European Central Bank
53 have recognised the many regulatory challenges and opportunities offered by
DLTs.
In Italy, according to Assinform (the association of Confindustria that brings
together ICT companies), in 2017 a growth of +2.3% is expected throughout the
entire ICT market, driven by the most important components related to innova-
tive ideas, principally concerning DLTs 54. Conservative estimates also forecast
that investments in DLT-based projects will exceed EUR 2 billion in 2017.
In addition to this, the interest of various scientific and technical commu-
nities is evident. (W3C - Blockchain Community Group, OASIS - ISITC Europe,
ITU-T, Committee, ITU-T, Committee. ISO/TC 307)55.
4.6.2 Challenges
A national DLT (open or regulated) opens up challenges related to research, in-
novation and progress in various fields: from monetary control to digital rights
management and patent protection; from possible innovations in e-voting to
smart contracts, and to support the tracking of supply chains, as well as the in-
troduction of other scenarios aimed at creating innovative public services. The
most important challenges include:
• Extension of DLT beyond financial applications — The original and cur-
rently predominant use of the blockchain is related to cryptocurrencies.
As currency applications dominate the discussions surrounding DLTs,
and represent the most mature and well known applications, they are in-
fluencing the development of innovative application-based technologies.
However, the accessability of DLTs with low management costs compared
to transaction value and the availability of a register capable of storing in-
formation in a permanent and secure way would extend the possibilities
of using this technology beyond the boundaries of financial applications.
The challenge in this area is not to create a legal, national digital currency,
but rather the management and control of a national DLT (potentially
50http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/cbdc.aspx
51http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/onebank/cbdc.
pdf
52http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/581948/
EPRS_IDA(2017)581948_EN.pdf
53https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/initiatives/shared/docs/dlt_task_
force_mandate.pdf
54https://www.confindustria.ud.it/upload/pagine/Industria%2040/la%
20posizione%20del%20sistema%20confindustria/Confindustria%20Digitale%
20-%20Assinform%20-%20%20Lug%202016.pdf
55https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html?view=participation
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permissioned) to support non-financial applications and forms of “near
money” (e.g., local currency, debt securities) with low costs and with high
accessibility and usability. In order for this to be possible, it is important
to identify forms of certification that require less computational and stor-
age capacity and therefore allow limiting energy consumption, which in
the case of bitcoin is becoming too expensive.
• Analysis and protection from illegal transactions — Beyond the new pos-
sibilities and challenges that they present, DLTs also introduce new secu-
rity issues. Transactions are by themselves semi-anonymous (especially
within unpermissioned DLTs) and this has introduced wide-ranging illicit
markets, which live in the deep/dark web (see box on page 17). In addi-
tion, the lack of authentication (both strong and weak) has introduced
large-scale financial fraud (in addition to exchange sites, fake lotteries,
false online sales and so on, which have been subsequently closed down)
The challenge in this field therefore includes the analysis of the traffic
(which for all intents and purposes can be classified as Big Data) and the
identification of the hidden and illegal areas, both through forensic and
machine learning tools, and through a technical-economic study of the
financial market based on unpermissioned DLTs.
• Modelling, analysis and verification of smart contracts — Smart contracts
are programs automatically executed by the network of nodes that con-
trols a cryptocurrency. The consensus mechanism used to ensure the
consistency of the blockchain also ensures that the execution of these
programs is correct (a crucial property, given that smart contracts are typ-
ically used to transfer currency). One of the main research challenges
of smart contracts concerns their modelling, analysis and verification.
This type of research is particularly innovative and urgent, since the in-
adequacy of currently available tools (both practical and theoretical) un-
dermines the security of the entire smart contract ecosystem, as evi-
denced by the many successful attacks56,57 against Ethereum, the most
widespread platform that supports them.
• Regulatory and process issues — Another point to consider is the need
to ensure that rules are properly enforced. Judiciary and law enforce-
ment agencies should have the means to act in case of abnormal DLT
behaviour due to technical problems or misuse due to human error or
malice. There are also other challenges related to the integration with
other public administration systems, to standardisation and design of the
procedures by which individuals and companies can access the DLT, and
56http://blockchain.unica.it/projects/ethereum-survey/attacks.html
57https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/
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the building and governance of the DLT physical infrastructure, which
should be considered a critical infrastructure for our country.
• Advent of quantum computers — A final challenge is to carefully study
the impact that quantum computers will have on DLTs. This technology
is based on conventional cryptography and the advent of quantum com-
puters could corrupt the information contained in the ledger or violate
its confidentiality.
4.6.3 Objectives
The activities related to the development of a national DLT pursue five objec-
tives, different in both scope and impact.
• DLT as an infrastructure to provide public services — The creation of a per-
missioned Italian DLT that supports smart contracts, where all those pub-
lic services that need regulatory control and high guarantees in terms of
data/functions protection can be migrated, e.g. all administrative appli-
cations that require the legal registration of documents, such as notarial
deed, business, cadastre, and protocol registers. The expected spill-over
effects include the improvement of these services in terms of reliability,
security, transparency, and accessibility, and a reduction in costs com-
pared to traditional methods of storing and processing information.
• Electronic voting — Experimental organisation of internal elections
through blockchains, in compliance with the rules set by the GDPR (Sec-
tion 6.1.1). European legislation does not specify detailed arrangements
for general elections in the Member States, but there is an interest in
using electronic voting in accordance with the constitutional principles
of electoral law (universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage). The
objective is to test electronic voting systems based on blockchain and
smart contract technologies, characterised by relatively low costs and
high transparency and security levels, in order to evaluate the possibil-
ity of their use in real-world environments.
• Digital Right Management — The blockchain can be used to record sales,
loans, donations and other transfers. All transactions are witnessed and
agreed upon by all users without the need for a trusted third party. In ad-
dition, manufactured articles cannot be transferred unless they are legit-
imately owned. Identifying copyrighted or patent-protected works and
resolving related disputes is an extremely important legal activity. The
development of the blockchain in this area can allow for multi-territorial
licensing policies and further guarantee the rights of creators and pur-
chasers by providing effective dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
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tariffs, licensing conditions, and concession/withdrawal of management
rights. Buyers could therefore, for example, check to see if they are buying
legitimate copies of music or videos.
• Supply Chain — The supply chain is the basis of today’s production and
distribution processes on a global scale and comprise various activities,
including: contract management, payments and invoice issuance, la-
belling and packaging, logistics and transport. In this regard, solutions
must be developed that allow for the use of DLTs for efficient, reliable
and transparent tracking of interactions taking place in a supply chain,
with the aim of significantly reducing costs due to poor performance and
errors of current management processes, often partially entrusted to hu-
man operators. The proposed solutions will also represent an important
deterrent for illegal activities, as the transactions reported in the ledger
will be relatively easy to use for anti-fraud and anti-counterfeiting checks.
As a result, the entire supply chain will become more efficient and safe,
with important impacts on management costs, authentication guaran-
tees of end products and the possibility to reliably reconstruct the entire
history of any product, from its origin to its retail distribution.
• Crypto-exchange analysis for control of illegal activities — The monitoring
and analysis of transactions in existing unpermissioned DLTs can help in
detecting fraud and illegal behaviour. Specifically, the objective is to pro-
vide the governmental authority with tools capable of detecting illegal
activities such as money laundering, tax evasion, illicit trafficking (for ex-
ample, drugs, weapons, human beings), and ransomware payments. In
addition, the reliability level of miner nodes should be checked in order
to estimate the possibility of dangerous situations for DLT integrity.
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CHAPTER
5
Technologies to protect
This chapter analyses technologies to protect, such as wireless communications,
Cloud, IoT, industrial Control Systems (ICSs), and robots, which are playing a
key role in the digital transformation process in the PA and in industrial sectors,
becoming increasingly pervasive.
Their protection and increased resilience to cyber attacks is therefore a pri-
ority and should be pursued along two directions: on the one hand by insert-
ing appropriate security measures into legacy systems which employ outdated
technologies, and, on the other hand, pursuing the concept of Security by design
in the next generations of technologies. Designing and developing these tech-
nologies with the concept of cybersecurity at the heart of their development can
become a competitive advantage for Italian companies.
In the end, the chapter deals with the protection of algorithms, which are
the actual driving engines of all digital technologies: the poisoning of ground
truth of machine learning algorithms or the alteration of algorithm code for
managing data replicated on different servers are examples of threats that must
be managed in a resilient cyberspace.
5.1 Wireless communications and 5G
The wireless and mobile nature of communications in cellular systems has his-
torically implied the need to protect data in transit. This activity has been duly
tackled over the course of previous generations of cellular systems, with solu-
tions that, though gradually and through various evolutions, have now reached
a level of protection considered satisfactory (it is not a coincidence that over the
last ten years there have been no significant developments in this field).
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However, the 5G network includes not just the mobile network, but also
landlines, supplying services arranged end-to-end and with performance pa-
rameters that are by far better than the actual solutions. Moreover, it has a
wider ecosystem that involves many players and more complex relationships
and business opportunities; it sets new requirements (e.g., relative to the IoT
environment and to highly reliable and low-latency applications); it is charac-
terised by increased heterogeneity and dynamism, radically new technical solu-
tions, among which the “softwarisation” of network functions and the splitting
of the network into “slices”.
Such functions are today at least partially implemented in hardware, also by
virtualising current physical devices. A network implemented in a software can
be split into slices, each of which supplies, end-to-end, a virtual autonomous
network to a subgroup of users, able to meet specific needs of a specific sce-
nario/case of use, in a comprehensive framework, in which different organisa-
tions coexist within a network (multi-tenancy).
This set of features deeply changes network security issues.
5.1.1 State of the art
The first generation systems did not specify any solution for the protection
of communications, but the GSM (second generation) already explicitly intro-
duced solutions for user authentication and encryption at the radio interface
level. GSM security solutions proved to be extremely preliminary and insuffi-
cient for a number of reasons, starting from the total inadequacy of the cryp-
tographic techniques adopted. The COMP128 algorithm, although not initially
made known to the scientific community, following a nefarious security by ob-
scurity model, was in fact “broken” in 1998 in a very short time after its (presum-
ably involuntary) disclosure. In addition, the GSM did not provide any mutual
authentication, i.e., it was not limited only to authentication of the user terminal
against the network, but it also allowed the user to verify the authentication of
the base station which led to attacks based on rogue base station, i.e., fictitious
base stations, controlled by attackers able to intercept communications. Finally,
no security solution in the core network part of the GSM had been standardised.
The following third generation, UMTS, was probably the generation in
which the greatest progress was made in terms of security, both in terms of qual-
ity of the solutions adopted and in terms of interventions in the many subsys-
tems involved. First of all, 3G systems adopted cryptographic algorithms from
the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) family, which are much more secure
and still state-of-the-art. The application of cryptographic techniques has also
been significantly improved, both through the explicit differentiation of encryp-
tion keys (and techniques) from those of data integrity, and through the intro-
duction of privacy features and protection for users from attacks to recognise
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and trace location (location privacy). 3G systems have also solved the prob-
lem of rogue base stations by providing a highly effective mutual authentication
technique. Finally, they have also defined security solutions at the network core
and related reporting.
In line with the progress made in 3G systems, the fourth generation, 4G,
made a number of improvements and, above all, explicitly adopted the theme of
security by design, i.e., has considered security aspects since the outset of the ar-
chitectural specification phase, organising the overall architecture into five ex-
plicit domains (and proposing, where necessary, specific algorithms to provide
the relevant protection services):
• Network access security — Radio Interface Protection;
• Network domain security — Protection at the level of information ex-
change and signalling between network components;
• User domain security — Mobile terminal security and interface between
USIM and device;
• Application domain security — Application service-level protection;
• Visibility and configuration of security: — Techniques to check if (and
which) security aspects are active.
5.1.2 Challenges
In view of the considerable progress made in recent generations, with regard
to the security of cellular networks and briefly summarised above, it is legiti-
mate to wonder if security should also play an important role in 5G networks,
or if the bulk of the work has already been done. The answer is that, despite
the significant improvements made to cellular networks over previous genera-
tions, the new emerging requirements in 5G systems and, above all, the radical
change of perspective that characterises the 5G network (which includes not
only the cellular network but also the fixed network), bring about new problems
that must be faced. While the previous 2/3/4G systems were well defined a pri-
ori and their requirements clearly listed, homogeneous and relatively stable, as
well as the related security and data protection solutions, the emerging 5G sys-
tems are strongly focused on the integration between heterogeneous technolo-
gies, partitioning (slicing) and virtualisation of network infrastructures, and on
the support of extremely diversified services. They are also no longer exclusively
dedicated to human users.
We therefore believe that the security architecture of 5G systems should be
extended to cover (at least) the following aspects:
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• IoT and heterogeneous Terminals — One of the most significant differ-
ences between traditional cellular systems and the new generation 5G
consists in the availability of services no longer necessarily reserved
for terminals managed by humans, but extended also to Machine-Type-
Communication (MTC). This will lead to the spread of terminals with ex-
tremely disparate characteristics (in terms of cost, energy consumption
and complexity of implementation) so that a “one-size-fits-all” security
model, which had characterised security solutions in previous genera-
tions, may no longer be adequate. For example, security mechanisms
designed for mission-critical services may not be applicable at all in a
context of IoT devices, where network sensors have very few computa-
tional and energy resources and where data transmission is sporadic. 5G
systems will therefore not only be called upon to support cryptographic
techniques (for authentication or encryption of data) that are extremely
variable in terms of robustness and level of protection, but, above all, it
will be necessary to develop both new models for the management of
such heterogeneous security solutions and new trust models.
• Signalling Traffic — In addition to the need to identify differentiated se-
curity solutions for the services offered, that are also more flexible than
the ‘unique” solution currently offered by 4G systems, another important
aspect related to MTC services is that signalling traffic could even be more
dominant than data traffic. This is followed, for example, by the need to
develop solutions capable of recognising (and defending oneself from)
attacks aimed at saturating the network resources dedicated to signalling
traffic; a well-known bottleneck in the case of MTC services is the access
to the RACH (Random Access Channel) which could become critical in
case of simultaneous and malicious activation by a botnet (see box on
page 48) IoT.
• Virtualisation and softwarising of network functions — A fundamental
feature of the 5G network is the migration to virtualised systems, in
which network functions are no longer provided by specific physical de-
vices, but made of software and run on virtual machines or containers,
in Cloud environments. These functions are routinely routed or dynami-
cally shifted where necessary and also relocated to the edge of the net-
work to meet the low latency requirements of critical 5G applications.
This new paradigm of network function virtualisation brings with it nu-
merous new security challenges. On the one hand, the physical separa-
tion of these functions into separate devices is no longer applicable as a
security measure and it is necessary to identify separation and isolation
solutions for functions in a virtualised environment. It is in fact neces-
sary to think about solutions for the security of the environment in which
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the network functions will be performed, that are independent for each
“slice” into which the network will be divided. On the other hand, the
ability to perform network functions on virtual machines leads to the
need to identify (and possibly adapt them from the IT world) solutions
for authorisation, management and secure migration of software images
that implement these virtualised network functions. Finally, of course,
virtualisation does not only bring “problems”, but also offers new oppor-
tunities, for example to develop virtual network functions dedicated to
security itself, i.e., it offers the possibility of rethinking security functions
in a perspective of Security-as-a-Service (SEaaS) and automation of net-
work protection functions.
• “Flexible” security — The 5G network will be characterised by the need
to have extremely flexible security solutions and to be adaptable to the
specific (different) scenarios considered. For example, services with very
low latency characteristics will require security solutions which in turn
require very low latency and therefore (ultimately) flexibility in the ability
of the network to activate the most suitable security solutions for a given
scenario. In addition, the problem of flexibility in security management
must go hand in hand with tools to simplify the management of network
security, allowing rapid adaptation to new services and needs, not only
regarding network operation, but also the security solutions proposed.
5.1.3 Objectives
The following objectives should be pursued in relation to the contexts described
above:
• Secure implementation and management of virtualised and logically seg-
mented networks — This objective includes specific tasks, such as:
– secure techniques of virtualisation and, above all, of isolation for
the network “slices” and for the functions in charge of such seg-
mentation, including hardening of the network functions, their au-
thentication and integrity management, and so on;
– the need to “secure” the emerging platforms, architectures, techni-
cal solutions and languages (e.g., P4) for the software programming
of network functions. Research has so far focused mainly on the
identification and development of highly flexible solutions, with
unfortunately limited attention paid to the significant security is-
sues involved in these new approaches;
– integration of security in the management and orchestration ser-
vices of the network functions, with particular attention to the
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programmability of heterogeneous security solutions for heteroge-
neous services and the assessment of the security status of the net-
work through special visualisation techniques;
– development and control of virtualised modules to implement
network security features such as firewalls, deep packet inspec-
tion and traffic flow analysis, threat mitigation and isolation tech-
niques based on the software-defined networking paradigm, pro-
grammable and relocatable network probes for the detection of
modern sophisticated intrusions, such as advanced persistent
threats - APT (see box on page 53), which use lateral movements,
etc;
• Security of 5G network scenarios dedicated to IoT services — The security
of 5G network scenarios to support IoT must be guaranteed by develop-
ing and experimenting:
– lightweight cryptographic solutions, designed for sensors and ac-
tuators with very low cost and very low energy consumption, and
their integration in the IoT communication protocols emerging in
mobile environments (NB-IoT, LTE-M), in Low Power WAN unli-
censed contexts (for example LoRaWan) and in short range con-
texts (RFID, NFC, BLE, etc);
– access control solutions for large-scale IoT scenarios, based on flex-
ible management of authorisation attributes and capable of oper-
ating in multi-tenant environments;
– algorithms for the scalable analysis of data generated by sensors,
also able to identify anomalies and traffic patterns that can be
traced back to coordinated large-scale attacks, for example, driven
by Mirai botnets.
• Data protection in new technologies and new communication environ-
ments and “wireless sensing” — Research must be focused on data secu-
rity and data protection related to emerging communication technolo-
gies and contexts and wireless sensing, including:
– the analysis of security aspects (including protection from Jamming
and Denial of Service attacks) in dense network contexts, and for
beamforming technologies, massive MIMO, mmWave, and integra-
tion or improvement of security solutions in 3GPP and IEEE 802
protocols and technologies – in the latter case, as it is certainly an
integral part of the future 5G networks (e.g.,802.11ax/ay, etc);
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– the study of new physical cryptography techniques (including
quantum techniques), able to exploit the unique characteristics of
the radio channel, their integration in the 5G architecture and ex-
perimentation in real systems;
– the use of wireless technologies (and waveforms) not only for
communication, but also for personal and environmental security,
through the development and testing of radio signal-based solu-
tions for pattern recognition and protection of environments from
physical intrusions.
5.2 Cloud
The Cloud paradigm undoubtedly offers great economic benefits and signifi-
cant flexibility in the use of resources; however, the problem of security in Cloud
environments is one of the major concerns for companies and public organisa-
tions that want to move their services, applications, and sensitive data to the
Cloud, as evidenced by numerous analyses such as, for example, the Gartner
reports1,2 and IDC3.
An IT system is considered to be secure based on the correctness of its se-
curity policy, i.e., the set of rules to ensure an appropriate level of protection,
and its ability to apply this policy correctly. The Cloud paradigm is based on the
principle of delegation to a third party of every type of service (infrastructure,
maintenance of data, and applications). From the point of view of a security
expert, this delegation makes part of the system inaccessible and therefore im-
possible not only to verify the correct application of the policies envisaged, but,
in some cases, simply specify with due precision the policy to be adopted.
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) can adopt advanced security procedures and
mechanisms. However, from the user’s point of view (Cloud Service Customer –
CSC), it is normally not possible to know the details of the policies implemented
in these systems. Basically, the security policies of the CSPs are inaccessible for
users and, above all, they cannot be monitored. In this context, ensuring that
local regulatory constraints are respected can also become an insurmountable
problem.
1https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/is-the-cloud-secure/
2https://www.gartner.com/doc/3328818/survey-analysis-cloud-
adoption-trends
3http://www.oracle.com/assets/cloud-inhibitors-3257526.pdf
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5.2.1 State of the art
At the European level, the ENISA has played an important role in recent years,
providing Cloud stakeholders with a detailed overview of the benefits and secu-
rity risks associated with migrating their applications and data to the Cloud4.
At the Community level, references to Cloud security are increasing in
strategic documents and in the major 2016 and 2020 research framework pro-
grammes 5). In this respect, the Data Protection, Security and Privacy (DPSP)
European cluster has as its objective to maximise the results of European re-
search projects in the area of Cloud security6. Added to this is the specific Euro-
pean Commission action aimed at making the best use of the potential of Cloud
Computing: Pre-commercial Procurement Cloud for Europe7.
At the Italian level, this action translates into the Three-year Plan for Infor-
mation Technology in the Public Administration 2017–2019 by AgID8, whose ob-
jective is a coordinated rationalisation of the whole PA and in which the devel-
opment of an evolutionary strategic model of the Cloud of the PA9 is envisaged.
In particular, this plan provides for the following: (i) the identification of a set
of physical infrastructures of the PA that should become National strategic Hubs
(PSN); (ii) the definition of a public service pathway to the Cloud, also with re-
sources provided by the PSNs and by the Public Connectivity System (SPC); (iii)
the definition of a qualification process of PSNs and other CSPs. This strategic
plan must be accompanied by appropriate strategies for the provision of profes-
sional and security services10.
In this direction, the SPC project Security Cloud11 has as its objective the
provision of Security-as-a-Service (SEaaS) services according to the Cloud Com-
puting paradigm. These include the management of digital identities, remote
digital signatures, services to support administrations in the prevention and
4https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-security-and-
resilience/publications/cloud-computing-benefits-risks-and-
recommendations-for-information-security
5http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-
179-EN-F1-1.PDF
6https://eucloudclusters.wordpress.com/data-protection-security-
and-privacy-in-the-cloud/
7http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/innovazione-del-mercato/
gara-pre-commerciale
8https://pianotriennale-ict.italia.it/
9https://www.agendadigitale.eu/infrastrutture/come-cambia-il-
cloud-della-pa-dopo-il-piano-nazionale-e-delle-regioni/
10http://www.agid.gov.it/notizie/2017/04/05/workshop-agid-csa-
italy-spc-cloud-sicurezza-del-sistema-cloud-computing-nazionale
11https://www.ictsecuritymagazine.com/articoli/spc-cloud-le-best-
practice-cloud-security-sistema-cloud-computing-italiano/
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management of cyber incidents and in the analysis of vulnerabilities of infor-
mation systems. Currently, only a limited number of CSPs offer SEaaS12.
Another fundamental aspect is how to let different Clouds communicate in
a secure way, in order to allow the integration of services offered by different
subjects, thus creating Cloud federations able to provide new and richer func-
tions. The SUNFISH13 project addresses this issue by proposing an architecture
and related enabling technologies to create Cloud federations that are secure by
design and democratically administered. One of the main instances in which
SUNFISH has shown its effectiveness concerns the safe integration of the pri-
vate Cloud of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Interior
for the reliable and confidential management of payrolls of Armed Forces per-
sonnel.
Finally, at an international level, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is an or-
ganisation dedicated to defending and disseminating best practices that can en-
hance the security of Cloud environments14. Since 2010, the CSA has promoted
the first professional certification program for the acquisition of Cloud security
expertise.
5.2.2 Challenges
The main challenge for the correct adoption of the Cloud lies in the construc-
tion of methodologies and techniques that allow to define and verify the level of
security of an IT system that uses and integrates Cloud services.
It is important to highlight how through the information provided by CSPs
(collected in public repositories, such as cloud2815 and CSA STAR16) you can
obtain useful data to build a security policy for Cloud, as shown by the results
of recent European research projects dedicated to the topic, such as SPECS17,
MUSA18, SLA-Ready19 and SLALOM20.
It is essential that CSCs should be able to choose between the services of-
fered by the different CSPs in an unequivocal and well-informed manner where
sensitive data are physically stored, in order to ensure compliance with the rel-
evant laws. By way of example, it is necessary to allow those who manage sen-
12http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/security/300083542/the-20-
coolest-cloud-security-vendors-of-the-2017-cloud-100.ht
13http://www.sunfishproject.eu/
14urlhttps://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
15https://www.cloud28plus.com/
16https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/
17http://www.specs-project.eu
18http://www.musa-project.eu
19http://www.sla-ready.eu/
20http://slalom-project.eu/
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sitive data or take part in public procurement to choose between different of-
fers, through a clear and quantitative evaluation of the services and guarantees
of security and protection of the personal data offered. To be able to compare
the security procedures and policies implemented by CSPs, or even more, the
services offered by a third party that in turn uses Cloud services, the adoption of
the Cloud paradigm becomes a key enabling factor. Therefore, the development
of security metrics that allow to quantitatively evaluate a Cloud service offering,
possibly enriched by security benchmarking procedures, that allow to evaluate
the overall security status of a Cloud service by CSCs, represents one of the most
important challenges from the user’s point of view.
Similarly, there is a growing demand from the CSP for the need to take out
insurance against cyber attacks. This is a demand that is difficult to meet, be-
cause of a cyber insurance market that is still immature due to difficulties in
assessing both the residual risk, i.e., that which cannot be mitigated with appro-
priate security measures, and the damage suffered in the face of an attack21.
The focus on the possibility of cyber attacks against CSPs has recently in-
creased following the discovery of two serious vulnerabilities of modern pro-
cessors brought to light by the Meltdown and Spectre attacks (analysed in sec-
tion 4.1. These attacks allow a process to read the private memory of another
process. In fact, within the infrastructure managed by a CSP, the sensitive data
of a CSC could be read by another process, managed by a different CSC, with
consequent loss of confidentiality of such data. Given the frequency of discov-
ery of new vulnerabilities of this kind, it is necessary to work on solutions that
can guarantee confidentiality even after the compromise of the Cloud infras-
tructure. An example of these solutions has been investigated under the SUN-
FISH project22, where the Secure Multi-party Computation [23, 40] is used to
distribute sensitive data over different Clouds in a Cloud federation, so that at-
tacking a single Cloud is not enough to filter data.
MPC – Secure Multi-Party Computation – A class of protocols to manage message
exchange between n processes, each of which provides data, unknown to others,
to calculate a function F (i1, i2 . . . in ). Some of the processes can be malicious and
work together to filter out data from others. An MCP protocol has the objective of
correctly calculating F by ensuring that malicious processes do not become aware
of the data provided by the correct processes. Many cryptographic distributed pro-
tocols (voting, on-line auction, etc.) can be considered special cases of MPC.
21https://www.dimt.it/index.php/it/mercatoconcorrenzaregolazione/
10466-9la-responsabilita-contrattuale-nella-gestione-dei-dati-nel-
cloud-computing
22http://www.sunfishproject.eu/
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At the national level, the main challenge is to develop a community Cloud
model, which allows interoperability between services developed for the PA at a
national level (such as SPID, e-invoicing, etc.) and those already present at the
local level in regional Cloud structures, properly supported by appropriate secu-
rity services provided according to an SEaaS model. Such a community requires
an infrastructure to securely integrate services offered by different Cloud ser-
vices. A related challenge is therefore the further development of Cloud federa-
tion solutions along the lines of the objectives pursued by the SUNFISH project.
A further point to develop is a structured relationship with private subjects
in order to ensure that their solutions (timely tested and certified) can also be
integrated into the national Cloud. Therefore, there must be collaboration be-
tween the national and regional service brokering activities, and the different
suppliers, with a structured process of validation and integration of services and
security solutions with respect to the national Cloud.
Ultimately, the challenge that the adoption of the Cloud paradigm poses in
terms of security, especially taking into account the Italian context, is to provide
CSCs, both public and private, with tools that allow, on the one hand, to gain
awareness of the risks that the Cloud introduces and, on the other, to have guar-
antees, security services and countermeasures commensurate with the effect
produced by the threats introduced by this paradigm.
5.2.3 Objectives
With reference to the challenges to be addressed and summarised above, the
main objectives to be pursued are set out below.
• To design and develop tools that allow CSCs to evaluate and compare the
security services and policies implemented by CSPs, with respect to their
own security requirements and current regulations on data protection
and location, through the use of appropriate security metrics and secu-
rity benchmarking.
• To define models and tools for the drafting of insurance policies for CSPs,
capable of estimating the residual risk and evaluating the damage suf-
fered in the event of a cyber attack, taking into account the different im-
pacts that failure to comply with a regulatory constraint or a specific se-
curity requirement have on the PA compared to a private organisation.
• To define safe Cloud federation models and tools that can reliably inte-
grate services offered by different Cloud services.
• To develop solutions to guarantee the confidentiality of data on the Cloud
even in case of compromise of part of the Cloud infrastructure.
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• To develop an open-source security service that can be, through reuse,
adopted and specialised by public bodies, and above all by Italian SMEs,
allowing them to comply with regulatory constraints, such as those
present in the GDPR (see section 6.1), which can have exorbitant costs
when applied in small amounts to the use of services in the Cloud.
• Based on specific cases of use applicable to the PA, to develop demonstra-
tors of the solutions identified to overcome the above mentioned chal-
lenges and, in particular, demonstrate how these can improve the com-
petitiveness of the Italian Cloud, thus facilitating the development of in-
novative business.
5.3 Algorithms
An algorithm is a procedure defined by a finite series of elementary steps for
solving a problem. The concept of the algorithm is fundamental with respect to
software development: given a problem that you want to automate, program-
ming essentially represents the translation or encoding of an algorithm in a pro-
gram (which represents the logic of processing) through a language that can be
interpreted and executed by a computer. It can therefore be deduced that algo-
rithms are the basis on which automation and the ease of use in our daily lives
are based.
A direct consequence of the central role of algorithms is the fact that they are
also a high value asset that must be protected from cybernetic attacks, just like
computing infrastructure and data. The problem is even more obvious when
one considers the impact that automatic learning algorithms are having on ev-
eryday life.
Contrary to what one might think, algorithms are not immune to threats.
An algorithm is nothing more than a function that receives a set of values (data)
in input and generates others in output (called a solution) through the execu-
tion of a finite number of intermediate steps. An attacker may then attempt to
compromise an algorithm by altering the input data and/or sequence of oper-
ations to be performed on such data. Below are some examples of application
scenarios for which an algorithm attack can have serious consequences.
Most of the web applications that we all commonly use (e.g., current ac-
count management, household management, etc.) are implemented in a dis-
tributed and replicated way. The replication is, in fact, the technique mainly
used to guarantee the availability of a service in the face of load variations (due
to changing demands) and the possible presence of faults that would otherwise
lead to a degradation of service quality and consequently of the level of user
satisfaction.
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In the paradigm of replication, the service is offered by multiple copies of
the same service and the basic requirement is that this distribution be com-
pletely transparent to the end user. To this end, a customer interacts with a reply
by means of reading operations (e.g. access to the balance of a current account)
and/or writing operations that update the status of the reply (e.g. deposits or
withdrawals from a current account).
In this case, an attacker may have an interest in compromising the availabil-
ity of the service (he may want to make the service inaccessible) or the integrity
of the managed information (he may, for example, alter the results of reading
and writing operations). All this can be achieved through the compromise, by
the attacker, of one or more instructions contained in the fragment of code that
manages the operations, causing the behaviour of the service to deviate from
the specifications and expectations. This type of attack is easily possible once
the attacker has taken control of a replica. In the literature there are some so-
lutions for the definition of replication algorithms tolerant to the presence of
attackers who take control of some replicas (so-called algorithms tolerant to
Byzantine or mischievous [50] agents).
Another application context in which algorithms represent a weak point is
that in which they are based on machine learning; these kind of algorithms are
at the basis of many applications that we all use daily and in which we often
place considerable trust. For example, Facebook uses algorithms for machine
learning for the recognition of faces in images; Amazon and Netflix analyse the
tastes of customers (last things seen or purchased) to suggest products with
them; Google uses machine learning algorithms in the field of translations and
travel, suggesting a less busy route according to our habits and the places where
we usually go on a given day of the week; Apple and Microsoft use machine
learning to provide us with a voice assistant that can help us use a phone or a
tablet with only our voice, perhaps when we are driving. Other companies are
currently perfecting automatic driving by artificial intelligence methods. Re-
cently, machine learning algorithms have also been widely used in healthcare
for the study of patient data and patient records, to identify, for example, the
people most likely at risk of contracting certain diseases, such as diabetes, or of
facing heart problems.
In all these examples, the algorithm learns a certain behaviour that must
be repeated based on the input data provided to it. It is therefore clear that
the correctness of all these applications depends heavily on the correctness of
the data on which the algorithm is trained. An attacker could therefore aim at
compromising the data from which the application learns to induce incorrect
behaviour; for example, improper driving in the case of self-driving or a delib-
erately incorrect diagnosis in the predictions applied to the health context.
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5.3.1 Challenges
Ground truth – A set of data used to train machine learning algorithms, which are
today the basis of multiple applications such as, for example, the recognition and
classification of e-mail as spam or the recognition of a user’s habits to pre-calculate
and suggest optimised routes or targeted purchases.
Code injection – A technique that takes advantage of a vulnerability of a code based
on giving a different data input to a program from that expected to induce it to
execute specific code provided (“injected”) by an attacker to modify the behaviour.
Privilege escalation – A technique that exploits the vulnerabilities of the code
based on the exploitation of programming and/or configuration errors that allow
an attacker to gain administrator privileges starting from a normal user account.
With administrator access privileges, an attacker can take control of the entire sys-
tem, such as altering stored data, changing procedures and rules for accessing parts
of the system, stopping or changing parameters of running applications.
Among the main challenges to be solved from the point of view of algorithm
protection, we can certainly mention:
• Poisoning of ground truth — Ground truth data is collected either auto-
matically (e.g. by storing information about a user’s paths in a completely
transparent way) or manually (e.g. by asking the user to indicate which
emails are considered spam). In both cases, these data are stored and an
attacker may try to compromise the integrity of the data during the stor-
age process. In addition, in the case of automatic data collection, these
can be altered by compromising the sensor technology.
• Exploiting vulnerability — Each algorithm must be encoded in a pro-
gramming language in order to be interpreted and executed by a process-
ing system. The coding process of an algorithm is not error-free and often
leads to the introduction of vulnerabilities (see box on page 10) which
can become a gateway for an attacker. From the point of view of algo-
rithm protection, two types of vulnerability exploitation are particularly
relevant and must be taken into account: (i) code injection and (ii) the
scaling of privileges.
• Viruses and Malware — Malware (see box on page 48), by entering ex-
isting executable code, act by modifying an already running algorithm or
the information used by the algorithm, taking care to not modify the algo-
rithm to hide the evidence of compromise and avoid creating suspicion.
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5.3.2 Objectives
Below is a list of possible projects involving both a research component and an
innovation component.
• New approaches to code injection detection — Discovering the presence of
unwanted software is a very difficult task because intrusion techniques
and programs themselves are constantly evolving and, to date, there is
no valid general methodology. New approaches must therefore be inves-
tigated in such a way as to merge the results from different contexts such
as anomaly detection, secure coding or static or dynamic code analysis
into a single framework that guarantees flexibility and accuracy in the
detection.
• New approaches to make learning algorithms more robust — Most ma-
chine learning algorithms currently used as automation support are not
designed to be attack resistant. It is therefore necessary to think of an
evolution of their design that makes them safer while preserving their at-
tributes. This can be carried out both in the definition of new logics on
which they are based and in the structural modification of the algorithms
themselves.
• New approaches to vulnerability assessment — The objective of this
project line is to develop new approaches also through the integration
of existing technologies that take into account that threats to informatic
security can come not only from intrusions into the company perimeter
but also through the manipulation of the functional logic of expert sys-
tems by compromising algorithms representing the “core” of the applica-
tions.
5.4 IoT
IoT devices are now used in a wide variety of situations, including mobile de-
vices (smartphones and tablets), home automation applications, industrial sen-
sors and actuators (Industrial IoT – IIoT), transport (from automotive to rail,
from shipbuilding to aeronautics and drones), critical infrastructure and Cyber
Physical System (monitoring and control systems). The most recent investiga-
tions estimated up to 6 billion devices connected to the internet at the end of
2017, with a forecasted growth to 21 billion in 2020.
In general, the use of IoT devices makes it possible both to improve the qual-
ity of the services offered by the equipment they are inserted in, and to create
additional, completely new ones.
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IoT – Internet of Things – An expression that refers to the multitude of “things”,
or “objects” that, connected to the network and uniquely identified, are able to
communicate with each other, or with other systems, without requiring any hu-
man intervention. Objects includes devices, equipment, plants and systems, and
machinery in the most diverse fields of our daily lives.
IIoT – Industrial IoT – An IoT device used in the industrial field which has become
particularly important following digitisation initiatives facilitated by the various de-
velopment plans within Enterprise 4.0.
Like all networked systems, IoT devices face the problem of cybersecurity,
which however, in this case, must tackle the new issues introduced by the pe-
culiarities of the involved devices and by their typical usages. IoT devices have,
in fact, a set of “physical” characteristics that make them peculiar both in the
ICT panorama and among the hardware architectures analysed in section 4.1.
These features include: low costs, low operating margins, reduced energy con-
sumption, limited processing capacity in terms of both computing power and
storage capacity, limited connectivity in terms of protocols and bandwidth. In
addition, the devices used for the connection of remote sensors and actuators,
as they are installed in the field and left for long periods of time, are more likely
to be subject to physical attacks exploiting Side-Channel Effects (see boxes on
page 81).
The spread of IoT devices and the new services they made available have
significantly increased the so-called surface of attack, by actually introducing
new vulnerabilities. Many applications, in fact, enabled by the IoT scenarios,
open the door to totally new and largely unexplored vulnerabilities, which can
expose users to particularly serious effects, if not prevented and treated in a spe-
cific way, as it was recently shown by the successful attacks that exploited, for
example, IoT devices present in toys, vending machines, and in smart switches
for home automation [79, 81]. This phenomenon is also particularly felt today in
the industrial field where, thanks to the incentives made available by the various
development plans of Enterprise 4.0, the diffusion of IIoT devices has reached
very significant levels, as shown in section 5.5.
It is then necessary to highlight that discovering and disclosing a vulnera-
bility in a single IoT device immediately translates into a vulnerability for all the
equipment and all systems using that device.
In addition, when multiple IoT devices of the same type are used within
a given system, a successful attack on that type of IoT device can result in
the byzantine behaviour [50] of the system, with potentially dire consequences
when the system is used in safety-critical applications.
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Another critical issue is posed by IoT-based systems used in critical infras-
tructures: they in fact require high degrees of safety and security, and mostly
have not been designed paying proper attention to the vulnerabilities intro-
duced by the adopted IoT devices. Unfortunately, there is still today a lack of
appropriate design methodologies for systems that use IoT devices and that, at
the same time, must guarantee the levels of security required for the target sys-
tems and for their adoption within critical infrastructures.
It is also worth noting the growing interaction of insurance services with IoT
mobile devices and sensors, which has two fundamental aspects: (i) the devel-
opment of specific insurance products aimed at those who use IoT devices with
respect to damage potentially done to third parties (examples include drones
and self-driving vehicles equipped with IoT devices); (ii) the provision of tradi-
tional insurance policies with a “consumption” rate clause, with premiums and
a modality related to quantities that can be measured in the field by IoT devices
(for example, mileage actually travelled by car, or other aspects related to indi-
vidual lifestyles). In Italy, the current integration of insurance services with IoT
technology will enable insurance companies to meet the growing demand for
highly personalised insurance products; however, this integration poses obvi-
ous problems in terms of protection of personal data.
5.4.1 State of the art
The analysis of the state of the art will be addressed by first considering the
main aspects of the actions undertaken in the governmental sphere and then
the main on-going research projects.
In the United States, the NIST has defined the programme for cybersecurity
in the IoT (NIST Cybersecurity for IoT Program)23, supporting the development
and application of standards, guidelines and related standards tools to improve
cybersecurity of connected devices and of the environments in which they are
used.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security published, in November
2016, the Strategic Principles for Securing the Internet of the Internet of Things24
guide, which outlines a set of principles to improve the security in the design,
production, and installation of IoT devices.
Finally, the Department of Technology and Innovation of New York City co-
ordinated a research project in cooperation with public and private organisa-
tions, universities, and standardisation institutes for the production of guide-
23urlhttps://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-cybersecurity-iot-program
24https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_
Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL....pdf
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lines on the implementation of IoT systems, whose use can have a potential
impact on public spaces and goods25.
In Europe, ENISA activated a programme for the development of guidelines
on security of critical infrastructures based on IoT technologies in smart cars,
homes, and cities.
The UK government launched the IoTUK26 programme aimed at promoting
the adoption of technologies and high quality IoT services in the field of health
services, smart industries, and smart cities. The programme pays special atten-
tion to the security of services and systems, to their dependability and to data
interoperability. In addition, it aims to promote cooperation initiatives between
universities, companies, research centres, and start-ups.
In Asia, Singapore’s government launched the Smart Nation27 initiative,
with the objective of improving the quality of life in urban contexts by way of
IoT technologies. Concurrently, they started the Singapore Cybersecurity Strat-
egy28 programme, acknowledging that security plays a key role in ensuring a
broad and effective implementation of the Smart Nation project.
In terms of research projects, among those funded by the European Com-
mission, particularly significant are the USEIT29 project, aimed at developing
new encryption algorithms, policy languages, and tool security measures to en-
sure that users of IoT devices are guaranteed secure and confidential access, and
the ANASTACIA30 project that aims to create a trustworthy-by-design develop-
ment framework to support all the phases of design and implementation of an
intelligent and dynamic security monitoring.
5.4.2 Challenges
The main challenges to be addressed in this area include:
• Modelling— In the well established domains of system dependability
and safety, accurate models of the main possible faults, errors, and fail-
ures have been developed and widely used worldwide. In addition, in
several domains these internationally recognised and accepted models
have found adequate acceptance in terms of de jure and de facto stan-
dards. Unfortunately, in the case of IoT devices, consolidated and ac-
cepted models of possible types of attacks and of their potential conse-
quences are still lacking.
25https://www.diffchecker.com/diff
26https://iotuk.org.uk/
27https://www.smartnation.sg
28https://www.csa.gov.sg/news/publications/singapore-cybersecurity-
strategy
29http://www.chistera.eu/projects/useit
30http://www.anastacia-h2020.eu
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• Correctness of physical quantities— When IoT devices are used in the
field, it is crucial to be able to measure a wide range of their “physical”
characteristics, such as power consumption, temperature, supply volt-
age, workload, geographic location, etc. Plenty of architectural solutions
based on a proper mix of hardware and trusted software exist and are
widely adopted in complex IT systems. Unfortunately, they are not appli-
cable to IoT devices, mainly due to their costs and complexity. In general,
in fact, the drive to reduce the cost of the final devices implies that the
protections at the device level are usually rather poor.
• Abnormal behaviour — In the case of architectures and IoT-based sys-
tems for industrial applications, “abnormal” behaviours induced by ma-
licious attacks mostly do not manifest themselves as physical “faults”.
As a consequence, they may not be detected by the normal solutions
adopted to monitor the system. More generally, it is necessary to study
approaches and solutions to correctly interpret the interactions of IoT
devices with their users and with other networked devices, based on het-
erogeneous and complex data, in order to develop efficient solutions for
monitoring and anticipating attacks.
• Holistic solutions— Unfortunately, holistic cybersecurity architectural
solutions compatible with the nature of IoT devices and with the critical
level of the systems in which they are used are not yet available.
• Software Updates— Typically, when a software vulnerability is revealed,
updates are made available within a short time, containing the changes
(patches) made to overcome that vulnerability. Not installing these up-
dates puts the system at serious risk, since its latent vulnerability, until
then only known to experts, is now in the public domain and can be ma-
liciously exploited by anyone. It is therefore clear that, if the involved
software application is an integral part of an infrastructure, failure to up-
date it could have catastrophic consequences on the infrastructure itself
in the event of cyber attacks.
• Hardware and Software Integrity — In the case of systems using IoT de-
vices with remote software upgrade capability and/or partial or total
hardware reconfiguration capability (e.g., through the established use of
FPGA-based devices) it is mandatory to be able to guarantee the integrity
of software updates, of the reconfigured hardware portions, and their re-
configuration files.
• Personal data protection and confidentiality — Many of the IoT solutions
available today or in the near future include sharing of information be-
tween users. This implies an exchange of data that may be detrimental to
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the protection of personal data when implemented without proper pro-
tections and without an adeguate awareness of the users with respect to
the data exchanged and their relevance.
• Integration and trade-off between safety and security— The use of IoT de-
vices in industrial control systems and, more generally, in safety critical
systems poses new challenges arising from the need to ensure, in parallel,
adequate levels of safety and security, as highlighted in section 5.5.
• IoT and 5G — 5G networks will make it so available services are no longer
necessarily reserved for terminals managed by human beings. They will
also be extended to terminals with IoT devices, where the network sen-
sors will be equipped with very few computational and energy resources
and where data transmission will typically be sporadic. As analysed in
detail in section 5.1, 5G systems, in order to safely manage IoT devices,
will therefore need to support not only extremely variable cryptographic
techniques in terms of robustness and level of protection, but also im-
plement new models for the management of heterogeneous security so-
lutions and new trust models.
• Insurance risk assessment — When dealing with insurance services, an
important risk element is the difficulty of ensuring the security of IoT de-
vices used to provide new services. Calculation of insurance risk mod-
els is made difficult not only by possible errors in real time probabil-
ity estimations, for which reliable data are needed to translate estimates
into consistent policies and premiums, but also for the assessment of the
severity of events covered by cyber insurance policies. For example, it
is difficult to quantify the economic losses or personal injury that new
devices such as drones or self-driving vehicles could cause as a conse-
quence of physical attacks to involved IoT devices.
5.4.3 Objectives
With reference to the challenges to be faced and summarised above, it is nec-
essary to activate a set of projects that, in their globality, aim to provide ade-
quate and sustainable responses to each of the challenges and, in particular, to
achieve the objectives indicated below.
• Modelling — To develop appropriate models of possible attacks on sys-
tems using IoT devices. The consequences of the attacks should be anal-
ysed and described both at the physical (or structural) level, where the
consequences are typically incorrect values of physical quantities de-
tected from sensors and transmitted to the control system, and at the
functional (or application) level, where abnormal system functionalities
occur as a result of the above incorrect values.
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• Correctness of physical quantities — To develop efficient solutions in
terms of usability and costs for the verification of the correctness of the
measured entities and of physical characteristics of IoT devices. In par-
ticular, the developed architectural solutions must support a hierarchi-
cal distribution of the trust chain, for instance by entrusting a “certified”
(and therefore assumed “secure”) PC or smartphone with the control of
the security of the whole set of IoT devices connected to it.
• Abnormal behaviours — To develop platforms and monitoring systems to
identify abnormal behaviour in IoT devices used to manage sensors and
actuators. In particular, the proposed solutions must be able to:
– extend the performance of current SIEM systems (Security Infor-
mation & Event Management), widely used for the defence of IT
systems, by developing at the IoT level (true end-point, in this case)
hardware architectures charged with performing locally intelligent
analyses of events that occurred to data, communications, com-
mands, controls, etc. The results of such analysis should then be
sent to the SIEM system;
– execute locally, on the end-point, part of SIEM itself. This will prac-
tically require, on the one hand, considering the actual values of the
signals exchanged with the sensors and actuators as events and, on
the other hand, adopting effective and efficient machine learning
techniques for the timely detection of anomalous behaviours;
– perform monitoring, attack tracking, and attack anticipation for
IoT systems, resorting to integrated approaches exploiting net-
work traffic monitoring, device utilisation by end-users, interac-
tions between end-user and devices, social network activities be-
tween users and devices;
– perform analyses of data generated by sensors to identify traffic
anomalies and patterns that can be traced back to large-scale at-
tacks, such as the ones driven by Mirai-type botnets.
• Holistic Solutions — To define methodologies and tools for the design and
development of IoT-based secure, distributed, and heterogeneous appli-
cations. In addition, to develop platforms for the secure and usable de-
ployment of heterogeneous and dynamic IoT-based systems. The pro-
posed solutions must be able:
– to guarantee the fulfilment of confidentiality, authentication, pro-
tection and security requirements and to enable secure human-to-
machine and machine-to-machine interactions; to ensure, when
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needed, the requirements of usability, efficiency, scalability, de-
pendability, and user-awareness;
– to ensure measurable levels of data and information protection “at
rest”, “in motion”, and “at use”, in order to ensure both confiden-
tiality and authenticity of end-to-end data transfer and the integrity
and availability of the interconnection infrastructures;
– to ensure the development, on the IoT side, of suitable hardware ar-
chitectures compatible with today’s most widely adopted standards
on communication and storage capabilities;
– to provide facilities and services to properly manage encryption
keys; they should support the whole life-cycle of each key, as well
as all the professionals involved in the implementation and usage
of the management system;
– to be usable by non-expert cybersecurity technicians, too;
– to be applicable, after the necessary customisations, to any appli-
cation and system using IoT devices.
• Hardware and software integrity — To properly adapt the solutions al-
ready widely adopted in other IT fields to the peculiar characteristics of
remote IoT devices.
• Certification and periodic review — Adequate national procedures should
be defined for certification and periodic review of IoT devices, according
to their criticality inside the systems in which they are used.
• Personal data protection and confidentiality — We need to define archi-
tectures that fulfil the requirements in terms of the protection of the
user’s personal data from malicious access via IoT devices. In addition,
the IoT devices used must ensure compliance with the requirements of
the GDPR, introduced in section 6.1.1.
In addition, it is considered strategic for the country to achieve, over the
next 3 years, the development of a holistic solution applicable to at least two
“vertical” solutions whose security levels can be predefined and subsequently
validated through the most advanced state-of-the-art approaches.
5.5 Industrial Control System
In the recent past, critical infrastructure operators have strongly supported the
thesis that Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which include Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and
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other systems, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), were intrinsically
safe, since they were disconnected from public networks and therefore pro-
tected by the air gap between the control systems themselves and the corpo-
rate network. Consequently, they considered that there was no need to put any
security mechanisms in place.
Nowadays the scenario has changed radically due to the high level of in-
tegration reached between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Tech-
nology (OT), so the myth of intrinsic security has been partly, if not completely,
shattered. In fact, the introduction of information technologies in physical con-
trol systems, motivated by the reduction of costs and the improvement of their
performance, has undoubtedly favoured the birth of a series of intelligent tech-
nologies, from smart grids to smart transportation and smart manufacturing.
This evolutionary process, which brings new functionalities and services, has,
however, at the same time, highlighted the need to increase the security and
resilience of industrial control systems.
Among the aspects to be taken into account in the design and development
of security solutions for industrial control systems, particular attention should
be paid to the difference between the lifetime of an ICS and that of an IT system
stem. Typically, in fact, while the life time of an ICS, based on technologies de-
signed and developed for a specific domain, is in the order of 10-15 years, that
of an IT component is much shorter, typically in the order of 3-5 years. This
difference is an extremely critical factor when planning upgrades and mainte-
nance for industrial control systems, due to the stringent availability and reli-
ability requirements posed by these systems. The scenario presented shows,
therefore, the need to address the security and reliability issues of industrial
control systems combining cross-functional expertise, allowing to fully under-
stand the possible implications of the installation and use of IT technologies on
the operation of industrial control systems.
5.5.1 State of the art
Among the initiatives concerning the security of ICS systems, it is worth men-
tioning the publication by NIST of document 800-82 Guide to Industrial Con-
trol Systems (ICS) Security31, which provides an accurate analysis of the typical
topologies of such systems, and identifies possible security threats and presents
countermeasures to be taken to mitigate the risks involved.
Another important initiative was the creation by the American government
of a dedicated CERT: the ICS-CERT32, whose task is to coordinate the efforts and
initiatives of government and industry institutions to improve the level of secu-
31https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-2/final
32https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
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rity of the industrial control systems used for the monitoring and management
of critical infrastructures.
In Europe, ENISA has published several studies on the security of industrial
control systems, addressing issues such as: analysis of vulnerabilities and the
exposure window of SCADA systems to attacks33; testing of the security level of
industrial control systems34; certification of the security skills of professional
figures working in the field of ICS/SCADA35; analysis of the level of maturity,
from the security point of view, of ICS/SCADA systems used in critical infras-
tructure36; the identification of lessons to be learned from the assessment of
security incidents involving SCADA37. The most recent document produced by
ENISA on the security of industrial control systems was published in February
2017 and is a report on the analysis of dependencies of ICS/SCADA systems from
communication networks38.
Another initiative in the European panorama was the creation of a specific
working group on Industry 4.0 and industrial control systems by ECSO39.
5.5.2 Challenges
The following are among the main challenges to be addressed in the area of ICS:
• Securing Legacy Systems — As mentioned above, in current industrial
control systems, technologies that have an extremely long lifespan (some
installed before OT networks interconnected with IT networks) and tech-
nologies that are subject to rapid obsolescence coexist with each other.
The integration of the two technological domains has generated new vul-
nerabilities and introduced new exploitable pathways to implement at-
tack strategies: it is therefore necessary to develop specific security mea-
sures.
• Security and Availability of Industrial Processes — An important require-
ment of ICS systems is to ensure the widest possible availability of in-
dustrial processes. Fulfilment of this requirement complicates the pro-
33https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/window-of-exposure-a-
real-problem-for-scada-systems
34https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/good-practices-for-an-
eu-ics-testing-coordination-capability
35https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/certification-of-cyber-
security-skills-of-ics-scada-professionals
36https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/maturity-levels
37https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/can-we-learn-from-
scada-security-incidents
38https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
39https://www.ecs-org.eu/
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cedures for the management and updating of IT-based tools and mecha-
nisms for the security of components of industrial control systems. Con-
sequently, it is necessary to develop techniques and methods to ensure
the security of the system without undermining its continuity of avail-
ability.
• Analysis of the relations between safety and security in industrial control
systems — Given the peculiar features of industrial control systems, the
analysis and modelling of dependencies between the properties related
to safety and those related to security are of great importance, in order
to correctly and effectively manage the system throughout its entire life
cycle.
• Impact of the IIoT on industrial control systems — Growth of the IIoT im-
plies a potential increase in the number of attack sources, introducing a
wide variety of distributed sensors and other devices that have not always
been designed in accordance with industrial safety standards. In this re-
spect, standardisation bodies should define standards and requirements
to reduce the security impact of the use of IIoT devices on industrial con-
trol systems. Particular attention should also be paid to the development
of tools for the definition, organisation and implementation of appropri-
ate assurance case aimed at jointly demonstrating the adequacy of the
system with respect to both safety and security standards.
5.5.3 Objectives
In relation to the challenges posed by the security of ICS systems, it is necessary
to activate project initiatives aimed at achieving the following objectives:
• Analysis of vulnerabilities of ICS/SCADA systems — Definition of specific
techniques for the analysis of vulnerabilities of ICS/SCADA systems, mo-
tivated by the peculiarities of these systems, also derived from the coex-
istence and integration of IT and OT technologies. In this regard, there
is a need: (i) to propose a taxonomy of systems; (ii) to develop method-
ologies for identifying vulnerabilities and threat analysis; (iii) to identify
countermeasures and best practices for the treatment of risk.
• Framework for the analysis of the safety and security properties of
ICS/SCADA — Define a framework for the analysis of the safety and se-
curity properties of these systems, identification and modelling of their
interdependencies and requirements (which can also be conflicting) and
automatic assessment of the impact of security issues on safety aspects.
In particular, there is a need to: (i) implement tools and processes for sim-
ulation and monitoring of cascading effects caused by cyber attacks; (ii)
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design solutions to mitigate such effects, increasing the resilience of the
systems involved; (iii) develop tools for the definition, organisation and
implementation of appropriate assurance cases aimed at jointly demon-
strating the adequacy of the system with respect to safety and security
standards.
• Training programs — To be defined and implemented are targeted train-
ing programs for professional profiles in the field of industrial control sys-
tems, as illustrated in section 6.2.
5.6 Robot
In this section we analyse, with reference to the aspects of cybersecurity, the
scenarios in which a device (robot), able to perform directly mechanical actions
in the physical world, can operate completely (or partially) autonomously and
without a direct and continuous control by a human operator. With this charac-
terisation, a refrigerator, for example, does not fall within the scope considered
because it typically does not move in the environment (even if it could open its
door automatically), while a vacuum cleaner is included if it can move indepen-
dently inside an apartment.
Robotics is now breaking its classical boundaries and, as an automatic sys-
tem used mainly in the industrial and automation world, it is hybridising with
technologies such as Cloud Computing, Artificial Intelligence and IoT. It also
plays a central role in the context of Enterprise 4.0, in which some significant
trend lines can be identified:
• Informatisation of industrial sectors — Cloud Computing and Artificial
Intelligence enter industrial manufacturing processes (and automatic as-
sembly lines) and significantly change their canons. From series produc-
tion we are moving on to custom production in which the same assembly
line, thanks to the use of increasingly sophisticated robots, is able to pro-
duce different objects on the basis of specific requests supplied directly
by the end customer. This is already the case in a number of contexts,
such as, for example, the custom painting of certain types of cars.
• The robotisation of the consumer world — Robotics enters and transforms
everyday life and work, with a view to maximise the efficiency and se-
curity of services, not only in the industrial production sectors, but also
pervasively in many other areas of society. In this context, we are witness-
ing a strong transformation of the objects of our daily life, which, from
simple instruments under the control of the human being, are becoming
autonomous and able to make decisions. Typical examples range from
vacuum cleaners to cars.
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• Intelligence distribution — While in the 1980s the intelligence of robots
was located within the robots themselves, today there is a tendency to
relocate part of this intelligence to the Cloud (technology identified as
Cloud Robotics) in order to have cheaper, lighter, and smarter robots.
While this approach has considerable advantages in the development of
increasingly autonomous and connected robots, connecting a robot to
the internet and delocalising its intelligence (and thus its ability to make
decisions) opens the door to cyber attacks on these devices.
As far as cybersecurity aspects are concerned, in addition to the security
problems deriving from the physical actions of the robot, a further aspect to
consider is the fact that the “autonomous” motion capability can also be instru-
mental to the acquisition of data and information through mobile sensors, with
potential risks for the protection of information and personal data.
Without wishing to be exhaustive, we list below a series of devices whose
security is critical in relation to actions that they can carry out in the physi-
cal world. The car is an already well studied case in which a cybernetic attack
can cause significant consequences. Criticism in this area has already emerged
from the academic context and there have been demonstrations that have re-
quired the intervention of the car manufacturers: for example, in 2015, Chrysler
carried out or recalled various models of cars40 following the demonstration of
serious vulnerabilities that can be used to obtain remote control of the vehicle.
In general, the growth of driving aids, up to self-driving vehicles, increases the
number and criticality of decisions made by interconnected IT and electronic
systems (i.e., ECUs) rather than by the driver. While this increases security in
everyday use of the vehicle, critical signals with a significant effect in the physi-
cal world (e.g., brakes) are controlled by systems that could be compromised by
a cybernetic attack.
Autonomous driving capabilities also extend to other classes of unmanned
vehicles, able to operate without the direct control of the operator, whose use
is spreading rapidly in the military field, in emergency scenarios, in agriculture,
in mines, and in numerous other “outdoor” contexts. In these contexts, the use
of drones and micro-drones is increasingly widespread, through which it is pos-
sible not only to acquire data for monitoring, but also to perform operations
such as the release of plant protection products. It is not difficult to imagine the
consequences of intrusions into such systems.
Even in the home, robots are already a widespread reality, not only with re-
gard to the vacuum cleaner that builds the map of the house in order to clean
it systematically, but also with regard, for example, to telepresence devices that,
although mostly guided, allow you to see what children do at home or interact
40https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/24/fiat-chrysler-
recall-jeep-hacking
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with the faraway grandparents. By way of example, devices capable of inter-
acting in natural language with the operator (e.g., Siri41, Alexa42) have been at-
tacked through the audio channel. The use of voice commands is a feature that
quickly spreads even on mobile robotic devices. It is evident that the presence
of mobile systems inside a house is an important critical factor from the point
of view of security. Their presence offers, in fact, a mobile observation point,
which poses not only questions of protection of personal data but also the pos-
sibility of improper acquisition of information for improper use.
The category of so-called robotic service systems extends to environments
such as the office, restaurant, shopping centre, hospital, where the introduction
of autonomous systems for transport or interaction with the user, although not
yet very widespread, is expected to expand strongly in the next few years. Also
in these contexts, cybernetic attack on the device can have very significant con-
sequences.
One of the most interesting applications in the medical field is robotic
surgery, which makes it possible to perform surgical operations by manoeu-
vring, through a console, a robot that is not completely autonomous but ca-
pable of performing controlled manoeuvres. The technology now makes it pos-
sible to operate the robot remotely (tele-operated deep-freezing robots) also us-
ing “normal” telecommunication networks. This obviously paves the way for
cyber attacks that can alter robot behaviour, with consequences on patient ve-
hicles. Recently, a surgical robot (Raven II), which uses the standard Interoper-
able Telesurgery Protocol on the internet for communication between console
and robot, has been successfully subjected to various types of cyber attacks, for
the purpose of analysing possible risks to the patient (even a simple “denial of
service” attack, if it occurs at particular times of the procedure, can lead to the
death of the patient) [18]. These robots must be designed to be resilient to pos-
sible cyber attacks before they can be used in practice.
In general, there are three types of possible attacks that can alter the func-
tioning of a robotic system, compromising its physical interaction:
• The first, most trivial and catastrophic, is a direct attack on the robot,
in which the attacker manages to take direct control of the locomotion
systems of the robot itself, being in a position to control it directly, in
order to cause physical damage.
• The second type is a direct attack on the robot’s decision-making system,
which in Cloud Robotics runs on a Cloud system. In this case, the robot
behaves as it should, but control and handling data can be altered or un-
duly extruded. In this case, local safety systems (such as obstacle avoid-
ance) should still be able to avoid direct physical damage.
41https://www.apple.com/it/ios/siri/
42www.amazon.it/alexa?
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• The third type of attack falls within the context of spoofing attacks. In this
case, the intelligence is not directly attacked, but the data on the basis of
which the intelligence itself processes its own decisions is altered, so that
the robot performs the operations required by the attacker. An interesting
example of such an application is the so-called GPS spoofing43,thanks to
which it was possible to divert a military ship by altering the GPS data
received from it.
5.6.1 State of the art
In October 2016, the EU Department of Policy for Citizens’ Rights and Consti-
tutional Affairs approved a study paper on European civil legal rules in the field
of robotics, commissioned by the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Par-
liament to analyse the prospect of a future regulatory framework of civil rules
for robotics44. The result has produced a general framework of ethical princi-
ples aimed at protecting humankind from robots, by declaring: (i) the duty of
robots not to cause harm to humans; (ii) the obligation to respect the rules of
caution and attention to man; (iii) the principle of objective civil liability for
damage caused by robots, in accordance with the model of “vicarious” liabil-
ity (responsibility) for damage caused by robots: the machine, in fact, lacks its
psycho-physical autonomy on which to base a legal “individual” responsibility.
The document concludes that the creation of an ad hoc legal category for IA
products is inappropriate.
The ethical, social and juridical conviction is thus made one’s own, so that
only a natural person can be held responsible through diversified imputation
mechanisms.
The problem of cybersecurity in medical robotic devices has been ad-
dressed by regulatory bodies such as the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
which has promoted various initiatives to protect public health from vulnera-
bilities related to cybersecurity. In particular, in 2016 it issued guidelines rec-
ommending manufacturers to address cybersecurity during the design and de-
velopment of medical devices, which may lead to more effective mitigation of
patient risks45,46. In addition, data protection is required in robotic systems
that store [67] patient medical information.
43https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-
gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/
44http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571379/
IPOL_STU(2016)571379_EN.pdf
45https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf
46https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM356190.pdf
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Among the scenarios outlined in the previous section, that of the car has not
only aroused the interest of government agencies to various nations, including
the USA47, but has already requested the intervention of legislators. The ap-
proval of a law on this subject in the USA is recent, where road testing is already
common practice; other countries will follow soon.
5.6.2 Challenges
Without wanting to repeat the challenges arising from the technologies that in-
tersect with robotics, such as Cloud and IoT, already analysed in the previous
sections, we want to analyse those interdisciplinary challenges that are arising
with the evolution of robotics and that involve, in addition to the scientific and
technological spheres, sociological and legal ones as well.
• As far as sociological and legal matters are concerned, Italy (and many
other countries) still have no rules governing the use of robots and au-
tonomous devices within the company. For example, the flight of au-
tonomous drones in an unsupervised way is currently illegal. In general,
there is still a lack of in-depth understanding of critical profiles intro-
duced by possible cyber attacks in different areas, such as:
– the management/manipulation of the individual’s personal data
acquired by the robot in social contacts;
– the possible manipulation of the human emotions of weak subjects
in daily contact with artificial social machines (robot in domestic or
paradomestic environments, especially those close to the elderly,
children, sick);
– the physical vulnerability of those who use mechanical medical
devices to integrate/substitute their own organic dysfunctionality,
even as prostheses;
– the circulation of automated or autonomous vehicles and means of
transport.
• From a strictly scientific and technological point of view, the problems of
interest can essentially be clustered into two categories:
– Studying how, from an architectural point of view, attack and, con-
sequently, defence strategies are defined in the field of robotic sys-
tems on which there are typically embedded systems as well as con-
47United States Government Accountability Office: VEHICLE CYBERSECURITY -
DOT and industry have efforts under way, but DOT needs to define its role in response to
a real world attack, 2016 – http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676064.pdf
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ventional processing systems, such as PCs, tablets, mobile phones
etc. [25].
– Monitoring and safety. In fact, in the case of devices considered in
this field, the study of anomalies in behaviour has a specific con-
notation that focuses on interaction with the environment, and in
particular with human beings. Characterisation of abnormal be-
haviour of autonomous devices poses a research challenge in the
near future.
5.6.3 Objectives
The main objective of the project is to identify and consolidate the methodolog-
ical bases for the development of research and innovation in the field of cyber-
security for the categories of autonomous systems considered here.
From a strictly technical point of view, the following lines of action have
been identified:
• the specialisation of cybersecurity technologies for autonomous robotic
systems, developing protocols and security solutions that guarantee not
only the information but also the physical security of these systems and
are therefore able to suitably combine safety and security;
• the regulation, from a legal point of view, of the aspects related to the
introduction of autonomous systems in society and the system of impu-
tation of liability for damages;
• the definition of long-term social and educational objectives in order to
prepare citizens adequately for the spread of robots in everyday life, so
that they become not only passive users, but active participants in the
ongoing change and sensitive to risks in terms of protection of personal
data, safety and security.
139

CHAPTER
6
Horizontal Actions
This chapter presents a number of horizontal actions, transversal to the en-
abling technologies and to those to be protected, which were analysed in the
previous two chapters.
First of all, the aspects related to the defence of personal data protection are
analysed, also in connection with the forthcoming entry into force of the GDPR
regulation.
Necessary actions in the fields of education, training and awareness-raising
are then presented. It is now strategic to train every sector of society to under-
stand the historical change that occurred with the development of the internet,
which has added a new dimension to our way of life. In order to respond to the
problems posed by the growing use of cyberspace and criticisms in terms of the
protection of information systems, it is necessary to promote the culture of se-
curity and to make citizens and workers aware that the lack of attention to these
aspects can put an entire community at risk. In order to achieve this objective,
it is necessary to strengthen specialist education sectors, to increase security to
the level of a strategic objective, and to further consider basic education, uni-
versity education, and vocational training.
6.1 Protection of personal data and GDPR
In a world where state security agencies and the global giants of the internet
economy collect and record data on our behaviour, the protection of such data
has a direct impact on citizens’ rights. This impact is mainly due to the han-
dling of personal and sensitive data having become commonplace, increasingly
restricting the right to protection of personal data and freedom of expression.
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This sometimes generates fear in those who are less aware of the actual scope
of this phenomenon, and conformism in those who are acquainted with its dy-
namics.
Cybersecurity is not only the protection of national assets, but is also a fun-
damental citizen right. An overall reflection is therefore needed on what digi-
tal security means in a context where state surveillance powers are expanded,
anonymity and technologies for personal data protection are limited, outlawed,
or even their users monitored, while guarantee systems are weakened and back-
doors are installed in the most popular software with the complacency of un-
scrupulous companies.
Backdoor – A method of bypassing normal authentication in a computer system
and accessing it remotely to take full or partial control. Backdoors can be hidden
within system programs, software applications or hardware components and can
be introduced by programmers, designers or compilers. There can be mathemati-
cal backdoors hidden in cryptographic systems, aimed at decrypting data streams.
Typically, whoever discovers a backdoor can exploit it, while a mathematical back-
door can only be used by those who have introduced it.
Failing to secure data and information endangers our privacy, which is the
precondition for exercising the rights of opinion and association, free speech,
press and movement, freedom to conduct business, and property rights as well.
For this reason, protecting our personal data and the information that qualifies
us and our actions becomes a fundamental requirement: the knowledge of our
most intimate beliefs and conduct can allow others to manipulate us, intimidate
us, or even blackmail us.
Large organisations are aware that the first line of defence is provided by
adequate risk management and observation of security procedures, but often
companies and institutions do not have a recovery plan in case of cyber attacks
and public managers and decision-makers have little awareness of the real risk
that occurs when a single link in the security chain is broken.
The following section addresses the main issues related to the protection
of personal data arising from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
introduced by EU Regulation 2016/6791 of 27 April 2016, which repeals the pre-
vious Directive 95/46/EC.
6.1.1 The legislation
The main purpose of the GDPR regulation, applicable from 25 May 2018, is to
reform, update and standardise the legislation on the protection and free move-
1http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/4964718
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ment of personal data, so as to make it more solid and consistent across the
various EU countries.
Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR regulation are profoundly different: while
the former sets out a series of requirements, similar to a checklist, the latter de-
fines the objectives to be achieved, leaving the choices of the most appropriate
instruments to the implementer in relation to the context, at the same time obli-
gating the documentation of the reasons that motivated these choices.
Given that personal data refers to all information relating to an individual
and his/her professional and public persona2, the concept of data protection
that characterises the GDPR also includes the obligations related to their man-
agement, which concern both security and other areas such as storage, con-
fidentiality, anonymisation, and cancellation at the request of the interested
party.
The GDPR distinguishes between the processor, the controller, and the sub-
ject, i.e., the person to whom the data are related.
The GDPR requires companies to review data management systems within
their organisational structures to prevent data loss or mis-sharing. The new Reg-
ulation revises the concept of accountability3: the responsibility for processing
lies with the controller and with the processor. Companies must also appoint a
Data Protection Officer (DPO) who is responsible for overseeing internal organ-
isational processes and is an expert in data protection law and techniques4.
To protect the entire supply chain of services for the company, data pro-
cessing issues are not limited to the company perimeter, but involve sub-
contractors, distributors, agents, outsourcers, industrial and commercial part-
ners, cloud providers, etc. All business partners are involved in the process and
must implement shared and efficient strategies.
The GDPR also requires the application of the data protection by design
principle, which requires data protection to be considered from the conception
and design phase of a system for the processing or management of personal
data, involving those involved in the development of services, products, and
applications that use personal data.
In closing, we highlight some basic principles of treatment that affect secu-
rity. Since no database is secure on the internet, some of the basic principles of
the GDPR are precisely aimed at limiting the scope of exposure to risks:
• Data minimisation — I collect only the necessary data and not others;
2http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32016R0679&from=IT
3http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/5184810/Guida+al+nuovo+
Regolamento+europeo+in+materia+di+protezione+dati
4http://www.garanteprivacy.it/titolare-responsabile-incaricato-
del-trattamento
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• Aims limitation — I cannot decide to do what I want with data, but only
pursue the purpose for which I have collected it;
• Storage limitation — I am required to delete data as soon as the purpose
for which I collected it ends.
6.1.2 Impact of legislation
The GDPR will have a direct impact on each Member State, which in turn will
be obliged to comply with the rules uniformly applied across the EU. For this
reason, its implementation will, on the one hand, require companies and public
bodies to carry out a thorough review of their data management systems and,
on the other hand, will increase public awareness of data protection issues.
Companies that do not comply with GDPR provisions by the due date are
subject to fines up to EUR 20 million, or 4% of the global turnover recorded in
the previous year. Furthermore, anyone who suffers material or non-material
damage as a result of an infringement of the regulation is entitled to request
compensation for damages.
The protection of personal data is already a priority for many players, but
the transition period prior to the date of application of this regulation is cru-
cial for many individuals, organisations, companies, and services operating in
the EU. All these parties will have to analyse their approach to data protection
in order to identify any discrepancies between the methods applied and the re-
quirements imposed by the GDPR. To this end, companies must place the pro-
tection of personal data at the heart of their internal processes and strengthen
corporate communication through specific training programmes that ensure
adequate training for those who have access to users’ personal data5.
Data breach – An event that puts an individual’s personal data at risk by making
them accessible or publicly available. Personal data include health or financial in-
formation, copies of identity documents, credit card data, etc. The main causes
of a data breach are typically cyber attacks, system vulnerabilities, and/or human
errors.
The severity of the penalties makes it clear that it is important to raise
awareness of the need for compliance with the GDPR. In addition to the pe-
cuniary consequences, compromising data security and violating the regulation
on the handling of confidential data can result in consequences that are not only
monetary; harm can be done to business reputation, trademarks can depreciate
and the goodwill towards a company can diminish.
5http://www.garanteprivacy.it/approccio-basato-sul-rischio-
e-misure-di-accountability-responsabilizzazione-di-titolari-e-
responsabili
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Finally, organisations should not underestimate the risk that, through the
collective actions for damages allowed by art. 82 for anyone who suffers material
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement on the regulation, they
are sentenced to pay large amounts, even when individual damages are small.
The number of victims of data breaches might be very high, often in the order
of tens of thousands or tens of millions.
The implementation of the new regulation is therefore a key step for data
processing legislation and will allow greater control over the use of personal
data. There is a real risk that the regulatory instruments provided by the GDPR
are not fully used by citizens because of a lack of awareness of the risks of protec-
tion of personal data to which they are subject every time they take any action
mediated by the internet: from access to web-based or mobile services (email,
e-banking, e-commerce, etc.) to the use of devices that are increasingly smart
(smartwatches, fitness trackers, etc.). These risks further increase if we consider
the amount of personal and sensitive data that every day are uploaded to social
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. It is therefore necessary, on the one
hand, as illustrated in detail in section 6.3, to increase awareness of the need
of protecting personal data on social media and, on the other hand, to provide
adequate regulations on how service providers should inform users about their
rights.
6.1.3 Implementation of legislation
On 13 December 2016, the EU Article 29 Working Party (WP 29) issued three
documents with indications and recommendations related to the forthcoming
implementation by Member States of the GDPR. The final version of the Guide-
lines6 was approved on 5 April 2017.
For Italy, there is therefore a need to proceed rapidly with the adoption of
the GDPR regulation regarding both regulatory aspects and company aware-
ness.
As far as the regulatory aspects are concerned, at the time of writing, the Per-
sonal Data Protection Authority has not disclosed information regarding codes
of conduct designed to supplement the GDPR with specific and detailed pro-
visions. These provisions will play a key role, as compliance with the detailed
requirements will determine the presumption of conformity in the case of in-
fringement proceedings.
With regard to the preparation of codes of conduct and technological tools
aimed at providing support to companies for the implementation of GDPR stan-
dards, there are some initiatives worth mentioning in the European landscape,
6http://garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/
docweb/3815707
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which may represent a useful reference basis. In particular, the code adopted
by CISPE.cloud7 provides a good example for operators who offer cloud com-
puting services; the Danish Confindustria has also approved guidelines8 for the
implementation of the GDPR at the business level, aiming to provide guidance
to Danish companies on controls that support the implementation of the regu-
latory requirements.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the joint adoption of the two GDPR
and NIS regulations (see section 1.2.1) introduces security incident reporting
obligations, on the one hand to protect data subjects under attack (GDPR) and,
on the other hand, for the “systemic protection” of national and European criti-
cal infrastructures (NIS). The development or transformation of these functions,
therefore, cannot be further postponed, in order to meet the May 2018 dead-
line. In particular, an evolution towards the so-called Next Generation SOCs is
emerging, in which a decisive role is played by soft law tools and sources of self-
regulation of specific categories, through correlation rules that include methods
and techniques of business-oriented data analysis and that, above all, can be in-
tegrated with monitoring tools designed for Big Data.
Security Operations Center (SOC) – The centre for the provision of services aimed
at the security of information systems internal to a company or at external cus-
tomer sites. Provided services typically include: (i) management of security fea-
tures related to the IT infrastructure (network, systems, and applications); (ii) mon-
itoring of IT infrastructure for early detection of intrusion attempts or improper use
of systems; (iii) control to improve the level of protection through security assess-
ment and early warning. While having different roles and purposes, in some cases
SOCs also act as CERTs (see box on page 17).
6.1.4 Objectives
In a company context, compliance to the procedures for the processing of per-
sonal data and sensitive information with GDPR regulations can actually be car-
ried out in two ways: customising existing technologies that have already been
developed as a part of business logic or implementing innovative algorithms
from scratch. The implementation objectives to be pursued are as follows:
• Identify tools and technologies of data discovery that can recognise, on
the basis of heuristic rules, the databases within the entire information
system in which information subject to the requirements of the GDPR is
present.
7https://cispe.cloud/code-of-conduct/
8https://digital.di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Vejledninger/
Persondataforordningen/Persondataforordningen_engelsk.pdf
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• Develop tools and technologies that, by analysing data and information
life-cycle processes, are able to report and track down procedures that
lower the levels of security or open the door to breaches of personal data
protection policies. This tool must therefore be able to assess how much
the implementation of a data processing procedure exposes the company
to a risk of a GDPR violation.
• Develop methodologies and tools integrated with best practices in cy-
bersecurity. In particular, integrate cyber risk management frameworks,
such as the National Framework of Cybersecurity [10], with the method-
ologies imposed by the GDPR. Many of the Framework’s best practices
correspond to GDPR implementation practices. A unified vision of cy-
bersecurity and personal data protection policies provides an integrated
view both in the risk assessment process and in adaptation and remedia-
tion initiatives, helping to develop project synergies and improve invest-
ment efficiency.
• Deliver a regulation (recommender) with simple rules to support com-
panies in designing procedures for accessing and managing information
which meet the GDPR requirements. The recommender must have the
ability to abstract itself from the specific technologies and procedures
used and should guide the user in defining an adequate data processing
workflow in relation to both the data sources and the applications that
shall access data or manage its life cycle.
6.2 Education
One of the main reasons for the success of cyber attacks in various areas, now
reported daily even by the non-specialist press, is the lack of a suitably qualified
workforce in the cybersecurity sector. The scarcity of professionals with ade-
quate skills makes companies, public bodies, and entire countries vulnerable,
and exacerbates the difficulties of managing accidents. A number of specialised
studies foresee a shortage of more than one and a half million units of labour by
20209, highlighting a steadily growing demand10.
Italy also suffers from the shortage of professionals in the area of cyber-
security, that is exacerbated by the migration of young people, trained in our
9http://www.csoonline.com/article/2953258/it-careers/
cybersecurity-job-market-figures-2015-to-2019-indicate-severe-
workforce-shortage.html
10https://www.isc2cares.org/uploadedFiles/wwwisc2caresorg/Content/
GISWS/FrostSullivan-(ISC)%C2%B2-Global-Information-Security-
Workforce-Study-2015.pdf.
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universities, but attracted abroad by more attractive salaries. In the absence
of appropriate professional skills, the Enterprise 4.0 programme can become a
boomerang for key sectors of our economy: extending the principle of “every-
thing connected, always” to the manufacturing world will lead to a significant
increase in the risk of cyber attacks that succeed in stealing sensitive informa-
tion from companies and compromising their operations.
To mitigate these risks, significant investments are needed to train security
experts with strong technical expertise capable of (i) defining protection and
control policies, strategies, and programmes, to protect data, networks, and
systems; (ii) managing situations, events and people in the presence of cyber
attacks; (iii) contributing to a culture of cybersecurity in companies and society
at large.
Given the pervasiveness of the aspects of cybersecurity in the professional,
educational, and academic spheres, as well as in the wider social context, train-
ing in this field should be addressed along six complementary lines:
1. Advanced Training — Aimed at providing the fundamental cybersecurity
technical and methodological tools through degree courses, university
Master’s courses, and Doctoral programmes offered by universities;
2. Basic Education — Aimed at providing the basics of cybersecurity from
at least the secondary schools, regardless of the specific school type, with
the objective of laying the foundations for a better understanding of the
topic and of promoting cybersecurity among the possible choices of uni-
versity courses;
3. Vocational training — Aimed at continuing training for all professions
that are increasingly confronted with cybersecurity issues;
4. Talent scouting — Aimed at finding young talents to be directed towards
a career in cybersecurity, attracting their interest through IT challenges,
simulations in protected virtual environments and, in general, through
initiatives that allow participants to experience possible operational con-
texts and to evaluate opportunities for professional growth;
5. Training — Aimed at strengthening, improving, and evaluating the prac-
tical capabilities of operators and procedures for countering and manag-
ing cyber incidents within organisations;
6. Citizens’ awareness raising — Aimed at providing citizens with the ba-
sic notions of cybersecurity and the basic concepts of what is now com-
monly called cyber-hygiene.
Of the six guidelines, the first five are analysed in this section, while the sixth will
be dealt with in the following section.
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6.2.1 State of the art
Advanced Training Many prestigious foreign universities, including MIT,
Harvard, Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon, Georgia Institute of Technology, Impe-
rial College, Eindhoven, ETH Zurich, etc.11 offer advanced training programs in
cybersecurity.
In Italy we are not in year zero. At the University of Milan, a Master’s de-
gree and a three-year degree in Computer Security have been offered for years.
For some years now, the University of Trento has been part of a consortium
within the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) which offers
a Master’s Degree in Security and Privacy. Since the 2017-2018 academic year,
Sapienza Università di Roma has also offered a Master’s Degree in Computer
Security. Study plans in cybersecurity are planned or in progress within various
Master’s Degree courses in Computer Science or Computer Engineering. These
initiatives are accompanied by many first and second level Master’s courses, ac-
cessible respectively after a three-year laurea or a subsequent laurea magistrale.
Also, other Master’s training courses such as that of the Cyber Academy12 of the
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia are offered. For a complete picture,
please refer to the study13 carried out jointly by CINI’s National Laboratory of
Digital Competences, Training and Certification and the National Laboratory
of Cybersecurity. This second laboratory is also leading various training and
awareness-raising initiatives14, bringing to Italy what had been done by the As-
sociation for Computing Machinery (ACM), which set up a commission to draw
up curricular guidelines based on a complete vision of cybersecurity, which take
into account the specific disciplinary needs for open and critical training and
the relationship between curriculum and type of workforce required15.
Basic Education Many countries pay particular attention to these aspects;
for example, in Great Britain more than EUR 20 million have been invested in
the Cyber Schools Programme16 for young people between 14 and 18 years of
age, to encourage them to approach these issues and develop skills that will be
increasingly important in defending the backbone of the economy.
11https://digitalguardian.com/blog/cybersecurity-higher-education-
top-cybersecurity-colleges-and-degrees
12http://cyber.unimore.it/
13https://www.consorzio-cini.it/index.php/it/lab-cfc/59-italiano/
laboratori/lab-cfc/notizie-in-evidenza/1183-il-laboratorio-cfc-e-l-
osservatorio-delle-competenze-digitali-2017
14https://www.consorzio-cini.it/index.php/it/labcs-home/
formazione-in-cyber-security-in-italia
15https://www.csec2017.org
16https://www.gov.uk/guidance/cyber-schools-programme
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In Italian high schools, at the moment, little attention is given to cybersecu-
rity issues and none among the 34 actions considered in the National Plan for
La Buona Scuola Digitale17 is dedicated to cybersecurity.
Talent scouting Numerous international initiatives have been set up to pro-
mote the spread of the cybersecurity culture by leveraging competition as a
stimulus to attract young talent. For example, in Great Britain, under the brand
name CyberFirst18, the government supports the growth of the next genera-
tion of cybersecurity experts through a scheme of courses, apprenticeships and
competitions for young people aged 11-17.
One of the most popular training initiatives is certainly the Capture-The-
Flag (CTF) competition (see box on page 74). Countries such as Australia, the
UK, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Romania and the USA have been or-
ganising competitions for some years, which select the best candidates to build
national teams.
Annually, the ENISA organises the European Cybersecurity Challenge
(ECSC), a competition dedicated to European national teams in which, since
2017, Italy has also participated under the aegis of CINI and MISE.
CyberChallenge.IT 19 is the first Italian programme of talent scouting in
cybersecurity promoted by the CINI National Cybersecurity Laboratory. The
project aims at identifying excellences in cybersecurity among high school or
early university students. The 2017 edition saw 700 applications from all over
Italy, while the 2018 event will offer training courses at 8 Italian universities and
will culminate in the first Italian cybersecurity championship. At the same time,
the initiative aims to train young people for the Italian team participating in
ECSC 2018.
Training Cyber Ranges (see box on page 35) can play an important role in
training at all levels and various states are using them for training in both civil-
ian and military cybersecurity. EDURange20 is a platform for the construction
of scenarios and individual training paths. Arizona’s Cyber Warfare Range21 of-
fers paths of increasing complexity for individual training. The Michigan Cyber
Range22 is not limited to reproducing the ICT infrastructure of a single organi-
17http://www.istruzione.it/scuola_digitale/allegati/Materiali/pnsd-
layout-30.10-WEB.pdf
18https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/new-talent
19https://www.cyberchallenge.it
20http://blogs.evergreen.edu/edurange
21http://azcwr.org
22http://www.merit.edu/cyberrange
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sation, but includes an entire virtual city (Alphaville). Locked Shields exercises,
performed using NATO’s Cyber Range in Estonia, support very sophisticated
training activities where an attack team, red team, contrasts with multiple blue
teams, which have the task of defending the scenario assigned to them from at-
tacks launched by the red team.
6.2.2 Challenges
The existing training initiatives in our country are unfortunately still insuffi-
cient and suffer two major shortcomings: the limited number of experienced
researchers who can teaching the needed skills, and an inadequate national co-
ordination between academia, high schools, and the public and private sectors
to define the necessary professional profiles. Moreover, at the university level,
even though the activation of new training courses is a particularly important
requirement, compliance with the fulfilment of the minimum requirements in
terms of teaching staff imposed by current legislation means that, in various es-
tablishments, the activation of new cybersecurity degree courses would imply
the closure of some of the existing courses.
From the point of view of training programmes for young talents, the main
challenge is to intercept them at an early stage of their studies when they have
not yet decided on a definite direction to invest their skills, and to show them
career opportunities and the stimulating aspects of activities in cybersecurity.
This can be pursued through the involvement of high school students and the
promotion of female participation, undermining the principle that cybersecu-
rity is a domain for men only.
As far as vocational training is concerned, provisions should be made for
continuing training programmes. Training employees on the field through
courses and practical exercises is just as important as acquiring new technology.
This training should be aimed not only at IT professionals but also at managers,
technical operators, and executive staff.
In private business organisations this issue is dealt with at different levels
of maturity: much can still be done in small and medium sized companies that
often have less investment capacity but represent the backbone of the Italian
economy. But, even more importantly, it is necessary to devote efforts to this
issue in the public context, where the working age of employees, the stratifica-
tion of the roles held over the years or the lack of funds for training often do not
contribute to the development of awareness of security issues: the challenge be-
comes even greater in those public areas that represent critical infrastructures
for the country, such as, for example, health care.
In particular, the preparation of operators who are directly confronted with
critical situations (e.g., cyber attacks, security incidents, data breaches, etc.) is
crucial not only for an effective and efficient management of the event when it
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has already occurred, but also from the prevention and lesson learned points of
view. Reference examples and best practices can be taken from highly critical
sectors (e.g., in the nuclear, aerospace, oil and gas fields, etc.) where a contin-
uous training based on drills has always been implemented, suitably designed
for the specific context aimed at guaranteeing the highest level of resilience.
For this reason, developing techniques and tools capable of automating ac-
tivities to support confrontation of possible attacks is a major challenge. The
next-generation Cyber Ranges can perform this task by adapting the complexity
of the considered scenarios to the tasks of the professional figures involved in
the drill.
6.2.3 Objectives
The following should certainly be included among the most significant objec-
tives of training:
• Plan for advanced training in cybersecurity — A specific plan should be
drawn, in concert with the public sector, private companies, and uni-
versities, in order to define professional profiles trained through degree
courses, university Master’s courses, and Doctoral programmes. These
courses, taking the current Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in computer
science and computer engineering as their starting point, should provide
basic cybersecurity technical and methodological tools. In particular:
– The universities shall:
* redesign the curriculum of basic computer science or computer
engineering courses, introducing security concepts from the
very beginning of the studies;
* offer new university courses on cybersecurity topics to be in-
cluded in existing curricula;
* set up graduate courses, especially lauree magistrali, to train
professionals able to understand complex systems and to
monitor heterogeneous and constantly changing environ-
ments, taking all levels of risk into account;
* set up Doctoral courses to train experts and researchers able to
understand international developments in cybersecurity re-
search, anticipate attack dynamics, and create new passive
and active defence tools;
* collaborate in the implementation of the National Training
Cyber Range presented later in this section;
* offer Master’s courses aimed at training immediately opera-
tional experts, attracting not only recent graduates, but also
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employees of public bodies and private companies, to be in-
volved and retrained on cybersecurity issues;
* apply to participate as local nodes in national research and
training programmes for young talent, such as the CyberChal-
lenge. IT.
– The Ministry of Education, Universities and Research will have to
define a special plan which, starting from the current emergency
situation, provides for the allocation of specific resources (teachers,
researchers, funding) for the development of higher education and
research in cybersecurity. This plan, as detailed in section 9.5, is
essential both to avoid that our researchers go to countries where
their professional skills are better recognised and remunerated and
to encourage the return or the arrival of highly qualified researchers
from abroad.
• Plan for basic cybersecurity education — The long-term strategy must in-
clude enriching programs at schools of all levels, from the moment pupils
start using smartphones and networked devices independently. The pro-
vision of adequate security knowledge must have the dual purpose of in-
troducing the basic concepts of cybersecurity and making children aware
of the risks associated with a careless use of the network and of the appli-
cations used on their devices. To this aim, it is important to:
– promote public-private partnerships to provide students with eco-
nomic incentives (e.g., through scholarships) to reduce the costs of
cybersecurity training;
– sponsor training programmes for the research of young talents,
promoting Italian participation in international competitions such
as the European Cybersecurity Challenge (ECSC);
– introduce compulsory notions of IT security in school curricula,
starting from the concepts of digital identity, threats and risks, tools
and behaviours for the safe use of the network, etc.;
– prepare ad hoc training for teachers identified as potential train-
ers on the topic, while stimulating the development of new profes-
sional skills within the teaching staff;
– encourage and strengthen opportunities for training experiences in
dual-training systems (learning and working)23 which, by exploit-
ing the combination of knowledge and know-how, offer partici-
pants the opportunity to get closer to the problems of cybersecu-
rity;
23http://www.istruzione.it/alternanza/
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– highlight how digital transformation has eliminated some types of
work but has created others, and that there are many job and career
opportunities in the cybersecurity field.
• Plan for professional training in cybersecurity — The problem of voca-
tional training is wide and complex because, as it happens with security
on the workplace, it affects not only the specialists but all employees of
any company, both in the private sector and in the public administra-
tion. Vocational training and refresher courses through continuous train-
ing therefore play a crucial role. Each individual must understand that
misbehaviour in terms of security can be the weak link in the defence
chain and facilitate malicious access to the IT systems and relevant data
of their organisation. In this respect, in particular, companies and public
authorities shall specifically:
– implement periodic cybersecurity training and refresher programs
for non-technical personnel such as executives, managers and
board members;
– implement training programs to fill the cybersecurity gaps of mid-
dle and senior technical staff;
– sponsor training initiatives of young talents, with the aim of getting
in touch with potential candidates to be recruited;
– define and implement specific training programs on cyber security
and risk management for professional profiles operating in the field
of industrial control systems, to meet the complex challenges that
arise when the aim is to protect such systems from cyber attacks;
– develop platforms for sharing up-to-date information on identified
vulnerabilities and threats, both within the individual organisation
and across the entire supply chain. These platforms should im-
prove the quality of training and raise awareness of possible secu-
rity risks.
• National National Plan for Awareness-raising — Finalised to provide the
population with the basic notions of cybersecurity and the basic concepts
of cyber-hygiene; this plan is analysed in detail in the following section.
• Talent scouting — In order to identify young talents, it is important not
only to involve students at an early stage of their careers, but also to pro-
mote the construction of a community of experts that provides a platform
for recruiting the profiles best suited to the various professional roles in
cybersecurity. This can be done by following the career development of
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young people after leaving initial training programmes such as the Cy-
berChallenge.IT24. A first objective to consider is their involvement in the
training activities of subsequent classes (according to a model of peer ed-
ucation), in order to train new generations of trainees. A second objective
is the promotion of degrees, Master’s and Doctorates in cybersecurity. An
important and concrete aspect in this context is the creation of a database
of young experts and their skills, to enable effective matching between
demand and supply in the professional labour market. The CyberChal-
lenge.IT programme is the starting point for creating this platform for the
development of the future Italian cybersecurity community.
• National Cyber range for training — It is important to aim at the creation
of a national Cyber Range dedicated to training. This will enable a set of
activities of great importance for the country. Sharing the Cyber Range
between researchers, PAs and industries will allow:
– academia to strengthen cybersecurity training programs with prac-
tical sessions, for students to experiment and acquire skills that can
be immediately spent in workplaces;
– researchers to experiment and evaluate the effectiveness of innova-
tive cybersecurity techniques in a controlled environment;
– public and private sectors to train the staff in charge of cyber de-
fence and also to be able to experimentally evaluate the effective-
ness of the defence instruments to be acquired.
6.3 Awareness and cyber-hygiene
The use of the internet is increasingly pervasive, engaging and, as time goes by,
the number of devices connected to the net is constantly increasing, just as the
activities that can be carried out with the help of the network. The net is today,
in fact, the element that unites different contexts, representing the privileged
communication tool in both the personal and business environment: for all of
us, it is now the infrastructure on which our personal data travel, the data of
the companies for which we work, our ideas and our interests. Without the in-
ternet we cannot navigate the web, use Facebook, search for information with
Google, send and receive electronic mail, send messages with WhatsApp, make
purchases and bookings online, and access many PA services.
The offer of online services has reached extraordinary levels of variety and
diffusion, thanks to the ease of access to mobile technologies and the flour-
ishing of new applications that can also respond to the needs of niche users.
24https://www.cyberchallenge.it
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Home banking, e-government, electronic healthcare and e-commerce services
are now an integral part of the lives of citizens who use the digital channel to
interact with public and private organisations.
The extensive use of social media is also favoured by the ease of data and
information sharing that these platforms support: in this context of openness,
the “natural” defences of a user tend to decrease due, on the one hand, to the
fact that communication is mediated by technology, and, on the other, to the
expectations of carrying out fun or interesting activities.
Dangers In such a tool-rich, opportunity-packed, and open scenario, the
network often becomes a source of danger if its limitations and threats are not
properly understood and security aspects are not taken into account. Citizens
are potential targets of attack both as consumers of digital products and ser-
vices, and as members of organisations.
We are therefore faced with a systemic risk that is difficult to manage, es-
pecially in the absence of the control mechanisms typical of organisations. In
addition, the limitations brought about by the adoption of security mecha-
nisms may conflict with other needs, such as improving the user experience of
products and services. An example of this is provided by the federated iden-
tity management systems, in which the urgency of reaching a critical mass of
users by offering useful and immediate services clashes with the need to pre-
vent and detect identity theft through complex procedures for identification
and authentication. It is also difficult to counteract unwanted behaviour in
inter-organisational contexts, regulated by commercial agreements, where dig-
ital platforms provide the infrastructure for real service ecosystems. Just con-
sider the phenomenon of fraud on mobile payment systems, whereby small
amounts are subtracted from millions of users through unaware online sub-
scriptions, triggered by advanced forms of phishing (see box on page 28).
Company Digital Divide Paraphrasing the concept of the digital genera-
tional divide, in the working context there is a clear separation between the
companies where the use of technology is predominant (where, therefore, part
of the staff has good or excellent IT and security tools) and the companies where
instead the use of technological tools plays a marginal role in the employees’
daily tasks.
Citizens and their workplace The best-known cyber attacks are carried out
on a large scale and affect both citizens and organisations. However, it is not cor-
rect to consider these two groups as distinct. In fact, very often, citizens are also
workers working in digitised environments where personal and professional
spheres intersect, thus creating dangerous short circuits in which cyber threats
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can spread and endanger economic resources, the protection of personal data,
and the profitability and security of critical infrastructures and democratic sys-
tems. Exposure to risk increases when business tools are also used for personal
activities: in these cases, attacks can result not only in the violation of personal
data protection but also in new vulnerabilities for the company where the vic-
tims work.
Social Engineering – A set of techniques designed to mislead a person in order to
obtain confidential information. These can then be used fraudulently to carry out
an attack, using different tools and technologies.
Work environments, therefore, play an important role in raising employee
awareness on security issues, not only for the corporate purpose of protecting
the information assets of the organisations in which they operate, but also as a
contribution to the basic training that employees transfer to their personal lives
as private citizens. Knowledge of threats deriving not only from digital tools
and the network through malware, but also from social engineering techniques,
which are acquired in the workplace, contributes more widely to the strength-
ening of the country’s social awareness on cybersecurity issues.
6.3.1 State of the art
At the European level, the lines of action defined in the field of basic digital skills
are based on pillar 6 of the European Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) Enhanc-
ing digital literacy, skills and inclusion25 and have two primary objectives:
• building digital citizenship: access to and participation in the knowledge
society, with full digital awareness;
• achieving digital inclusion: equality of opportunities in the use of the net-
work and development of a culture of innovation and creativity.
In line with these objectives, in Italy several bodies, in various ways, operate
for the promotion of training initiatives aimed at cybersecurity. For example,
the Department of Security Information Department (DIS) has promoted a se-
ries of initiatives aimed at Italian high school and university students to spread
the culture of cybersecurity through dialogue with the new generations. The Be
aware Be digital26 campaign that was recently launched is particularly relevant
in this respect.
25http://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-
reports/opinions/enhancing-digital-literacy-e-skills-and-e-inclusion
26https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/archivio-notizie/
be-aware-be-digital.html
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6.3.2 Challenges
In such a complex scenario, structured action is needed towards end users that
takes the differences due to different age groups - teenagers, young adults, and
adults - into account.
Teenagers navigate online with ease, but often do not know the mecha-
nisms and limitations of the internet, and above all do not understand the close
link between actions carried out on the internet and in real life; the sometimes
tragic situations in which they find themselves involved because of cyberbully-
ing phenomena in social media bear witness to this. Families feel unprepared
to tackle the issue competently and parents are often unable to respond to the
alarms raised by teenagers. Schools rely on the various external initiatives avail-
able, promoted by companies, non-profit organisations, or public institutions:
all these initiatives, however, despite their great usefulness, suffer from a lack of
continuity and limited scalability on the national territory.
Young adults who enter working life have developed behaviours and habits
over time, such as the tendency to easily share information or acquire infor-
mation on the web, without applying the necessary filter of critical thought.
Such behaviours can pose a risk both to them personally and the companies
that employ them. Structured initiatives are needed to adequately train young
people to become real networkers citizens: even those who have not followed
curricula with a technological focus must be able to benefit from digital train-
ing in security, suitable for a mature use of technological tools, based on risk-
and responsibility-conscious behaviours online. In order to achieve this goal,
voluntary initiatives are not enough: it is necessary to provide a real civic edu-
cation on the net, through an educational programme of national scope, at all
levels, which includes training and awareness raising on the subject of internet
security.
Adults generally lack a broader perception of cyber risk. As a result, they do
not adopt what are considered to be the basic rules and behaviours of so-called
cyber-hygiene. Even when these rules are known, they tend to be circumvented
in favour of easier access to services and information. People are therefore ex-
posed to the danger of large-scale attacks, which exploit naive behaviours such
as, for example, the vulnerabilities resulting from the systematic failure to up-
date system software, from PCs to tablets and smartphones. In this regard, it is
important to point out that the relationship between system vulnerability and
security countermeasures is not static, but dynamic: the evolution of technolo-
gies and the continuous adaptation of tools to user needs make it necessary to
systematically update the software, which in many cases, due to various wide-
ranging reasons, is not possible to carry out automatically. Finally, it is neces-
sary to stress the importance of individual behaviours: the most sophisticated
and perfectly updated technological protections are in fact completely useless
if each of us does not adopt safe behaviours. By way of example, one may exclu-
158
sively use devices with the most up-to-date antivirus, but if one cannot recog-
nise a phishing email and provides his credentials to malicious organisations by
accessing a “fake” site, he is actually distributing all of his home keys.
6.3.3 Objectives
The Italian Digital Agenda27 clearly states that our country needs effective mea-
sures to promote the digital literacy of the population. In this context, it is nec-
essary to carry out campaigns for the safe use of the network and its communi-
cation tools, in order to guarantee the security of individuals and, consequently,
of the whole country. For this reason, action should be taken towards increas-
ing citizens’ awareness of security issues and to significantly influence their be-
haviour in the use of digital communication tools.
It is therefore necessary to set up a set of actions for training on the safe use
of the network, aiming at increasing technological knowledge and social secu-
rity for our country, by pursuing the following objectives:
• A national framework for awareness raising and permanent training
— Develop a structured path at the national level for the definition of a
Framework as a reference model for implementing permanent refresher
training actions on the themes of network security and conscious use of
digital tools. The Framework should define a set of coherent “contexts”
and identify for each of them, with the contribution of multidisciplinary
specialist teams: (i) the objectives to be achieved, defining, where appli-
cable, the relevant bodies of knowledge and syllabuses; (ii) the sequence
of actions to be implemented to achieve them; (iii) detailed operational
plans, in terms both of timing and resources.
• Minimal checks for citizens and cyber-hygiene — (i) Define a set of mini-
mal controls for citizens and a set of basic cyber-hygiene rules that must
be systematically followed; (ii) Identify and activate the most suitable
mechanisms for the maximum diffusion of these minimal controls and
the basic rules of cyber-hygiene through advertising and mass informa-
tion campaigns, both in traditional media (newspapers, radio, TV) and in
social media.
• Public, private, third-sector cooperation — Promote and encourage a vir-
tuous model of cooperation between public, private, and third sector or-
ganisations for the enhancement and implementation of today’s initia-
tives that are already implemented, in various forms, on the national ter-
ritory. In fact, many companies, organisations, professionals, and vol-
untary associations are already including training initiatives within their
27http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/agenda-digitale-italiana
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corporate or social missions. Cooperation would require both the shar-
ing of best practices and the great deal of material already available today,
following however a verification with respect to the above-mentioned
Framework directives.
6.4 Managing cyber risks of companies
Cyber risk management plays an increasingly important role over time: the
more cyber risk is perceived at the company level, the more managers strive
to understand its impact even in the absence of specific technical knowledge on
the subject.
The CINI National Cybersecurity Laboratory has been working over the last
several years to design risk management tools that can be used by both private
companies, regardless of their size, and by the PA to evaluate their exposure,
as well as by consulting companies that can use them in the delivery of their
advisory services.
These instruments take the form of (i) the National Framework for Cyberse-
curity[10], published in 2016 in collaboration with different industrial and gov-
ernmental actors and suitable for companies that, regardless of their size, al-
ready have some degree of security preparation; (ii) the Essential Controls of Cy-
bersecurity[11], published in 2017.
These actions were aimed at standardising the cyber language in different
contexts, for an immediate understanding and a smoother adoption process.
6.4.1 Objectives
In the light of the experience gained, two project proposals based on these two
documents are presented here and a third one is proposed, with the aim of
bridging the gap for individual citizens, who are still lacking in tools from the
point of view of cyber risk management.
• National Framework Contextualisations for large organisations — The
National Cybersecurity Framework [10] can be adapted to the different
heterogeneous contexts present in the national panorama through the
creation of appropriate contextualisations. Companies from different in-
dustries present different and specific requirements and critical issues in
the cyber domain. This means that, depending on a set of factors (such
as product sector, type of services or products, size, risk exposure, etc.),
the set of security practices to be implemented and the necessary imple-
mentation processes can also be very different from each other.
The contextualisations of the Framework are extremely valuable tools, as
they allow for the structuring of the cyber risk management of the target
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organisations. The creation of a contextualisation is however a complex
operation that requires both a high knowledge of the application domain
and a significant mastery of the National Framework.
The project aims to draw up contextualisations of the Framework for:
– large enterprises (depending on the product sector, e.g., energy,
construction, telecommunications);
– large hospitals;
– large central governments (e. g. ministries);
by setting up private-academy partnerships for the first case, and public-
private-academy for the other two.
The effects of the project will be manifold: (i) raising the general security
level of the Italian business structure and the PA, (ii) establishing cross-
sectoral consistency in risk management and a common cyber language
shared between private and public sectors, as well as between private
and private ones, which will facilitate cooperation and sharing of require-
ments.
• Dissemination, promotion, and updating of Essential Controls for SMEs
— The definition, update, and promotion of essential cybersecurity
checks for small and medium-sized enterprises represent a fundamen-
tal element to foster the widespread diffusion of cybersecurity culture
within the national entrepreneurial reality and to reduce the exposure of
the productive world to the risk of cyber attacks. Essential controls are in
fact an instrument for defining a minimum level of protection against cy-
ber attacks and for helping companies to reach this level, thus reducing
the attack surface area and providing a basis for the consolidation of the
national productive infrastructure against cybernetic risks.
This is a step in the direction of increasing the security of the cybernetic
space for small and medium-sized enterprises, on the one hand by re-
ducing the risk of loss due to accidents and attacks and, on the other
hand, by increasing the level of confidence of national and international
customers and investors in Italian industries. The net effect is twofold:
companies will benefit from a competitive advantage, and an ecosystem
of cybersecurity will be established, to be used as a foundation for more
advanced initiatives.
At the national level, essential cybersecurity controls were first defined
in the 2016 Italian Cybersecurity Report28 published by the CINI National
28http://www.cybersecurityframework.it/sites/default/files/
csr2016web.pdf
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Cybersecurity Laboratory and CIS Sapienza29. These controls focus at-
tention on: (i) the identification of hardware and software systems and
services in use and their need or criticality levels, (ii) the compliance with
current regulations and management of responsibilities, (iii) the use of
appropriate technical solutions for data protection, training, and man-
agement of personnel, (iv) incident management and related recovery.
Following their publication, compliance with the essential controls of cy-
bersecurity was subjected to a statistical survey by the University Politec-
nica delle Marche in collaboration with CIS Sapienza. This investigation
has shown that some requirements (such as compliance with current reg-
ulations, adequate training of personnel and rapid replacement or de-
commissioning of obsolete software) are more difficult to satisfy than
others.
Given this background, further efforts should be made to disseminate
and promote essential cybersecurity controls. In addition, it is necessary
that these controls are periodically reviewed and updated in order to take
into account the evolution of both the threats and the level of cybersecu-
rity of small and medium-sized enterprises. This action must be carried
out by considering the estimated levels of satisfaction of the individual
essential controls and by introducing appropriate corrective actions in
relation to the most critical controls.
After an initial phase of voluntary adherence to such essential controls, a
national certification based on such controls should be defined, similar
to what has been done in the UK for controls known as Cyber Essentials30.
A first step in this direction has been taken with the enactment by AgID
of the official list of minimum ICT security measures that are mandatory
for all PAs31. Similarly, it is desirable that the fulfilment of a minimum
number of essential controls and their certification gradually becomes a
mandatory requirement for the provision of products and/or services to
the public sector by private entities, to start with.
The project regarding the definition, updating and certification of essen-
tial controls for SMEs has the following practical objectives:
– The activation of a technical panel responsible for defining and up-
dating essential controls. In this context, universities and research
institutions can contribute to the formation of the panel and to the
definition and updating phases of the essential controls, as well as
29https://www.cis.uniroma1.it/
30http://www.cyberessentials.org/
31http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/infrastrutture-
architetture/cert-pa/misure-minime-sicurezza-ict-pubbliche-
amministrazioni
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to the publication of the controls themselves and their accompa-
nying documents. The government can act as guarantor of the cer-
tifying body and can issue the related certifications. The compa-
nies, on the other hand, will undergo self-assessments of compli-
ance with the essential controls and request the relevant certifica-
tion in order to be included in the public list of certified subjects.
– The regular update and review of the list of essential checks and
accompanying documents.
– The creation and maintenance of a portal for the dissemination
of essential controls and self-assessments of compliance with the
controls.
– The definition of a certifying body which, at the request of the in-
terested party, carries out procedures to verify compliance with es-
sential controls and certifies the outcome.
– The maintenance of a public database of companies that have ob-
tained certification of compliance with the essential controls.
The spill-over effects on society and industries will result in a general in-
crease in the level of resilience, as well as in the increase of visibility and
attractiveness to those subjects who have obtained and maintained cer-
tification of compliance with essential controls.
From the point of view of researchers, creating and updating a bench-
mark based on the essential controls will provide insights into the defi-
nition of the controls themselves and of their relationship with other in-
dustry standards, both nationally and internationally.
6.5 Affordable Certifications
In modern societies, which continue to rely on ICT technologies for increasing
amounts of valuable and critical information and services, ICT security certi-
fication is taking on a very important role. Information and service providers’
statements about their level of security increasingly need to be supplemented
by third-party verifications, preferably carried out in accordance with widely
recognised international standards. Also at an institutional level, both Ital-
ian and European, the certification of ICT security is a subject of attention, as
demonstrated by the recent initiatives of the Presidency of the Council of Min-
isters and the European Commission. The former, with the DPCM Gentiloni
(illustrated in section 1.3.1) and the National Plan for cyber protection and cy-
ber security of March 2017 (illustrated in section 1.3.2), envisaged, among other
things, the creation of a new assessment and certification centre for compo-
nents to be used in critical and strategic infrastructures. The latter, in the Joint
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Communication to the European Parliament and the European Council of 13
September 2017 that outlines the European cybersecurity strategy (Cybersecu-
rity Package32), has expressed its intention to propose a European cybersecurity
certification framework33.This framework will be applicable to products, ser-
vices and/or systems and will allow a modulation of the certification level that is
appropriate to the application context. The Commission’s objective is twofold:
to avoid customs barriers within the EU due to national certifications and to
pursue the vision of the European Digital Single Market.
6.5.1 State of the art
The various types of certification currently available are mainly used on a vol-
untary basis and only rarely, especially in Italy, as a result of obligations or pref-
erential requirements for the acquisition of goods and services. Below, the three
main forms of security certifications that currently exist will be considered: (i)
the certification of ICT security management systems used in an organisation
or part of it; (ii) the certification of ICT devices, also called product certification;
(iii) the certification of competences in the field of ICT security.
Certification of ICT security management systems The Information Se-
curity Management System34 - ISMS] has traditionally been certified by ISO,
which inherited the old BS 7799 and ISO 17799 standards. The verification
methods are defined by the ISO/IEC 27001 standard, which is used as a basis to
verify compliance with the security control requirements contained in the con-
nected standard ISO/IEC 27002. The latter reports the requirements, expressed
in natural language, in the form of a catalogue from which they can be extracted
on the basis of the results of the risk analysis. The catalogue also contains in-
formation on how the requirements can be met (implementation guidance). A
single level of verification, and therefore certification, is foreseen.
The ISO 27001 standard is certainly the most internationally recognised and
the most widely accepted and probably effective, but it is also a standard that
begins to need updating (the latest release is dated 2013) and often requires very
high application and maintenance costs, especially for small companies and in
the case of complex ISMSs.
The evolution appears to be“light” certifications, i.e. economic and effec-
tive, based on the model of “quick win” security practices. This path has has
32https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-
2017-477_en
33https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-cybersecurity-
certification-framework
34https://www.iso.org/?-27001-information-security.html
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already been followed by the UK with the Cyber Essentials35, which proved to be
extremely cost-effective and attracted worldwide interest. These certifications
are at different levels: from self-certification for the minimum level, to certifica-
tions made by third parties through an on-site inspection for the highest level of
certification.
Documents have been developed that provide suitable guidance for the ap-
plication of ISO 27001 in specific contexts. This is the case for the ISO/IEC Tech-
nical Report TR 27019 developed on the basis of ISO/IEC 27002 and containing
guidelines to define ISMSs that are suitable for a critical infrastructure. In fact,
the report can be used in the energy sector where process control systems are
used.
Certification of ICT products The best-known standard used to certify ICT
products, intended as components and systems, continues to be ISO/IEC 15408,
better known as Common Criteria36. There are also specific standards for cryp-
tographic modules, i.e. FIPS 140-237 and ISO/IEC 1979038, 24759 and 17825
standards, which are mainly used in the United States.
The Common Criteria provide for seven levels of certification (EAL1–EAL7),
which correspond to stricter checks on the object to be certified. They are used
both in the context of national security, in which case product suppliers are of-
ten obliged to obtain this type of certification, and in what the National Plan for
cyber protection and IT security (set out in section 1.3.2) defines as the context
represented by the national productive infrastructure and the citizens. In both
cases, there is only one national institutional certification body in each coun-
try. In Italy, specific decrees issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
have appointed the National Authority for Security (ANS) and the ISCTI of the
Ministry of Economic Development as certification bodies, respectively, for na-
tional security and business security. Each certification body accredits a num-
ber of assessment laboratories (called Ce.Va. in the first case, LVS in the second)
which are responsible for verifying, under the technical supervision of the cer-
tification body, whether the requirements contained in the standard are met by
the subject of the certification.
Although a considerable number of products have been certified accord-
ing to the ISO/IEC 15408 standard, its use in the commercial context cannot be
considered wide-ranging, due to various factors that have hampered its diffu-
sion. In fact, apart from a few cases in which it has been made compulsory, out-
side the context of national security, Common Criteria certification is requested
35http://www.cyberessentials.org/
36https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
37https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/Standards
38https://www.iso.org/standard/52906.html
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by suppliers who decide independently to use the certification to improve the
image of their products. It is clear that such use is not possible with low certifi-
cation levels that would risk being even counterproductive in terms of product
advertisement. As a result, the majority of Common Criteria certifications are
carried out at least at average levels (from EAL3 upwards) with correspondingly
long times (a few months) and high certification costs (hundreds of thousands
euro). Equally high is the cost of the important process of maintaining the certi-
fication, which, consequently, is not often carried out, possibly because it is not
indispensable for the advertising purposes mentioned above.
Common Criteria certification enjoys a fairly wide recognition in the com-
mercial context, both worldwide, through the mutual recognition agreement
CCRA39, and in Europe, through the SOG-IS40 agreement. However, the recog-
nition is foreseen only at the low levels of certification (EAL1 and EAL2) in the
CCRA, through the medium ones (EAL3 and EAL4), ordinarily, in the SOG-IS
and, following specific procedures defined for specific types of products, up to
the maximum levels of certification in special cases.
The high certification costs have led to the creation, in some European
countries, of lighter product certifications that require considerably less time
and costs and are comparable with those of Common Criteria certifications at
the first level of certification (EAL1). By way of example, France, through ANSSI,
issues a first level security certificate called CSPN41, which may be extended to
the upper levels of Common Criteria and easily obtainable within a guaranteed
period of less than 8 weeks; CSPN certification is required in some public ten-
ders.
Similarly, the UK introduced the Commercial Product Assurance (CPA)42,
a certification for off-the-shelf commercial security products, where the gov-
ernment itself acted as a driver. Eleven security functions, which are updated
regularly, are checked by authorised laboratories at a cost of about GBP 4 500.
The CPA is also required in a number of cases as part of public procurement.
Other countries that are about to activate light national certifications are Ger-
many and the Netherlands, which are already testing them on an experimental
level.
Certification of competences The additional aspect of the certification
problem is the certification of the competences of those who operate in the sec-
tor, at various levels of responsibility. The theme has been the subject of study
and, subsequently, of attempts at “standardisation” and then of “regulation” for
39https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra/
40https://www.sogis.org/
41https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/produits-certifies/cspn/
42https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/scheme/commercial-product-assurance-cpa
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some years. In fact, the market has seen a proliferation of certifications issued
by various bodies, very often of a private nature, which have endeavoured to
meet the needs of companies and organisations in the best possible way.
The certification of competences requires: (i) defining the knowledge do-
main, (ii) defining how knowledge translates into operational skills, (iii) ver-
ifying the degree of maturity (proficiency) of this translation, which defines
the degree of autonomy and responsibility. It is a complex scenario, which
entails broad discretionary areas. However, there are established systems at
the international, European, and national level, which provide guidelines and
which, in some cases, are operational and binding. ISO has produced the
ISO/IEC NP 27021 (Information technology – security techniques – competence
requirements for security management systems professionals43), which defines
a framework for professionals and a scheme dedicated to more operational fig-
ures (ISO/IEC NP 19896-1/2/2/3 “tester” and “evaluator”44).
The European standards body45 (CEN/TC 428) recently issued a wide-
ranging framework standard on ICT professionals, EN 16234-1, which is the
outcome of several years of activity by the “Consortium Workshop Agreement”
CWA 16458, in which Italy has often carried out a leadership role. The European
context has produced a “rule”’ which, as such, is in force and applies to all the
countries of the Union, replacing those by any national standards bodies (for
Italy, UNI46).
The European general standard defines ICT competences using the eCF
scheme 3.047, which describes 42 competences and declines a set of 6 profes-
sional “profile” families articulated in 22 “second level profiles”, which include
the ICT Security Manager and the ICT Security Specialist. The definition of the
competences of the eCF scheme is based on a set of notions, i.e., on a domain
specification which deliberately provides little details and is unstructured. As
a consequence, professional profiles are only broadly defined. Italy has im-
plemented the European standard by issuing the standard UNI 11506:201648,
which is a framework standard in four parts (called 11621-1/4). Specifically,
part 4 (Information security professional profiles) defines 9 “third level pro-
files”’, which are therefore part of the two second level profiles of the European
standard. In Italy, AICA has also proposed different levels of certification: at an
intermediate level, the IT Security certification49 and at an advanced level, the
43https://www.iso.org/standard/61003.html
44http://www.uni.com/
45https://standards.cen.eu/
46http://www.uni.com/
47http://www.ecompetences.eu/it/
48http://www.ithum.it/uni11506
49http://www.aicanet.it/it-security
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ICT Security Specialist certification50, which has a matching profile in the eCF
framework.
This is the regulatory framework in which the market players operate: any-
one who wants to offer a certification service to individuals must necessarily
build its offer in compliance with this legislation, as well as in compliance with
the other rules that allow a body to propose itself as a “certifying body”.
6.5.2 Objectives
The main objective of this action is the activation of the National Evaluation
and Certification Centre (CVCN) for the verification of the reliability of ICT com-
ponents for critical and strategic infrastructures envisaged by the DPCM Gen-
tiloni51 of 2017. The DPCM correctly entrusts this centre to the Ministry of
Economic Development (MiSE), which has already gained, as described in the
previous sections, significant experience in product certification, through the
Ce.Va. of the Istituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie dell’ In-
formazione (ISCTI), then in the commercial sector, starting from 2003 when the
Computer Security Certification Body (OCSI) was established at the ISCTI. This
centre will have to develop the national certification strategy, taking into ac-
count the following boundary conditions:
• The difficulty in separating the consumer market from the national secu-
rity market — The digital transformation process, and in particular the
spread of IoT, have paved the way for an invasion of commercial software
and hardware products in all market sectors, from the consumer sector
to critical infrastructures (which obey to market rules as well as public
service rules), to national security. Therefore, establishing which prod-
ucts/services to certify for reasons of national security becomes an abso-
lutely vital exercise.
• The coexistence of Italian and European certification — The European cer-
tification tends to work towards the creation of a digital single market and
therefore to break down the barriers that can be placed on a commercial
level for the sale of products within the European market and increas-
ing consumer confidence in online services. National certifications focus
on national security. Finding a balance between these certifications will
not be easy. A European certification system will guarantee a system of
mutual recognition between Member States, as this is the basis of every
50http://www.aicanet.it/per-i-professionisti-ict/servizio-di-
certificazione
51https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/DPCM-17-02-2017.pdf
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Treaty of the Union. However, mutual recognition shall take into account
the fulfilment of specific requirements dictated by national interest for
the critical and strategic infrastructures of individual countries.
• National Product Certification — Following the example of the French
and British national certifications, as well as the German and Dutch ex-
perimental ones, Italy itself could adopt a sustainable national certifi-
cation for cybersecurity. Geared towards national security and critical
infrastructure protection, this certification should be compatible with
the European one, beyond having predictable costs and time frames for
each certification (affordable certification). Another important step will
be defining a clear boundary for certifiable products, to make certifica-
tion valuable to companies using those products, by relieving those com-
panies from the burden of compliance checks. Finally, it is important
that certification procedures can also be updated to respond to changing
needs that may be required to confront new types of attacks. Certification
should be seen by companies not as a financial burden, but as an impor-
tant step to secure the objects that will populate the national cyberspace.
In addition, the development of a national security certificate could lead
to the creation of local jobs, considering the certification laboratories that
will have to be established throughout the territory.
Other important design objectives may be:
• National certification of companies — For the security of national sup-
ply chains it would be important to introduce a national certification
with sustainable costs for medium, small and very small enterprises,
which would never have the financial resources to obtain ISO certifica-
tion. In fact, in the vast majority of cases, attacks on multinationals occur
through the tampering with the information systems of some suppliers,
usually small or very small companies, whose security levels are certainly
much lower and heterogeneous than those of multinationals. It is there-
fore necessary to develop a system of sustainable certifications, also to be
used in the tenders of large private companies, in order to put them in a
position to entrust services to companies that have a guaranteed mini-
mum level of security.
• Extension of safety standards to security — For medical devices52 it is nec-
essary to go beyond safety certification53 and to consider security aspects
52http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_4.jsp?area=dispositivi-
medici
53http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&
id=8&area=dispositivi-medici&menu=conformita
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as well. Security guarantees would also improve the usability and main-
tainability of these devices (which are often disconnected from the net-
work due to the risks associated with the presence of vulnerabilities), as
these guarantees would allow updates or reconfigurations to be made
without running the risk of certification cancellation.
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CHAPTER
7
Impact on key aspects of
digital transformation
Digital transformation is affecting all sectors of our economy and will pro-
foundly change society, our relationships, and our industries. It brings us all
within the cyberspace dimension, which creates a spatio-temporal collapse in
which citizens, organisations, and cyber criminals alike, from every geographi-
cal area, are only 100 milliseconds apart. In this context, cybersecurity is every-
where: in hardware, software, interconnection systems, business or public ser-
vice processes, contracts, policies, human factors, and cyber-social interactions.
Cybersecurity therefore becomes the essential element of this new dimension in
order to guarantee, over time, an adequate level of security for our relations, our
businesses and our democracies.
This chapter deals with the impact of digital transformation on some of the
most important sectors of society, by analysing how, due to digital transforma-
tion, the threat is changing in these sectors and how cybersecurity can play a
key role in reducing the risk associated with this threat.
7.1 Democracy
In actual digital society, and even more so in the future, “Cyber is the World
of Everything”. This implies that citizens are not only interested in the protec-
tion of sensitive data; digital technologies are spreading like wildfire penetrating
the physical world and involving various aspects of daily life, from transport to
health services, from the environment to banks, to the educational system, the
electoral system and other essential services provided by the PA.
For a democratic state, it is therefore essential to guarantee a good level of
cybersecurity both to protect national security (including the protection of free
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elections and election campaigns from external interference) and to ensure eco-
nomic welfare and growth of the country. This requires a serious commitment to
developing national cybersecurity strategies that align national security needs
with those of economic growth, promoting a more proactive security right from
the design of all digital policies and increasing the ability to prevent, deter and
detect cyber attacks and respond to them in a coordinated manner with the var-
ious institutions involved in the cybersecurity architecture.
Raising the citizens’ awareness about the many risks linked to the digital
revolution (from computer intrusions to digital addiction, from data theft to
ransoms, from sabotage to scams, from fake news to incitement to online ha-
tred) is another important aspect.
The cyber challenge is very demanding because the threats connected to the
digital revolution evolve faster than public policies; for this reason it is particu-
larly important to increasingly involve the government, universities, research
centres, and companies. The virtuous triangle between institutions, universi-
ties, and the business world is the precondition for facing such technological
challenges and providing an effective response in any democracy1.
It is essential to strengthen cooperation instruments in the European and
international dimension and it is necessary that democratic countries find a
minimum common denominator starting from the full awareness that digital
societies are in fact much more fragile and vulnerable than generally thought.
Citizens may easily be victims of intrusions, disinformation campaigns, manip-
ulations of all kinds and their fundamental rights can be eroded: in this context
democracy itself, with tragic results, may become the victim of cyber insecurity.
Cybersecurity and awareness of the risks to which the pervasiveness of the
internet and its applications exposes us, therefore, become essential elements
for democracy. We would like to consider here two aspects: on the one hand the
possibility of using the network to spread fake news in any part of the world and,
on the other hand, the possibility of reducing the distance between the State and
its citizens by using the internet for political and opinion consultations, with the
related risks of fraud that this entails.
Fake news There have always been information campaigns aimed at polaris-
ing public opinion in specific directions in the event of both elections and con-
flicts. The ease with which news of any kind can now be disseminated from
anywhere in the world has transformed the net into a powerful tool for the con-
trol of opinions. As mentioned in section 3.4, it is essential to develop tools for
detecting abnormal diffusion dynamics, warning tools for network users, but
above all campaigns to raise awareness of the phenomenon and critical use of
1http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/italy-building-cyber-
resilient-society-18229
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the net based on a scientific research approach of sources and on the risks of
being trapped in so-called echo chambers (see box on page 61).
E-Voting systems In many countries, methods and technologies for elec-
tronic voting are being tested; recently, various proposals to use Distributed
Ledger Technology have been put forward (illustrated in section 4.6) as the ba-
sis of electronic voting systems in which it is not necessary to have an authority
that has control over the underlying information systems and that offers voters
the opportunity to count and control the votes autonomously, without the risk
of addition of illegitimate votes. We have experienced, also in Italy, how these
electronic voting systems or platforms can be prone to attacks, see the case of
the hacking of the Rousseau platform of the 5 Star Movement of August 20172.
These instruments must therefore be used with caution, especially for general
elections. In fact, as already seen in the previous chapters, there are no 100%
secure computer systems and the chances of a successful attack depend on how
much an attacker is willing to invest and, therefore, on how much one can po-
tentially earn from the attack. In the case of parliamentary elections, there can
be many who want invest a great deal in order to govern, control or destabilise
a nation.
7.2 Essential Services: Energy
Electricity is of fundamental importance for the economy and society in gen-
eral, as they are dependent on its availability. A power failure can have a direct
impact on the provision of other services (transport, finance, communications,
water supply, etc.) for which the backup power is not available or the service
restoration time exceeds the backup autonomy. The increasing use of renewable
resources and polygeneration lead the electricity grid (hereafter EPES - Electric
Power and Energy System) to become increasingly decentralised. The presence
of subjects (prosumers) that produce energy on a small scale and feed it into the
network makes the energy flow bidirectional.
The stakeholders involved in the process are growing, as well as the smart
IoT devices connected to the grid. The interconnected devices - from smart
home devices to electric vehicles - are constantly increasing, and are equipped
with advanced functions, requiring the increasingly articulated management of
smart grids. The impact of digital transformation in the energy sector affects
the entire energy supply chain: from supplies to aggregators, distribution and
transport, up to sales and communications with end customers. The separation
2http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/08/02/news/hacker_online_
dimostra_la_vulnerabilita_di_rousseau_ho_bucato_il_sito_dati_a_
rischio_-172221493/
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between IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operation Technology), which is
traditional in the electricity grid, disappears and the two levels are intertwined.
ICT thus becomes the mainstay of future smart grid management and, at
the same time, its potential weakness. The security approach of ICS/SCADA
legacy systems (shown in section 5.5) is based on the unconquerable castle
assumption. The limits of this approach are well known and technological
solutions for the protection of existing infrastructures (without affecting their
functioning and avoiding invasive interventions) have reached an advanced
development stage. The discourse is different for new generation networks
that, in order to provide services to various users/stakeholders and improve the
QoS/reliability of the electricity system (grid balancing, stream optimisation,
etc.), will require a more stringent use of ICT and will therefore potentially be
more exposed to cyber threats. The design of new power grids will have to rely
on the best practices developed at an international level for the cyber protection
of distributed ICT systems, adapting them to the specificity of the application
domain. Unlike current power grids, cybersecurity will have to guide the design
and development of next-generation electricity grids.
Critical Infrastructures in the electric field are very varied; among oth-
ers we can mention: (i) large traditional thermal and hydroelectric generation
plants; (ii) distributed hydroelectric generation systems; (iii) distributed renew-
able generation (wind power, solar, etc.); (iv) energy transmission and distribu-
tion systems, consisting in hundreds of primary stations and tens of thousands
of secondary stations.
Remote controlled and distributed systems are exposed to all risks related to
this environment. Even large plants cannot be operated in isolation: the secu-
rity of systems, networks, and protocols is therefore an essential element. Pos-
sible threats may sneakily be posed through non-connected means, such as re-
movable media or devices used for maintenance. The remote control of the dis-
tribution networks represents a very complex framework for the large number
of systems involved, and the infrastructure of digital meters is even more gran-
ular. The different needs of the various area involved need to be taken into ac-
count and, for each of these areas, an appropriate “by design” protection strat-
egy should be developed, both at ICT and operational logic levels.
When getting closer to the “leaves” of the system, the order of magnitude of
the number of objects grows and with it the need to identify a specific security
strategy. Without appropriate IT protection measures, access rules to systems
could be violated, power failures and cascade effects to interconnected systems
and power services may occur and ultimately, irreparable damages to objects
and people may take place. Therefore, EPES will face an increasing number of
challenges, requiring the development of IT solutions that balance security re-
quirements with high communication speed and guarantee easy scalability to
the number of devices involved.
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7.3 Finance
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the Italian bank market has undergone a reor-
ganisation that has led to a reduction in the number of credit institutes and their
presence on the territory. The digital transformation was also the occasion for a
radical change of the business models. The spread of banking services provided
via mobile devices has led to the entry of global operators such as Amazon and
Google into the payment business. Since the European Directive EU 2015/2366
(Payment services - PSD2) came into force, the monopoly of banks on payment
services has ceased. Expansion of the ecosystem to non-bank operators poses
various regulatory and operational security problems.
The digitisation of insurance services has a specific element: the interaction
with mobile IoT devices, which concerns insurance relying on autonomous de-
vices such as self-driving cars and the provision of consumer insurance with pre-
miums linked to measurable quantities on-field, including individual lifestyles.
Digitisation involves an increasing use of context data associated with transac-
tions and collected by IoT devices to carry out online analyses. They are aimed
at enabling customised proposals and at dynamically pricing products, based
on quantitative non-actuarial models of risk calculation. The on-line analytics
leads to an increase in the size of the data associated with individual transac-
tions. Such de-normalisation of financial data increased their unit value on the
illegal market, making them a more attractive target for attackers.
In recent years, the financial sector has fallen victim to an unprecedented
number of attacks, characterised by distributed and coordinated attack vectors.
Analyses of the attacks reveal three key threats:
• Temporary impairment of banking and insurance services — The corre-
sponding risk is increased by the high level of interconnection of the
banking system and has worsened in recent years, also due to the rapid
advances in attack technology. Today, attack vectors that can damage the
banking system are automated and distributed bot systems. These carri-
ers are difficult to track and deactivate, in part because they use hetero-
geneous and unsuspected devices such as mobile phones, printers and
even toys.
• Organised large-scale theft of financial data — Typically, they are car-
ried out through episodic theft (Data breach, introduced into the box on
page 144) or through the creation of permanent failures (leaks) in banking
and insurance processes. The growing competence of the attackers has
increased their ability to inject attack vectors targeted not only at users of
online services, but also at the internal organisational structure of indi-
vidual banking and insurance operators, through spear phishing attacks
(introduced in the box at page 29). Injected vectors also exploit errors
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and weaknesses in the configuration and management of cryptographic
security controls.
• Violation of the integration of data present within the banking system
— Other than stealing data from the banking system, attackers may alter
it, using different attack vectors, ranging from ransomware to IoT devices
and false installations (fake install) that use mobile device emulators in
the cloud to provide false information. With the increasing spread of fi-
nancial services on mobile terminals, such carriers are amenable to so-
phisticated cyber attacks aimed at introducing false or misleading data
into the system, thus polluting the data underlying the non-actuarial risk
models mentioned above. Attacks can damage the quality of the analytics
without being detected, causing permanent damage to the system.
A first specific cyber risk factor is the growing number of unregulated com-
panies operating in the financial sector. These operators are very different in
size and product offerings, as well as in terms of security processes and controls,
making it more difficult to estimate the probabilities in cyber risk assessment
models.
A second risk factor is the role of the financial system in the national eco-
nomic context. Cyber threats to critical banking services, in addition to dam-
aging individual operators, can create a systemic risk to financial stability. For
example, coordinated attacks on the banking system can lead to an impairment
of the system’s ability (in technological and non-financial terms) to inject capi-
tal and liquid assets into the corporate system at particular times of the business
cycle. The mitigation of this systemic risk is fully part of cyber-warfare scenar-
ios.
A third risk factor is the predominantly defensive nature of the security con-
trols currently in place by banks and other financial sector companies. Without
cyber-intelligence action to identify the most critical attack vectors, the attack-
ers’ increasing technical abilities may make the defence unsustainable in the
long term.
For the insurance industry, an additional risk factor stems from the difficulty
of guaranteeing the security of IoT devices integrated into the new insurance
services, as illustrated in section 5.4.
7.4 Transportations
Addressing the impact of cybersecurity in the transport sector requires the anal-
ysis of three closely related and interdependent areas: vehicles, enabling infras-
tructures, and services.
In the field of intelligent road transport vehicles, under the following head-
ings fall all initiatives related to infotainment and assisted driving, with the ul-
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timate goal of self-driving vehicles. Added value services includes initiatives
linked to telemetry (road assistance, preventive maintenance), vehicle security
(customised insurance policies, smart anti-theft systems), shared-mobility and,
more generally, platforms for the collection and analysis of data related to vehi-
cles. Finally, intelligent infrastructures now include all initiatives related to op-
timisation of consumption and flows, and road signs capable of autonomously
adapting to the context conditions. In the future, this field will also include in-
frastructure enabling the management of fully autonomic traffic of self-driving
vehicles.
As far as vehicles and services are concerned, the increasingly widespread
use of IoT devices, while on the one hand increases passenger comfort and of-
fers innovative services, on the other hand introduces obvious challenges re-
lated to the processing of the bulk of data generated (Big Data Analytics) and,
above all, new problems of cybersecurity, both in terms of a disproportionate
increase of the attack surface and of the capillarity and pervasiveness of possi-
ble attacks, as widely analysed in section 5.4.
It has also been pointed out how the newly introduced services, due to the
high personalisation, offer new opportunities and pose new challenges at all
levels, from pricing to the measurement of the provided services actually, to the
on-line dynamic assessment of insurance risk.
The world of transport is governed by a wide range of international stan-
dards and, traditionally, the systems used in this context are designed with spe-
cific approaches and solutions to address problems of safety, service quality as-
surance, and fault tolerance. In this regard, it is urgent to define new standards
for integrating the existing ones, considering security issues introduced by new
technologies and, in particular, by the IoT.
In closing, it is important to point out the radical paradigm shift in the new
enabling infrastructures that the country will be necessarily need to equip itself
with, in the medium/long term, to allow both the use of fully self-driven road
vehicles and the use of drones in urban areas.
Beyond the necessary legislative adjustments, it is necessary to provide,
from the outset, rules linking the project and the subsequent construction of
these new infrastructures to the concept and practice of security by design, as
it is not conceivable nor tolerable to repeat, for these cyber-physical infrastruc-
tures, the same mistakes made for computer systems, which were initially de-
signed without considering security aspects at all.
7.5 Industry
Digital transformation will profoundly change the way industry does business
in the future. The new industry in fact completely loses the concept of a phys-
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ical perimeter, typical of the 80s, finding itself in this way immersed in the
cyberspace, with suppliers and customers in one big blob. IoT, artificial in-
telligence, cloud and blockchain technologies are completely eliminating the
perimeter by moving data and services outside of it. For example, artificial in-
telligence algorithms will require increasing data from the company’s business
network, suppliers and customers, in order to optimise all business processes,
from facility management to sales and production. In this context, cybersecu-
rity is everywhere: in the hardware and software used by the company, in con-
tracts with customers, in the supply chain, and in the human factor, thus be-
coming an essential element of the company itself.
Unfortunately, security is still considered a burden for the company in too
many work contexts. The typical condition of security management at the com-
pany level is that it is completely misaligned from other activities. The prob-
lem is then aggravated by the fact that, faced with the greater complexity of the
products, services and systems involved, costs and management problems are
constantly growing.
At the company level, there are numerous risks linked to security, such as:
loss of critical information (employees, suppliers, users, application data, etc.),
interruption of business processes (damage to corporate web systems, mobile
systems and devices supplied to company employees, etc.), damage to the cor-
porate image and reputation.
Unfortunately, given these risks, it is still often the case that security and
even possible critical situations are dealt with at the individual level, without
any standard reference protocol.
It is therefore important, first and foremost, that a process of awareness is
initiated within the company which must necessarily involve everybody: from
the CEO to the CTO, from the Board of Directors to all employees. Awareness
that cyber risk is a primary risk to the company’s survival is needed, and it is
therefore necessary to initiate proper staff training and cyber risk management
process based on internationally recognised and approved best practices.
From the point of view of the supply chain, particular attention must be
paid to what comes within the company’s perimeter in terms of hardware and
software. From here stems the primary need for a sustainable certification sys-
tem that can help a company understand the various products that it can ac-
quire and/or install internally, with the guarantee of an adequate level of secu-
rity. Enabling technologies and actions should be considered when looking at
the corporate cyber profile, physical assets, and data to be protected.
Certainly, in a national context, the sectors of shipbuilding, mechanics, ma-
chine tools, agri-food products and other made-in-Italy goods are the most “at
risk” as they represent the beating heart of our economy and therefore those
most attractive aspects to competitors or state actors. Appropriate counter-
measures based on enabling sector infrastructures, such as ISAOs and Regional
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Centres of Competence (illustrated in section 2.3), interconnected and closely
linked to the national CSIRT, must be put in place to adequately address the
threat.
7.6 Tourism and culture
The digital transformation currently underway in many sectors cannot but
also affect tourism and its connected educational-recreational activities related
to cultural heritage, to museums, and in general to artistic-cultural interests.
Smart tourism [41]) is the new password to describe the increasing dependency
of tourist destinations, their industries, value chain and tourists, by exploiting
ICT technologies able to transform huge quantities of data into added value.
The use of IoT devices, smartphones and other mobile devices such as cam-
eras and smartwatches, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and machine
learning techniques applied to the analysis of tourist visiting habits and social
networks, are creating a new ecosystem. Tourists are then at the centre of this
ecosystem and are pro-actively directed, guided and advised towards the ex-
periences that best suite their preferences and are most rewarding in terms of
learning and exploration of the territory, even in the case of minor cultural as-
sets [26].
Particularly relevant is also the considerable improvement that these tech-
nologies have brought to the usability of museums and cultural assets in general
by visitors with disabilities. It should not be forgotten that the same technolo-
gies also allow for a more detailed and in-depth monitoring of the health of the
assets, permitting a more effective preservation, at the same time allowing for a
detailed vision of them that was all but unimaginable until just a few years ago.
By analogy with other sectors, this transformation creates new cyber risks,
both for tourists and for the assets themselves. The protection of tourists’ per-
sonal data can be violated: smart applications can, for example, be tampered
to direct flows of people from one place to another, causing huge economic
damage and/or critical situations of confusion and panic. The asset monitor-
ing networks can be compromised, again by issuing false alarms – with conse-
quent economic damage – or by not issuing alarms in due time, thus leading to
irreparable damage to the asset itself.
Therefore, cybersecurity also plays a crucial role in this sector, however pre-
senting some peculiarities of its own. On the one hand, there is the need to have
strong domain skills (on the materials of the goods, on the state of preservation,
etc.) when assessing the possible tampering of the monitoring networks. On
the other hand there is the need to guarantee, in a context with a strong human
component in a recreational/recreational attitude, the overall security of peo-
ple, while at the same time preserving the confidentiality of personal data and
179
controlling the possible onset of psychosocial mechanisms that could generate
panic.
7.7 Press and communication
Communicating information security is a difficult task. The complexity of the
issues, the actors involved and the characteristics of its contents have so far
favoured the idea that cybersecurity is a matter for specialists. And yet we know
that this is not the case for a reason that is before everyone’s eyes: the alarm that
arises in citizens for the repeated violations of the cybersecurity of banks, com-
panies and ministries that the press is now reporting with a certain frequency.
Certainly, this information is sometimes reported using a language for experts in
a country like Italy where the basic computer culture is still limited. Other times
such information is reported in a hyper-simplified way, with alarmist tones and,
sometimes with an incorrect wordings, unsuitable to explain the nature, the ex-
tent, and depth of the phenomenon.
To that we must add the journalism crisis and the absence of a shared nar-
rative of facts due to vested interests, standing above the collective ones. This is
the case, for example, when the press refrains from revealing names and figures
of data breaches, in which the breach of security concerns the banks that guar-
antee their debts, advertisers, organised political interests and careers, which
would be shaken, instead, by a clear disclosure of facts.
Last, but not less important, is the scarce preparation of the ones charged
with explaining cybersecurity topics in non-specialist contexts, who instead
prefer to retreat into their comfort zone, where only already publicly known
topics, able to attract the audience attention with sensational formulas and to
arouse ancient fears, are discussed. Such situations prevent journalism from
playing their double role as democracy watchdog and civic maintainers of the
society’s fundamental values.
Alas, there has never been such an urgent need of good information on cy-
bersecurity topics before. There is a need to educate people, to find a common
language, to build a culture of information security starting from the dissemina-
tion of its most important topics: personal data protection, freedom, security,
health.
For all these reasons, informing and educating on cybersecurity themes is
a challenge that concerns everyone: citizens, company, institutions, and uni-
versities. And, for this reason, it is of fundamental importance to determine a
precise common language, which is appropriate for the correct communication
of cybersecurity topics.
In addition to national security, cybersecurity should be identified with the
protection of personal data that anticipate and define our behaviour. We need it
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because our lives are defined by our digital identities, which interact daily with
reality, whose core business is the extraction and collection of data about us in
order to resell them to the highest bidder. Risks are evident when digital welfare
agencies manage everything that makes us citizens with rights (health, pension,
unemployment) and by the fact that the IoT “stuff” is not governed because of
an insufficient and outdated legislation.
In this scenario, it is even more evident that linguistic confusion related to
the world of cybersecurity does not benefit from words referring to deforming
concepts. But words are important: he who speaks poorly, thinks poorly. An
example is given by the terms hacker and hacking. The erroneous association
between a hacker and a cybercriminal does not only arouse irrational fears, but
it also deprives us of the theory and practice, in which, instead, hackers may be
the best allies of cybersecurity.
Clarifying the terms at the origin of hacking may favour the mythopoiesis of
the “good” hacker, ethical hacker that summarises in itself the best qualities of
modern societies: autonomy, independence, freedom. In fact, the genesis of the
word hacker had a positive adjectivation: the first hackers were the pranksters
of university dormitories, soon becoming the most talented in the field, just by
playing with their software. However, bad literature and the emerging industry
of personal computers have over time transformed hackers into secret officiants
of esoteric practices. The bogeymen represented by hackers started to embody
personal and social frustrations, fears, uncertainties. Yet hackers established
the biggest IT industry brands, from Bill Gates to Steve Wozniack, up to Page
and Brin.
Luckily, people are often leaps and bounds ahead of those who pretend to
represent and guide them, so they have started to challenge the negative stig-
mata associated to hackers for so long and have become aware that being a
hacker, a virtuoso of programming, expert in networks and computers, is the
necessary but not sufficient condition to enter illegally into a protected com-
puter system, which inevitably qualifies them. However, these hackers may be
extraordinary defenders of our cyberspace, as many indeed are. Therefore, it
is important to realise that, today, there are many types of hackers. The ones
committing an offence are qualified by the adjective “criminal”. The others have
to be found, intercepted and trained in a technological and ethical framework
to become the spearhead of our cyberspace policies. As we mentioned in sec-
tion 3.8, it is important that the legislator understands this basic difference and
appropriately qualifies it.
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7.8 Cyber social security
The cyberspace is not a mere space of interchange, but a cyber-social ecosys-
tem that takes the form of human experience in an increasingly concrete way
through the progressive evanescence of the material/immaterial boundary. Re-
ality is compressed in the aggregation of the digital imagery, where the mobile
device becomes the augmented mirror of oneself, the extension of the sub-
ject, whose individual space-time is determined by the compulsive-narcissist
fruition. The private sphere disintegrates in favour of its shared transmutation,
while the frantic need for presence in social media platforms, as narcissistic me-
dia, colonises the daily routine of homo digitalis, de facto de-socialising it, dis-
tancing it from the others to leave it hyper-connected in the cyber-social soli-
tude of selfism. In this context, the violent polarisation of audiences, favoured
by the processes of communication and interaction within the cyber-social
ecosystem, highlights the centralised dynamics of demarginalisation, the reduc-
tion of inhibitory brakes, gamification, positive reinforcement, identity recogni-
tion by the peer group, as key elements of deviant and/or criminal behavioural
structure.
The transition from the hierarchical analogue world to the global digital sys-
tem, identified in the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century,
favoured a process that deeply changed the very identity essence of terrorism.
The internet and social media platforms do not represent a territory of conquest
of contemporary terrorism, but the cyber-social ecosystem within which it has
developed, evolving into completely new expressions with respect to the ideol-
ogised terrorism of the last century.
In the last twenty years, the presence of information of a terrorist nature on-
line has increased from about ten to ten thousand sites, highlighting the growing
centralisation of the internet Jihadism or on-line jihadism, as a complex evo-
lutionary phenomenon characterised by multidimensional, multifactorial and
pervasiveness. The propaganda, traditionally aimed at merging the individ-
ual into the mass, turns out to be different from the jihadist cyber-propaganda
that is articulated through a strategy of individualised globalisation, cyber-
experiential, mobile, able to overcome the need for direct affiliation, in favour of
the cyber-socio-cultural propagation of the jihadist modus vivendi, as well as to
redesign the reality and colonise the sphere of perceptions in the most vulner-
able subjects [3]. After more than a decade of Qaedist culture, the Islamic State
was able to create the first truly globalised imaginary, exploiting social media,
viralising and stimulating the sadistic-violent and reactionary impulses of the
most vulnerable subjects, in order to motivate, inspire and trigger them into
indiscriminate terrorist actions in increasingly spontaneous, asymmetrical and
low-cost ways, as sadly has happened more than once in Europe in the last two
years. Terrorist avatarism [2] spreads day by day through file sharing sites and
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social media platforms. The Millennials are both prosumers, followers and in-
fluencers constantly immersed in the cyber-social ecosystem, characterised by
generational vulnerabilities - mainly due to the absence of a digital literacy and
a digital awareness pathway - that together with the vulnerabilities of the single
individual may favour the violent cyber-radicalisation of younger and younger
and increasingly vulnerable people throughout the superficial complexity char-
acterising the disintermediated experience of the jihadisphere, giving rise to two
distinct dynamics of violent cyber-radicalisation [4]:
• cyber-ecosystemic — cyber-social radicalisation through the social media
platforms;
• cyber-egosistemic — mobile radicalisation in terms of cyber-social self-
isolation and self-radicalisation.
Today, in the post-truth era, the alarming redefinition of the concept of
truth, increasingly in line with that of experience sharing in additive and emo-
tional terms, increases the asymmetric capacity of terrorist entities. Fake news,
chatbots and cyber-trolling are emerging as the new weapons of the progressive
convergence of mobile cyber-social extremism, hate speech and terrorism. The
jihadist hybrid warfare imposes, from the point of view of research, analysis,
prevention, anticipation and contrast, and the alliance between public-private
convergence on the cybersecurity front, which takes into account both the rapid
non-linear evolution of the threat and the specific implications in terms of gen-
erational and individual vulnerabilities of the cyber-social ecosystem. In order
to achieve this, the intervention strategy must be guided by the following essen-
tial principles:
• develop knowledge, training and competence based on cross-
disciplinary approaches that integrate social sciences with ICT dis-
ciplines;
• promote digital literacy, education and awareness at any level, from the
earliest ages, as well as within the family;
• prepare strategies and institutional tactics for reputational protection in
a cyber-social environment;
• structure resilience and mitigation models based on specific cyber-social
dynamics, with particular attention to space-time elements;
• promote the establishment of a location where experts, coming from the
public and private sectors, cooperate in the development of evolutionary
scenarios about vulnerability and threats, from the cyber-social perspec-
tive.
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It is, therefore, evident that cybersecurity cannot be considered as such in
the absence of its cyber-social dimension, that, among other things, is increas-
ingly relevant in terms of deviance and crime.
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CHAPTER
8
International scenario
This chapter considers the international scenario described by Italian col-
leagues who have been working in foreign universities or research institutions
for some time. The scenario shows how different nations are equipping them-
selves with adequate staff in cybersecurity competence centres, developing na-
tional research programmes and, in the case of training, making plans to reach
the necessary workforce level for their sovereign state needs as soon as possible.
The chapter also highlights the size of the resources allocated by the various
countries in this policy area.
8.1 Canada
Established in 2010, “Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy”1 is based on three fun-
damental pillars: securing government systems, fostering the security of the
country’s non-governmental vital infrastructure, and ensuring the protection of
Canadian citizens. A summary of the practical measures put in place for the im-
plementation of the strategy is included in the corresponding Action Plan for the
years 2010-20152. In summary, the government has: (i) divided the responsibil-
ities of the agencies involved in managing security incidents, (ii) announced the
1Public Safety Canada: Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy – https://www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/cbr-scrt-
strtgy-eng.pdf, ISBN: 978-1-100-16934-7, 2010.
2Public Safety Canada. Action Plan 2010-2015 for Canada’s Cyber Security
Strategy – https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ctn-pln-cbr-
scrt/ctn-pln-cbr-scrt-eng.pdf, ISBN: 978-1-100-21895-3. 2013
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allocation of specific funds for cybersecurity, (iii) strengthened collaboration
with the US Department of Homeland Security3 and with private companies,
(iv) launched campaigns to spread a culture of security throughout the public
domain.
8.1.1 Cyber Management: actors, roles, and funding
The roles and identities of government actors involved in the management of
accidents are defined in the Government of Canada Cyber Security Event Man-
agement Plan (GC-CSEMP)4, which details how events (accidents and reports
of vulnerabilities and possible attacks) involving (or which may involve) gov-
ernment structures are to be managed. The main actors of the GC-CSEMP form
the core of the Cyber Security Event Management Team, a group dedicated to
the management of events. The following other structures have been created to
deal with specific issues.
Public Safety Canada Public Safety Canada has, as one of its tasks, the
protection of critical infrastructures and the cyber space, and coordinates the
implementation of the security strategy. Public Safety Canada handles initia-
tives to gather feedback from and raise awareness amongst citizens, academics,
businesses, and public administrations. It manages the Get Cyber Safe portal5,
which contains news and reports on recent attacks carried out in Canada. Pub-
lic Safety Canada incorporates the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre,
which coordinates the national response to cybersecurity threats. This centre
collects reports from critical infrastructures, government structures and busi-
nesses about new threats that can impact vital infrastructures in the country
and circulates alerts, reports and periodic bulletins on cyber threats, vulnerabil-
ities and incidents to its partners. It works closely with CERTs in the UK, USA,
Australia, and New Zealand.
Communications Security Establishment The Communications Secu-
rity Establishment belongs to the Department of National Defence and deals
with signal intelligence and information security. This includes the Cyber
Threat Evaluation Centre, which deals with the detection and technical analysis
of cyber threats operating in network infrastructures of national interest. Not
3https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cybrscrt-ctn-
plan/index-en.aspx
4https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/
access-information-privacy/security-identity-management/government-
canada-cyber-security-event-management-plan.html
5https://www.getcybersafe.gc.ca/index-en.aspx
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only does the centre play the role of technical advisor, it develops and supplies
accident management tools.
Shared Service Canada Shared Service Canada is responsible for provid-
ing data processing centres and networks to various government organisations.
Essentially, it centralises government IT management. The Security Operation
Centre incorporates the Government of Canada Computer Incident Response
Team, which is the interface for government agencies involved in an accident,
and acts as coordinator at all stages of incident management. It should be noted
that it is the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Center that acts as technical and
coordination consultant for critical infrastructures.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat The Treasury Board of Canada Sec-
retariat provides strategic direction to the Incident Management Mechanism to
minimise the impact of losses that may affect the government.
The GC-CSEMP also defines the role of secondary actors. These are not in-
volved in the management of all events, but only in those of particular gravity
or those which, by their very nature, fall within the competence of a particular
actor (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces).
Funding Given the number and the heterogeneity of the government struc-
tures involved, it is difficult to accurately quantify the funds that the govern-
ment allocates specifically for cybersecurity. For the period 2001-11, the 2012
Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada6 notes that 13 agencies, involved
in various ways in cyber activities, received CAD 780 million in emergency man-
agement and national security funds. In addition, a further EUR 200 million has
been allocated to projects dealing with protecting critical infrastructures from
cyber threats. It is not clear how many of these funds have actually been used
for cyber-related issues.
8.1.2 Towards a new Canadian national strategy
The government has recently published the results of the national consultation
conducted by PSC7. The report highlights four key areas of action: spreading the
culture of security and basic awareness; improving the preparation of law en-
forcement and cyber professionals; developing and promoting standards, best
6http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201210_03_e_
37347.html#hd5b.
7https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2017-cybr-rvw-
cnslttns-rprt/2017-cybr-rvw-cnslttns-rprt-en.pdf.
187
practices, and certifications; increasing funds and resources for all cyber-related
areas. In addition, the need for collaboration between government, academia
and businesses emerges as very important.
For the years 2012 to 2019, the Reports on Plan and Priorities list cyber-
related funding of about CAD 80.6 million allocated to Public Safety Canada.
For cyber and IT Security for the 2014-2020 period, a budget of approximately
CAD 760.9 million is given to Shared Service Canada8.
Fundings for Academia
The funds available for academia are divided between those used to create re-
search centres and networks of excellence and those used for basic research.
Networks of excellence and research centres To facilitate the transfer
of know-how to the production sector, a network of excellence was created in
2014. SERENE-RISC includes 24 different academic institutions and more than
24 non-academic public and private-sector partners. In 2017, the Canadian In-
stitute for Cybersecurity was opened at the University of New Brunswick. One
of the main partners of the centre is IBM. The centre is led by Canada Research
Chair in Cybersecurity, Ali Ghorbani.
Basic research In 2017, a specific NSERC call was launched in collaboration
with the Department of National Defence. Cyber-related themes were among
the areas of interest of the call, the total funding of which was CAD 2.4 million.
Other research funds are the Discovery Grants, which are provided annually by
the NSERC. For the period 2014-17, the total funding for projects on cyberse-
curity themes was about CAD 10 million only for computer science and elec-
trical and computer engineering. In addition to the funding mentioned above,
the Canada Research Chair is specific for cybersecurity, which is endowed with
substantial seven-year grants.
8.2 China
China’s cybersecurity strategy is deeply rooted in the government’s attention to
information management. Throughout the millennia of Chinese history, the
role of information in both civilian and military affairs has been of primary im-
portance. The current Chinese cybersecurity strategy and the new law and reg-
ulations on cybersecurity are both firmly grounded in this tradition.
8Shared Services Canada, 2017-2018 Departmental Plan – https://www.canada.
ca/en/shared-services/corporate/publications/2017-18-departmental-
plan.html, ISSN 2371-7912. 2017
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The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is the central internet regula-
tor. The CAC is responsible for policy formulation and implementation, domain
name registration and content supervision.
The CAC white paper guidelines that are at the core of the Chinese govern-
ment’s cyber governance strategy revolve around four main objectives: (i) Guar-
antee cyberspace sovereignty and national security; (ii) Protect critical informa-
tion infrastructures; (iii) Act against cyber terror and cyber crimes; (iv) Expand
international cooperation.
On November 1st, 2016, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress promulgated the first comprehensive Cyber Security Law (CSL). More
than 700 million people in China use the internet. The CSL, which came in to ef-
fect on June 1st, 2017, is intended to protect the critical information infrastruc-
ture, to regulate Chinese user data, to augment internet security, and to monitor
and certify foreign technologies that enter the Chinese market.
Under the new CSL, the mainland network operators (a notion that includes
a wide array of actors) must adopt stringent internal and operational procedures
as well as strong and updated technical protocols in order to prevent computer
viruses and cyber attacks. In addition, telecommunication hardware and soft-
ware, which is under intense scrutiny, requires proper certifications before it can
be used in the domestic market. The law applies to both Chinese companies as
well as to international companies that operate in China.
The Chinese cybersecurity information architecture also includes many
other actors, including the following:
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). The MIIT closely
monitors the cybersecurity aspects related to the development of the infor-
mation highway and cooperation in the communication technology sector in
China and abroad.
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS, which is in charge of the security
services, also closely monitors the cyber aspect of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT).
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS is focused on the cyber crimes
committed at the national level as well as cyber terrorist attacks. The Ministry is
responsible for the oversight and enforcement of the CSL.
China Information Technology Security Certification Center (CNITSEC) The
CNITSEC is responsible for security reviews and approvals of network products,
services and the related supply chain in accordance with the CSL.
China National Vulnerability Database of Information Security (CNNVD)
The CNNVD provides a public database of confirmed software vulnerabilities.
CNNVD’s early warning capabilities support efforts in both the public and pri-
vate sectors to address any cyber vulnerabilities.
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8.3 France
An initial cybersecurity strategy was developed in early 2010 in France, shortly
after the discovery of a cyber attack to spy on the Ministry of Economy and Fi-
nance. Subsequently, in October 2015, the then French Prime Minister Manuel
Valls announced the French national digital security strategy in order to support
the digital transition of the French society. This strategy is the result of a coor-
dinated interdepartmental effort to address emerging issues on digital security.
The definition of this strategy confirms that cybersecurity is regarded by France
as a national priority and now also concerns individual citizens. The strategy is
characterised by five objectives that describe the role of the State in cyberspace:
1. Ensure freedom of expression and action for France and the security of its
critical infrastructure in the event of a major cyber attack. This objective
will be pursued by strengthening the scientific, technical and industrial
capacities necessary to protect national information, ensure network se-
curity, and develop a reliable digital economy.
2. Protect the digital life of citizens and businesses and combat computer
crime. France will increase its fight against computer crime and its assis-
tance to victims of cyber violence.
3. Ensure the education and training necessary for digital security. France
will increase children’s awareness of digital security and responsible be-
haviour in cyberspace, starting at the school age. Higher education and
lifelong learning will also include a section on digital security.
4. Contribute to the development of an environment that fosters trust in
digital technology and that can make digital security a factor of com-
petitiveness. France will support the development of the economy and
the international promotion of its digital products and services, and will
ensure the availability of digital products and services with ergonomic,
trust and security levels appropriate to the uses and threats of informa-
tion technology.
5. Promote cooperation between Member States of the European Union
(EU) so as to promote strategic digital autonomy in Europe, the long-term
guarantee of a cyberspace that is more secure and respectful of the Euro-
pean core values.
From a practical point of view, the five objectives will be achieved through
the federation of effort of many actors. In particular: the ANSSI 9 (Agence Na-
tionale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) is the primary actor in charge
of measuring and assessing the risks and effects of cyber attacks, addressed
9https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/
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to both public and private institutions; the CNIL10 (Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés, i.e., the National Commission for Information
Technology and Freedoms) supports professionals to ensure that they comply
with current regulations, and helps private individuals to control their personal
data and exercise their rights; public research agencies (CNRS, CEA, INRIA) have
increasingly invested in research activities on digital security; regional clusters
(such as the SCS polo –Solutions Communicantes Sécurisées – in the Provence-
Alpes-Côte d’ Azur region, and the PEC –Pôle d’Excellence Cyber – in Brittany)
support local industries by funding research projects and sharing infrastructure
and development platforms between local companies; finally, funding agencies
(NRAs, FUIs, DGAs) have financed several projects on issues related to digital
security.
8.3.1 Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes
d’Information
The role of ANSSI is to promote a coordinated, ambitious and proactive re-
sponse to cybersecurity problems in France. A law passed in 2013 establishes
that “the Prime Minister defines the policies and coordinates the government’s
action in the field of cybersecurity and cyber defence; and for this purpose the
Prime Minister has at the ANSSI at his/her disposal.”
In addition to ensuring the proper functioning of daily life and availabil-
ity of the IT services that have become intrinsically linked to our lives, there is
also an economic aspect at stake. In fact, it is essential that companies protect
themselves against cyber attacks in order to safeguard their skills, know-how
and competitiveness.
The ANSII coordinates the Centre for the Evaluation of Information Security
(Centre d’Évaluation de la Sécurité des Technologies de l’Information, CESTI),
which is a service provider that certifies product security. In order to be certified,
a product must comply with the rules of the French certification scheme, which
allows two types of assessment: compliance with Common Criteria and certi-
fication of the first level security (Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau,
CSPN) of IT products. The CSPN was established in 2008 and provides evidence
of the security of products such as software, operating systems and hardware
devices. The ANSII also has an adequate CERT network (see box on page 17).
8.3.2 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés
The Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) is an inde-
pendent administrative authority which is responsible for ensuring that infor-
10https://www.cnil.fr
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mation technology is at the service of the citizen and does not violate identity
and human rights, privacy, individual freedom, and public freedom. The CNIL
analyses the impact of emerging technological innovations on privacy and free-
dom and works with its European and international counterparts to develop
harmonised regulation. Its main missions are:
• Informing and protecting — The CNIL informs individuals and profes-
sionals and responds to their requests. It provides practical and peda-
gogical tools, and regularly intervenes to foster training and awareness-
raising actions, particularly in the context of digital education. Anyone
can contact the CNIL in case of difficulties in exercising their rights.
• Accompanying and advising — The regulation on the use of personal data
is implemented through various tools that have the verification of com-
pliance with organisations as their main objective. Citizens are offered
the opportunity to comment on draft laws and decrees, giving recom-
mendations to simplify legal procedures and make requests for advice.
• Controlling and sanctioning — The CNIL verifies concrete compliance
with the law by on-site inspections or upon queries. A control pro-
gramme is drawn up on the basis of current issues, the main problems
identified, and the complaints made. The CNIL is responsible for the
control of video protection systems authorised by the prefectures.
• Anticipating — The CNIL detects and analyses technologies that can
have a significant impact on privacy. It has a laboratory that allows one to
experiment with innovative products and applications. It contributes to
the development of technological solutions that protect privacy, advising
companies at all levels, in the spirit of a privacy-by-design implementa-
tion. To enhance its effectiveness, the CNIL has set up a committee of
external consultants who contribute to the establishment of an annual
study and research programme.
8.3.3 Public research institutions
In France, many efforts have been devoted to digital security over the past years.
In particular, the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) dedicated
the year 2016 to security, and recently created a research group (Groupement
De Recherche, GDR) for digital security. The GDR for cybersecurity serves as
a stimulus for scientific research. Topics covered by the GDR include encryp-
tion, privacy protection, multimedia data security, network and infrastructure
security, software and hardware system security, and formal security methods.
The GDR organises various events annually: a summer school in cyberse-
curity; a week of meetings between companies and PhD students (REDOCS),
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where doctoral candidates work in groups with the best companies in the sec-
tor in order to address real problems; the “national day” (similar to a confer-
ence) at CNRS headquarters in Paris; and the l’Atelier sur la Protection de la
Vie Privée (workshop on the protection of privacy), whose objective is to bring
together researchers from the French-speaking community whose work focuses
on the protection of privacy and personal data, offering them a privileged forum
to present and exchange their ideas on this issue. The workshop is multidisci-
plinary and aims to bring together researchers in information technology, law,
economics, sociology, and statistics.
8.3.4 Public funding
The Public Research Agency (Agence Nationale de la Recherche, ANR) has
funded 35 cybersecurity projects since 2012. Funding for these projects was
EUR 6 million in 2012, EUR 3 million in 2013, EUR 6 million in 2014, EUR 1.5
million in 2015, and EUR 3.8 million in 2016.
8.4 Germany
Since the 1980s, the German government has been aggressive in developing ICT
technologies, developing broadband technologies and combating digital divide
in rural areas. This attitude has allowed Germany to become a European leader
in the ICT sector and fourth in the world11. Progress in this area has made it pos-
sible for Germany to face the challenges of information security and telecom-
munications ahead of other European countries.
For example, one of the first steps taken by the German Federal Govern-
ment was the establishment of the Federal Office for Information Security (Bun-
desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) whose objectives, de-
scribed in the Act of the same name, include protection of federal government
IT networks, verification and certification of software and services, advice for
the federal administration, and, more recently, alerts of malware infections.
The national strategy on cybersecurity is part of a broader innovation con-
text that covers all strategic high-tech sectors. This strategy, called “High-Tech
Strategie 2020”, is described in a series of documents that have been drawn up
since 2006 and updated every four years. This plan is implementing the rec-
ommendations of a panel of experts that from 2006 to 2013 consisted only in
members from research and industrial spheres12; starting from 2014, members
from civil society have also joined the panel.
11http://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/for-qualified-
professionals/working/industry-profiles/it-and-telecommunications
12http://www.forschungsunion.de/
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Cyber and IT security are addressed within the “Innovation for a mobile
and interconnected life” priority in the strategic plan. In particular, the Ger-
man government recognises that securing the telecommunications and infor-
mation infrastructure is one of the main priorities. The solutions sought must
offer integrity, confidentiality, and availability in ICT in general, particularly for
critical infrastructures of industrial production, airplane navigation, the auto-
motive industry, and traffic management. In addition, the government priori-
tises research on procedures and techniques for defending against malicious
software13.
The 2010 strategic plan renews the interest in security issues and introduces
a new priority on digital identities. In this context, the German government in-
tends to create secure processes for authentication and management of elec-
tronic identities and a reliable, secure, and flexible infrastructure based on new
identity cards. Security projects were refinanced for the next four years14.
The 2014 strategic plan expands and further details the priorities in the field
of cyber and IT security. The new plan introduces the term “Civil Security”,
which encompasses all priorities in the field of cybersecurity, identifying them
as key areas:
• Cybersecurity: The challenges identified in the plan concern all criminal
actions that may violate privacy or trade secrets, targeting unauthorised
access and interception of data. The government intends to give priority
to research on digital forensics and computational criminology. The im-
plementation of the program is described in the “Cyber Security Strategy
for Germany”;
• IT security: the challenges in this area concern computer and network
security in the classic sense of reliability and security. In this respect, the
government intends to further develop expertise in the development and
protection of ITs. The federal government supports IT security research
with two funding programmes: “Self-Determined and Secure in the Dig-
ital World” for academic research, and “IT Security in Industry” for small
and medium-sized enterprises to improve their security levels;
• Secure identity: the security of identities is of particular interest to the
German government because identities form the basis of privacy, com-
merce and business on the internet. The government continues to sup-
port research on the creation of new interdisciplinary approaches with a
“Privacy — Self-Determined Living in the Digital World” forum.
13https://www.fona.de/pdf/publikationen/die_hightech_strategie_
fuer_deutschland.pdf
14http://www.ibbnetzwerk-gmbh.com/fileadmin/Content/
Foerderprogramme%20und%20pdfs/BMBF%20%20Ideen.Innovation.Wachstum%
20Hightec2020%202010.pdf
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The strategic plan on cybersecurity is implemented on different levels. The
first is purely for research and is implemented in “Self-Determined and Secure
in the Digital World 2015-2020” and partly in “Research for Civil Security 2012-
2017”. This programme is implemented by the Ministry of Education and Re-
search. The second, “Cyber Security Strategy in Germany”, focuses on cyberse-
curity and is implemented by the Ministry of Interior15.
8.4.1 Implementation of the Strategic Plan
The Federal Ministry of Research and Education (Bundesministerium für Bil-
dung und Forschung, BMBF) supports the development of solutions to cyber-
security problems by providing funds for research and innovation (academic
and industrial) and by funding cybersecurity-oriented competence centres.
ICT 2020 and Research for Civil Security To address the challenges of the
strategic plan, the Federal Government created in 2007 a research funding pro-
gramme for information and telecommunications technologies research called
ICT 2020 (IKT 2020 - Forschung für Innovation) managed by the BMBF, which
provides research funding in almost all ICT areas.
The new Strategic Plan 2015-2020, Self-determined and secure in the digital
world, has considerably expanded research topics in the field of cybersecurity
and covers 17 research areas organised in four main areas:
• High technology for IT security: hardware-based trusted platform mod-
ules, digital identity management, efficient and secure long-term encryp-
tion, quantum communication, new security technologies;
• Secure, open, and reliable information systems: transparency and ease of
use, protection from internet attacks, demonstrable security of informa-
tion systems, IT security in heterogeneous system structures, protection
of knowledge and products;
• Fields of IT security application: IT security for Enterprise 4.0, cybersecu-
rity for critical infrastructure, applications of information and communi-
cation technologies in medicine, cybersecurity in transport and logistics;
• Privacy and data protection: privacy and self-determination in the digital
world, internet culture and shift of values in the internet age, privacy and
big data.
15https://www.bmbf.de/pub/HTS_Broschuere_eng.pdf
195
8.4.2 Centres of Competence and Special Actions
The German Federal Government has also funded the creation of three research
centres whose mission is to become national and international points of refer-
ence for all competences on cybersecurity issues:
• CISPA, Centre for IT Security, Privacy and Accountability in Saar-
brücken16;
• EC SPRIDE, European Centre for Security and Privacy by Design in Darm-
stadt17;
• KASTEL, Centre of Competence for Applied Security Technology in Karl-
sruhe18,19.
The centres were financed in two phases: 2011-2015 and 2016-2020. The
total amount of 2011 funding for the three centres was EUR 17 million over four
years. In 2015, the Federal Government renewed its financing by raising the total
amount to EUR 41 million over four years.
Helmholtz Center on IT Security: CISPA In 2017, the German Fed-
eral Government and the federal state of Saarland, in collaboration with the
Helmholtz Association, decided to set up a research centre on cybersecurity in
Saarbruecken. The new centre will absorb the current CISPA competence cen-
tre and its 200 researchers with the objective, in the medium term, of hosting
more than 500 researchers in all areas of cybersecurity. The centre is currently
under construction and will be operational from 201820.
Financing for small and medium-sized enterprises Germany is one of
the few countries that does not offer incentives for research and development in
the form of a tax credit. However, the BMBF has provided funding since 2007 to
support research in the field of cybersecurity within SMEs. The areas where the
16https://www.bmbf.de/de/geballte-kompetenz-fuer-it-sicherheit-
1723.html
17https://www.bmbf.de/de/groesstes-europaeisches-
forschungszentrum-fuer-it-sicherheit-gegruendet-2023.html
18https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/
service/aktuelles/kompetenzzentrum-fuer-it-sicherheitsforschung-
kastel-startet-durch,
19https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/
projekte/kastel
20https://www.saarland.de/dokumente/thema_innovation/2017-03-
14_41_Forschungszentrum_fuer_IT-Sicherheit_EN.pdf
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government intends to support SMEs are: privacy and data protection, IT secu-
rity in networked systems and applications, secure and trustworthy ICT systems
and technologies, and procedures and tools for handling IT security incidents.
So far, the BMBF has approved over EUR 1 billion in funding for more than 1,500
individual or collaborative projects involving some 2,500 SMEs21.
8.5 United Kingdom
The development of cybersecurity in Great Britain was led very carefully by the
government and in particular by the Cabinet Office (equivalent to the Presi-
dency of the Council of Ministers) and by the security services (equivalent to
the NSA in the USA). The thrust has focused on universities, research and train-
ing, as well as on companies and, of course, their relations. The main features
of these initiatives are outlined below.
8.5.1 Academic centres of excellence in cybersecurity
In 2011, the government launched an exercise to identify existing university re-
search capabilities on cybersecurity in the country. Eight universities (Belfast,
Bristol, Imperial College, Lancaster, Newcastle, Oxford, Southampton, and Uni-
versity College London) were initially recognised as centres of excellence, with
the aim of helping them to develop their capabilities, channel resources and
information. In 2017, the number of centres of excellence has risen to four-
teen, with the addition of Birmingham, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Royal Holloway,
Surrey, and Warwick. The cooperation between the various centres is strongly
supported by the government with the aim of fostering a shared agenda at the
national level, both in the academic field and in the industrial and governmen-
tal world22.
8.5.2 Cybersecurity Research Institutes
As a complement to the creation of centres of excellence for research, the gov-
ernment has created, in successive stages, four research institutes in cybersecu-
rity:
• Research Institute on Science of Cyber Security – RISCS,
• Research Institute on Verified Trustworthy Software Systems – RIVeTSS
21https://www.bmbf.de/de/kmu-innovativ-561.html
22https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/496340/ACE-CSR_Brochure_accessible_2015.pdf
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• Research Institute on Trustworthy Industrial Control Systems – RITICS
• Research Institute on Hardware Security.
Each institute is led by a director who has the responsibility to select specific re-
search projects, promote collaboration with industries, and facilitate the emer-
gence of research communities around the institutes.
The RISCS23 is dedicated to understanding the overall security of organ-
isations, including technological, human and process components. Its main
objective is to support organisations in their decision-making process in cy-
bersecurity, favouring the correct analysis of present risks, their effects and the
cost/benefits of applicable countermeasures. The ultimate goal is to provide or-
ganisations with the most appropriate tools to make informed decisions about
cybersecurity policies.
The RIVeTSS24 is dedicated to the valorisation and financing of academic
and industrial research activities in cybersecurity, focusing in particular on the
verification of programs. The Institute brings together all the avant-garde activ-
ities in the field of analysis and verification of programs, favouring the develop-
ment of industrial theories and tools for the verification of real applications. The
ultimate goal is to offer verification tools that are always up-to-date and able to
keep up with the rapid evolution of cyber-space systems.
The RITICS25 is dedicated to the study of industrial control systems and na-
tional critical infrastructures in cybersecurity. The Institute involves the most
representative academic research projects in the sector that are strongly linked
to industry. These projects aim to identify three key issues: the real dangers
and threats, the business risks to be considered, the most effective and efficient
state-of-the-art defence techniques.
The RIHS26 devotes itself to the study of security techniques for hardware
components. The Institute brings together virtually all the academic activities in
the sector, encouraging the creation of collaborations and technology transfer in
the world of industry. In this context, the Institute promotes the dissemination
and learning of the correct use of the latest hardware technologies in the cyber
space.
8.5.3 National Cyber Security Center
The National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) supports and finances a number of
initiatives at the national level.
23https://www.riscs.org.uk
24http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/P021921/1
25https://ritics.org
26https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/research-institute-hardware-
security
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Certification of courses of study in cybersecurity The government offers
a certification mechanism for cybersecurity courses, with the aim of guarantee-
ing quality and usability. This creates a virtuous cycle since this certification
attracts the best students from all over the world, providing the industry sector
with a continuous recruitment of qualified personnel and professional train-
ing of cybersecurity-related skills to existing staff. The certifications guarantee
that the students make a conscious choice of their course of study, so that they
obtain the qualification of expert in cybersecurity that is highly usable in the
industrial field.
Financing of doctoral fellowships in cybersecurity The government
sustains an annual doctoral programme for students from centres of excellence.
The government assists students annually by offering summer internships at
the NCSC or the GCHQ on cutting-edge topics in cybersecurity. Cooperation
between the government and the centres of excellence promotes the develop-
ment of a common cybersecurity agenda between government, industry and
academia.
Financing of higher education centres in cybersecurity The govern-
ment currently finances two Cybersecurity PhD schools in Oxford27 and Royal
Holloway28.These centres offer over 25 fully sponsored cybersecurity PhD posts,
and provide a backbone for the entire country to train new cybersecurity experts
for industry and academia. The centres offer multidisciplinary training and re-
search programmes that educate experts capable of responding to cybersecurity
needs in known or emerging areas of the cyber space. The diversity of skills and
abilities favours the creation of innovative techniques to defend against cyber
attacks and their continuous adaptation over time.
8.5.4 Other initiatives
Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre The Global Cyber Security Capac-
ity Centre (GCSCC) is a state-of-the-art centre for the development and creation
of cybersecurity training programmes adapted and updated to the needs of the
real world. The role of the GCSCC is to develop an integrated programme be-
tween all areas of cybersecurity that guarantees effective policies and invest-
ments in cybersecurity for public administration and industry. The activities
are at the forefront of international research and involve leading industry and
government players.
27https://www.cybersecurity.ox.ac.uk/education/cdt
28https://www.royalholloway.ac.uk/isg/cybersecuritycdt/home.aspx
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Cyber Invest Cyber Invest29 is a government scheme to stimulate private
investment in research activities at top university centres of excellence. The
investments are managed through government research funding programmes,
and foster the creation of new relationships between universities, industry and
government with the ultimate aim of confirming the UK’s global role in cyber-
security.
Cyber First Cyber First30 is a government scheme to encourage high school
students to undertake cybersecurity careers. It consists of a programme of
orientation-focused summer schools, to be undertaken before choosing a uni-
versity course. This scheme also offers scholarships to cover the cost of univer-
sity courses in cybersecurity. The ultimate aim of this scheme is to improve the
basic cybersecurity skills of future professionals for the industry.
Cyber Security Academy A special national initiative is the Cyber Security
Academy of the University of Southampton (CSA)31. CSA is a collaborative pro-
gram between Universities and leading cybersecurity industries, currently the
Defence Science Technology Laboratory, Northop-Grumman and Roke Manor.
The objective of the CSA is to foster collaboration between academia and in-
dustry through a structured approach based on four basic elements: research,
innovation, training, and dissemination. Thanks to the close relationship be-
tween the University’s research teams, the CSA offers a broad portfolio of re-
search projects of industrial interest, an annual industrial doctoral programme,
consulting, and professional training programmes on cutting-edge cybersecu-
rity topics. At the moment, the CSA offers training programmes both for man-
agers, with particular emphasis on cyber risks and the new European regula-
tions in the area of privacy and the GDPR, and for technicians in the sector, with
particular emphasis on penetration testing and blockchain systems.
8.6 Singapore
Singapore addresses cybersecurity issues with an approach based on joint ac-
tions between government, private sector and academia.
29https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/cyberinvest-securing-our-
future-through-research
30https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cyber-first-improving-cyber-
skills-in-the-uk?
31https://www.southampton.ac.uk/research/centres/cyber-security-
academy.page
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The National Cyber Security Agency (CSA) is the national body that oversees
strategies, operations, education, and development of the cybersecurity ecosys-
tem. The CSA is a department of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), which deals
with all the most important issues for the government, and is managed by the
Minister of Communication and Information (MCI).
With a predominantly top-down approach, the government of Singapore
creates a series of directives that typically materialise in a bill and are imple-
mented with the help of the private sector and academia. In particular, the bill
for national cybersecurity, presented in the second half of 2017 and approved
in 2018, provides for substantial public and private investments aimed at the
creation of a national cybersecurity ecosystem.
The government’s main objectives include the construction of a national
network of cybersecurity experts. To this end, the CSA, in collaboration with
leading local and international companies, is creating a national academy of
training for cybersecurity professionals that will be used both in government
infrastructure and critical infrastructures (CII) such as energy, health, and trans-
port with the aim of providing more security and resilience capacity to the digi-
tal community of Singapore. The SCA also contributed to the drafting of guide-
lines for industrial control systems used in the country’s critical infrastructure.
To encourage companies, professionals, and students to make a significant
contribution to the cybersecurity ecosystem, the government of Singapore or-
ganises the Cybersecurity Awards, which recognise and reward the professional
talent present in the country.
Internationally, Singapore works closely with national CERTs. For example,
at the time of the ransomware WannaCry attack, the SCA exchanged informa-
tion and strategies with the UK and shared the analysis with the CERT Asia Pa-
cific community. Another area of international cooperation is represented by
critical infrastructures that have an impact beyond the country. In this case, the
CSA carries out coordinated actions and recurrent exercises to validate the abil-
ity to react to potential attacks on critical international infrastructures such as,
for example, global payment systems, air traffic control systems, etc.
In recent years, the CSA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) on cybersecurity cooperation with national security agencies in several
countries including, in chronological order, France, the UK, India, the Nether-
lands, the United States, Australia, Germany, and Japan.
From the point of view of the implementation of cybersecurity systems and
infrastructures, Singapore operates according to a precise methodology that
starts from the awareness of the problem to arrive at the solution by analysing
(through installation and testing) all the most advanced technology available on
the market and deciding whether one or more systems deserve to be integrated
and adopted. Following the analysis phase, which consists in an extremely ac-
curate technical evaluation — sometimes accompanied by a strong acquisition
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of know-how — it is decided whether to proceed with the adoption of the solu-
tions as-is or to create locally a product that fully meets the needs of the coun-
try. This modus operandi requires a considerable investment both in economic
terms and in terms of effort; however, it has the advantage of providing a global
overview of strategies on the market, through interaction with the major players
in the sector, with considerable benefits in terms of know-how growth.
In terms of investments and financing, the government of Singapore has al-
located approximately EUR 10 million through the National Research Founda-
tion (NRF), a department of the PMO that defines national research and devel-
opment trends, to activate cybersecurity projects with high marketing potential
or skills development that meet the security needs of the country. Each project is
a collaboration between a private sector company and a research or academic
institution. Among the most interesting projects are those based on machine
learning and artificial intelligence, especially in critical infrastructures, which
drastically reduce reaction times in detecting anomalous behaviour that could
indicate ongoing attacks.
The National Research Foundation (NRF), in collaboration with the Singa-
pore State University of Singapore (NSU), has also created the Singapore Cy-
bersecurity Consortium (SCC), with the aim of maximising synergies between
government agencies, the private sector and academia by encouraging joint re-
search activities, the transfer of know-how, training, and technology awareness.
8.7 USA
In the United States, cybersecurity involves different government departments
and agencies that often focus on the most specific aspects of cybersecurity in
their sector. The most active actors are:
1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — The Department’s interest
in national protection is focused on critical infrastructure protection, in-
cluding energy and transport infrastructure and border and immigration
control tools, such as biometric techniques for identification and authen-
tication.
2. Department of Defence (DoD) — The Department of Defence’s interest32
is focused on various basic security issues such as defence techniques
from cyber attacks as well as applications.
3. Department of Energy (DoE) — The interest of the Department of Energy
is focused on protecting energy infrastructure and developing security
32https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf
202
management tools (such as public key management) in these infrastruc-
tures.
4. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) — This Institute
has been active for about 20 years in all aspects of cybersecurity for gov-
ernment applications and in the development of security standards, such
as the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) standard.
5. Department of Justice (DoJ) — The interest of the Department of Justice
is focused on digital forensics issues and the use of digital techniques for
investigative and forensic activities.
6. National Security Agency (NSA) — The interest of the National Security
Agency is focused on a number of topics, including Cybersecurity Sci-
ence.
7. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) — FBI is the main federal agency
for the investigation of cyber attacks by criminals, terrorists, and ene-
mies from other nations. In particular, the FBI has a division specialising
in cybersecurity and actively cooperates with other government depart-
ments, including the DoD and the DHS, in various cybersecurity activ-
ities. FBI coordinates various initiatives addressing different aspects of
cybersecurity, including the Internet Crime Complaint Centre, the Cyber
Action Team, the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance.
At the governmental level, the various administrations have often ap-
pointed a national cybersecurity officer (cybersecurity czar) and the past admin-
istration launched a national cybersecurity plan33.
8.7.1 University and other research and development
institutions
Universities in the United States are very active on research topics and teach-
ing related to cybersecurity. Many universities have centres and institutes that
deal with cybersecurity, often with specific specialisations. A recent ranking has
listed the 20 best universities for cybersecurity teaching and research; the top 3
universities in this ranking are Purdue University, Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy, and University of Washington, Seattle campus:
• Purdue University — in addition to an MS and PhD in cybersecurity, Pur-
due offers an MS and PhD in Computer and Information Technology with
a specialisation in cyber forensics. In addition, MS and PhD courses in
33https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/
fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan
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computer science have several cybersecurity lessons (including encryp-
tion, network security, data security and privacy, system security, tech-
niques for secure software development, analytical techniques for secu-
rity). The Centre for Education in Research in Information Assurance and
Security (CERIAS) is also home to professors and students from six differ-
ent faculties and more than 20 departments, who carry out research on
all aspects of cybersecurity, with a strong multidisciplinary emphasis.
• Georgia Institute of Technology — offers a Master’s programme in cyber-
security divided into three specialisations (information security, security
of energy systems, security policies). GeorgiaTech is home to the Institute
for Information Security & Privacy (IISP).
• University of Washington, Seattle campus — offers a Bachelor’s degree
(BS) with a specialisation in Information Assurance and Cybersecurity
(IAC) with professors from various university campuses. The UW also
offers an online certificate in cybersecurity, directed to professionals and
technicians already in the field of work. The research is mainly carried
out at the Security and Privacy Research Lab, which is part of the School
of Computer Science and Engineering. Therefore, the research is mainly
focused on the more traditional aspects of cybersecurity. Multidisci-
plinary research is carried out as part of the Cybersecurity Initiative34 at
the l’International Policy Institute (IPI).
What emerges from an analysis of research and didactic initiatives is that, in
many cases, in addition to traditional research themes, there are innovative and
interesting multidisciplinary initiatives. The education sector is also very active,
with specialist courses within the area of Computer Science and Computer En-
gineering, and Master’s programmes dedicated to cybersecurity and other ini-
tiatives aimed at professionals already working in the field. It should be noted
that in US there is a strong demand for students with skills in cybersecurity and
companies are therefore very active in supporting educational initiatives at uni-
versities.
In addition to universities, other research and development activities are
carried out by numerous ICT companies (from IBM to Google to Facebook). In
addition to these, there are companies specialised in cybersecurity (including
the well-known Symantec and RSA) and other organisations and laboratories,
such as the MITRE Corporation, a non-profit organisation that operates feder-
ally funded research and development centres, and MIT Lincoln Lab, founded
in 1951 for activities related to national defence.
34https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/
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8.7.2 Financing
There are numerous funding programmes to support cybersecurity research.
The main programme is the NSF’s SaTC (Security and Trustworthy Cyberspace)
programme, whose research themes are alined with the federal government’s
priorities. The programme, which for 2018 has a total funding of USD 68 mil-
lion, in addition to basic research projects, also funds projects aimed at teaching
cybersecurity. In addition to the SaTC programme, cybersecurity issues are also
featured in a number of other NSF programmes, such as the CPS (Cyberphysical
Systems) programme and the CICI (Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyber infras-
tructure) programme. In addition to the NSF, several government departments
(the DHS, the DoD, the DoE, and the DoJ in particular) have programmes to
support academic research and joint industry-university research projects.
Added to this are the numerous research programmes funded by the
DARPA, which have covered various topics related to cybersecurity, including
formal models for the cybersecurity of military vehicles, and techniques for pro-
tection against advanced persistent threats. For example, the Brandeis pro-
gramme (financed by the DARPA) has recently funded projects dealing with
various aspects of privacy, from the development of efficient encryption tech-
niques in order to operate on encrypted data to the development of specific
metrics for privacy. In addition to these sources of financing, there is also fund-
ing from companies, in particular companies involved in applications for the
US government and in the aerospace sector.
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CHAPTER
9
Conclusions
The digitisation of our life brings both opportunities and threats. We must be
ready to seize the infinite opportunities for development and manage the com-
plexity that this transformation introduces. If not properly managed, complex-
ity will become a difficult threat to contain, with significant consequences for
the independence and development of Italy. For this reason, the security of the
national cyberspace is a strategic goal to pursue over time.
The spatio-temporal collapse generated by cyberspace, and practically
guaranteed anonymity, change the scale factor and the lower operational costs
that have always existed, such as propaganda, espionage, and theft. In the past
these were highly risky, lengthy, and difficult to manage. Fake news represents,
for example, the evolution of disinformation and propaganda (soft power and
information) aimed at destabilising and confusing the citizens of a country.
Ransomware campaigns, such as wannacry and notpetya, phishing and fake
news are the tip of an iceberg that includes all the threats brought by digital
transformation. The submerged part of the iceberg is characterised by thou-
sands of daily targeted or broad spectrum attack campaigns carried out by
sovereign states, cyber-criminals and political activists, aimed at critical na-
tional infrastructures, companies, government infrastructures, and citizens in
order to steal data, monitor behaviours, monitor operations, control operations,
and cheat.
As we have seen in the previous chapters, a national policy must be multi-
dimensional and operate in different directions, with a well-defined core, cen-
tred on digital technology and information security. It must take into account
that Italy, like as many other European countries, does not produce a consid-
erable quantity of hardware (usually it is of Chinese or US origin), software is
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very often imported, and industrial control systems are, for the most part, from
Germany.
A proper national cybersecurity policy must manage the threats from digital trans-
formation and keep it within an acceptable risk level over time. Combining Italy’s
economic competitiveness at the international level with national security and in-
terests is the real challenge when setting up a national cyber policy.
Recent recent attacks Meltdown and Spectre (considered in section 4.1) have
shown that there are no secure parts in a processing system and that there is no
silver bullet that can solve all problems. We need to find articulated solutions to
develop secure computations through a distributed system that is intrinsically
insecure and, for example, contains our sensitive information. This will be the
main technical challenge of the future.
An appropriate policy should favour the creation of a set of infrastructures
enabling national cybersecurity (such as those described in chapter 2) for the
public, the private and the public-private partnerships. This development must
be seen in the context of a national strategy to coordinate the action of verti-
cal competence centres, and then connect similar regional competence centres
in a network. Public and private organisations should deploy, either alone or
through partnerships, the actions and the technologies described respectively
in the chapters 3, 4 e 6. Finally, organisations should protect the technolo-
gies that are driving, or will drive, the digital transformation on which they rely
(chapter 5). The national cybersecurity policy should be supported by adequate
public funding, as everything we have described directly concerns national se-
curity. However, private organisations will also have to play their part, by devot-
ing adequate resources to strengthening their defences, as this will benefit the
maintenance of their reputation and their ability to continue to produce goods
and/or provide services.
An appropriate cybersecurity policy must unite and coordinate governmental de-
partments, industry and research centres to build a country resilient to the new at-
tacks that can directly impact our values and democracy, as well as Italy’s prosperity.
It is a continuous process, based not only on technology, but also on digital aware-
ness, education, and culture.
In conclusion, in the rest of this chapter we make some recommendations
which, if followed, will allow us to respond adequately to the challenge of digital
transformation. The recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive, but
touch upon points that we consider essential for a correct implementation of a
cybersecurity policy at a national level. A policy that, by nature, must necessar-
ily be dynamic and constantly evolving considering technological, regulatory,
social, and geopolitical changes.
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9.1 Implementation of the Strategic Plan
The speed with which attacks unfold requires strong coordination between
threat detection and response and therefore a full implementation of the Na-
tional Strategic Cyber Security Plan. The DPCM Gentiloni (see section 1.3.2) can
claim the merits of both having reduced the chain of command and of clarify-
ing roles and responsibilities. There is, however, a need to ensure the rapid es-
tablishment of the new structures indicated by the DPCM itself (the Comando
Interforze per le Operazioni Cibernetiche and the Centro di Valutazione e Certifi-
cazione Nazionale), the strengthening of those that already exist (the Nucleo Si-
curezza Cibernetica and the CNAIPIC), and the unification and strengthening of
the CERT-Nzionale and the CERT-PA to achieve the National CSIRT as required
by the European NIS Directive (see section 1.2.1).
We also hope to see a change of pace in the realisation of a Foundation
which, having as its sole mission the interest of the public good and national
security, can support important actions in the private and public sectors, such
as those already reported in the DPCM: a Centre of Research and Development in
Cybersecurity (see section 2.3) and a Laboratory of Encryption see section. 4.2).
Other nations have developed similar organisations, in forms appropriate to
their own regulations. In the United States, for example, the Federally Funded
Research and Development Centres, such as the MITRE1, are heading in this di-
rection. Although these centres are private organisations, they have no com-
mercial purpose and assist the federal government in scientific analysis and
research, in technological scouting, and in system engineering. In addition,
in Italy, the Foundation could carry out other important actions for training,
awareness-raising and technology transfer, through
• the creation of an Cybersecurity Academy that, along the lines of the music
conservatory model, could track over time the growth of talent discovered
through programs such as the CyberChallenge. IT ;
• the provision of an ethical venture capital fund, envisaged by the DPCM
Gentiloni, for the creation and strengthening of start-ups that develop
technology of national interest (see section 9.6). The fund would play a
key role in the activation of a cyber ecosystem between universities and
business and would allow the many prototypes, proof of concepts and in-
novative algorithms developed by Italian researchers (and often unfortu-
nately left in a drawer) to be transformed into business opportunities [9].
1http://www.mitre.org
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Following the example of other European countries (see chapter 8), it is important to
identify and finance research centres of excellence, distributed throughout the coun-
try, whose star point is the National Centre for Research and Development in Cyber-
security. These centres should focus on basic technologies essential for cybersecurity
(machine learning, data analytics, operating systems, compilers, software engineer-
ing, networks and distributed systems, hardware architectures, etc.) and on other
subjects relevant to cybersecurity, such as law, economics, psychology, and sociology.
Finally, certification systems for hardware/software/firmware must be de-
veloped at the national level, in a context of coexistence and integration with
the actions being carried out at the European level. Introducing affordable well-
designed certified systems within sectors such as our critical infrastructure can
provide greater guarantees of proper functioning and, at the same time, con-
crete bases for the threat anticipation actions and the risk analysis systems de-
scribed in chapter 3.
9.2 National digital politics
Strategies for cyber security should be considered an integral part of the na-
tional digital policy; involving the government as a whole, they should all come
under the direct political responsibility of the Prime Minister.
We hope that the Prime Minister will initially be able to set up a group of
advisers, as is often the case in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, able interpret
digital transformation in the various fields: economic, legal, social, technolog-
ical, and industrial. This group should be formed of highly qualified scientists,
high level business people, and governmental figures, creating a Committee of
Experts. The Committee should study the impact of specific disruptive tech-
nologies on the Italian system, such as the IoT, artificial intelligence, pervasive
robotics, cryptocurrencies, etc., and define national strategic plans within the
framework of these transformations. It is also important for the Committee to
ensure that specific measures taken by the government in each sector are alined
with the possible changes required by digital transformation, in order to prevent
the promulgation of rules that are outdated from the outset or are destined to
become outdated shortly.
At an operational level, it would be desirable for the Prime Minister to set
up a new unit dedicated to digital policy, with clear competences and effective
powers on services, production, and the public administration. The new unit
must be organised in such a way that it does not represent, as has unfortunately
often happened in Italy, an additional bureaucratic level aimed at verifying pro-
cedural requirements in legalistic-judicial terms. On the contrary, it must be
able to plan and guide strategic programmes that enable a continuous and con-
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trolled transformation of Italy over time, in order to keep it effectively compet-
itive at an international level. Such a unit would, among other things, be in
line with what has already happened in other industrialised countries (not only
the leading powers, but also the United Kingdom, Germany and France, not to
mention smaller countries such as Israel and Estonia), where digitisation has
been a significant factor in the economic growth2. In this perspective, such unit
should also pursue the fundamental objective of setting the foundations for the
creation of a national cyber ecosystem [9].
9.3 Security as a competitive factor
Many studies by major institutions and third parties, such as the national cen-
tral banks [16], have shown that security in cybernetic domain can no longer be
considered a certain cost in the face of an uncertain damage. The exponential
increase in attacks, which will become increasingly smart and complex, will be
a constant in the near future. Organisations that do not take appropriate coun-
termeasures by developing a solid internal culture of security are destined to
become inevitable targets of fatal attacks that will turn damage from uncertain
to uncertain. An organisation that is hit will suffer, in addition to the economic
damage due to the subtraction of data, reputational damage that could become
lethal to its very survival.
Funding research and the industry in this area wisely, but appropriately and within a
strategic programme, is a priority. Achieving the highest possible degree of indepen-
dence in preventing and managing risks related to data, transactions, and critical
infrastructures has to be an important objective.
The above considerations on private and public organisations also apply
perfectly to the concept of state organisation. The implementation of a multi-
dimensional national programme for the security of Italy is undoubtedly a nec-
essary condition to ensure economic prosperity and, considering the growing
integration within the cyberspace of cyber-physical systems, will also ensure the
physical security of its inhabitants.
Although security naturally has a financial cost, it should be considered a
competitive factor for companies and, at the national level, a fundamental pre-
condition to guarantee the competitiveness of Italy’s entire production system.
2http://www.tau.ac.il/~liort/Cybersecurity%20in%20Israel.html
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9.4 Reducing professional migration
Professional profiles in the field of security are sought after around the world.
In Italy, we often find ourselves competing with companies that, across borders,
offer far better wages. The number of professional profiles related to cybersecu-
rity that have graduated from our universities is still too low, which is also due to
the low number of professors in this specific area available in Italy. This is one
of the reasons that the activation of new Bachelor’s and Master’s degree courses
in many Italian universities is hindered; there is only just a handful of university
degrees currently offered in the field.
The combination of the brain drain of professionals, who leave Italy to take
advantage of better salary opportunities, and the training of a limited number of
professionals able to meet the existing needs, makes it necessary and urgent to
develop brain retention strategies, so that working in Italy on IT security issues
is made more attractive. Israel, for example, managed to halt the drain through
the creation of an industrial-university-government ecosystem based on tech-
nology parks and incentive policies for spin-offs, thus successfully transforming
an endemic weakness into a growth factor.
In addition to these programmes, we must pave the way for our best brains
in science and entrepreneurship in the field of security to return to Italy. The
mobility of the labour market in this sector is an endemic problem that affects
other countries as well as Italy. Some large countries are working both on the
formation of the future workforce and on strategies for retaining their profes-
sionals within the country confines. Among the strategies implemented there
are student loans, which have already been pursued in France and Germany,
which could also be considered in our country, to keep new graduates in our
government structures, in the public service, and in the national industrial sys-
tem.
Unless adequate policies are implemented, the situation will significantly
deteriorate in the coming years. In this respect, it should be noted that countries
such as Germany are implementing very aggressive policies to attract not only
scientists and entrepreneurs, but also simple foreign students to degree courses
within their universities.
9.5 Special plan for Universities
The implementation of the projects and actions proposed in the previous
chapters requires an extensive workforce (technicians, engineers, experts, re-
searchers) all over the national territory. In order to achieve this objective, we
need a special plan for the recruitment of university researchers and professors
in this field.
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We have seen in chapter 8 and in section 9.4 that several countries are tak-
ing steps to achieve, as soon as possible, a workforce level that meets their needs
in the cybersecurity sector. All this, of course, depends on having top-level re-
searchers and trainers in the sector. We hope that, as has happened in the past
for other areas (e.g. chemistry in the 1960s), a wide-ranging plan (piano straor-
dinario) is launched in Italy for the recruitment of researchers and university
professors dealing with cybersecurity and, in general, digital transformation in
all its components: legal, economic and, above all, technological. Only signifi-
cant special actions can accelerate the creation of the necessary workforce.
Currently, the number of professors and researchers in cybersecurity is so
small and scattered throughout the country that universities and research insti-
tutions cannot independently activate research or teaching programmes. The
reason is that security has always been considered as a secondary element, or
at most a supporting element, in the development of educational experiences
in the computer science and information engineering sectors. However, at this
moment in time, the creation of new degree courses in Italy is an essential ele-
ment towards increasing the workforce. But this can only be done with an ade-
quate number of expert professors in this field at the individual universities.
Apart from the component related to the development of research projects,
investing in cybersecurity training provides a unique response to multiple prob-
lems of the country system and is indispensable in the context of the progressive
digitisation promoted by the Enterprise 4.0 plan. Training the new generations
will trigger a virtuous process in which the managers and technicians of the fu-
ture will have the skills, cultural background, and operational capabilities nec-
essary to face the technological and scientific challenges that will change our
lives in the coming decades. They will thus be able to implement the initia-
tives enabling us to adapt to the continuous changes and risks we will face in
the future. It should be noted that similar considerations can be found in the
document of the U.S. Commission established to improve cybersecurity in the
U.S.3.
9.6 National technology
When defining the national cyberspace, it is also necessary to address the prob-
lem of the architectures of the systems used. The abstract concept of the archi-
tecture of a complex processing system has been gradually expanded and now
includes hardware, software, algorithms, communication infrastructures, plat-
forms, data, processes, methodologies, contracts, human factors, etc.
3https://www.dropbox.com/s/lgw7bq05bstk2m7/cybersecurity-
commission-report-final-post.pdf?dl=0
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Italy undoubtedly has interesting players, although not giants, in software
integration, communication infrastructures and specific niche markets that can
be useful for the development of pieces of a national architecture. There are ar-
eas such as hardware that we have long since abandoned. Given the trends in
the top-of-the-range semiconductor market, with investments in the order of
a few billion euros to set up a production line for latest-generation integrated
circuits, building a national production able to compete with the over-the-top is
unfeasible. On the other hand, it might certainly be reasonable to think of “na-
tional” productions for niche applications and/or sectors considered strategic
for national security, such as the vulnerability-tolerant architectures presented
in section 4.1.
Since Italy lacks industrial leaders in various digital transformation sectors,
we must find a national approach to integrating foreign technology with na-
tional technology within a domestic architecture over which we must have com-
plete control. A national strategy should be defined in order to decide, for each
category (or subcategory) of components and technologies, which are to be de-
veloped at national level and which ones can be sourced from the foreign mar-
ket. We should define clear limits for the latter and, for strategic technologies,
we should design tools for enabling systematic checks on software and hard-
ware and, above all, for allowing full and unconditional control over such tech-
nologies, if necessary. In this respect, the creation and development of a Na-
tional Assessment and Certification Centre is of primary importance.
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Projects and Actions 
to better defend our country 
from cyber attacks
At the end of 2015, the CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory 
produced a White Book to describe the main cybersecurity 
challenges to be faced by Italy over the following five years. The 
book focused mainly on the risks of cyber attacks and outlined 
some recommendations, including organisational ones.
 
This volume has been created as a continuation of the 
previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas 
and actions that the Italian national research community 
considers essential.
 
The book touches upon many aspects of cybersecurity, 
ranging from the definition of the infrastructures and centres 
needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and 
technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the 
identification of the main technologies to be defended to the 
proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness 
raising, and risk management.
 
Reading the volume does not require any particular technical 
skills; the text is accessible to anybody who knows how to use 
a computer or surf the internet.
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